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We derive the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics from epistemic principles. A key assumption is
that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong
predictions. An epistemic formalism is developed, where concepts like individual and collective knowledge are
used, and knowledge may be actual or potential. The physical state S corresponds to the collective potential
knowledge. The state S is a subset of a state space S = {Z}, such that S always contains several elements
Z, which correspond to unattainable states of complete potential knowledge of the world. The evolution of S
cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble
in classical phase space. The evolution of S is described in terms of sequential time n ∈ N, which is updated
according to n→ n+ 1 each time potential knowledge changes. In certain experimental contexts C, there is
knowledge at the start of the experiment at time n that a given series of properties P,P′, . . . will be observed
within a given time frame, meaning that a series of values p, p′, . . . of these properties will become known. At
time n, it is just known that these values belong to predefined, finite sets {p},{p′}, . . .. In such a context C, it is
possible to define a complex Hilbert spaceHC on top of S , in which the elements are contextual state vectors
S¯C. Born’s rule to calculate the probabilities to find the values p, p′, . . . is derived as the only generally applicable
such rule. Also, we can associate a self-adjoint operator P¯ with eigenvalues {p} to each property P observed
within C. These operators obey [P¯, P¯′] = 0 if and only if the precise values of P and P′ are simultaneoulsy
knowable. The existence of properties whose precise values are not simulataneously knowable follows from
the hypothesis that collective potential knowledge is always incomplete, corresponding to the abovementioned
statement that S always contains several elements Z.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The meaning of quantum mechanics (QM) has been sub-
ject to debate since the birth of the theory almost a hundred
years ago. A wide spectrum of interpretations have been pro-
posed, with radically different perspectives [1]. Some theo-
rists think that QM is incomplete or approximate. The sug-
gested changes may involve the introduction of hidden vari-
ables [2, 3], mechanisms for objective state reduction [4, 5], or
other nonlinearities in the evolution [6]. Another view is that
there is redundancy in the standard postulates of QM [7]; the
most radical example is the ’many-worlds’ interpretation of
Everett and DeWitt [8, 9], according to which linear evolution
of superposed states is all there is. Zurek tries to derive some
postulates from the others [10, 11]. In recent years, several
attempts have been made to derive the Hilbert space formal-
ism of QM from other principles, which are easier to interpret
physically [12–14]. One approach is to use as a foundation
the concept of information [15–17].
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2Already Bohr, Heisenberg and colleagues focused on in-
formation, or rather knowledge. The Copenhagen interpre-
tation stresses that the quantum state encapsulates what can
be known about a system, and that it is meaningless to ask
for anything else. This epistemic perspective has gained re-
newed interest. Caves, Fuchs and Schack have introduced an
interpretation of QM in which the collapse of the wave func-
tion is an update of subjective, bayesian probabilities. Fuchs
and Schack have given the name Qbism to this approach [18].
In Anton Zeilinger’s eyes ”the reduction of the wave packet
is just a reflection of the fact that the representation of our
information has to change whenever the information itself
changes” [19].
Knowledge has an inevitable subjective side to it: someone
has knowledge about something. The association of quantum
mechanical states with states of knowledge therefore suggests
that knowing subjects play a fundamental role in the modern
scientific world view. Nevertheless, the common drive be-
hind many attempts to understand or alter QM has been to
explain away or suppress this feature. The aim in this paper
is to confront the subjective aspect of knowledge face to face,
turn such an epistemology into symbolic form, and show that
the formalism that emerges provides a simple and coherent
way to understand QM.
To do so, we need to be more clear about the structure of
the subjective aspect of the world than is normally the case in
epistemic interpretations of QM. For example, we distinguish
between actual and potential knowledge, and between indi-
vidual and collective knowledge. We also need to formulate
epistemic principles that constrain the form of physical law.
The present approach can be seen as an attempt to walk
as far as possible in the direction pointed out by the fathers
of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. In
a certain sense, though, the present approach is opposite to
theirs. They wanted to understand a given physical formalism,
and arrived at an epistemic interpretation. Here we start with
a set of epistemic assumptions and use them to motivate the
physical formalism. The advantage of this reverse approach is
that the conceptually well-defined starting point enables a bet-
ter understanding of the components of the formalism, and its
domain of validity. Another advantage is that it makes it pos-
sible to understand better not only the meaning of quantum
mechanics, but also some other physical concepts and princi-
ples, such as Pauli’s exclusion principle, the gauge principle
and entropy [20].
In the present paper, the more limited aim is to account
for the Hilbert space formalism of QM as the only gener-
ally valid algebraic representation of well-defined experimen-
tal contexts. This means that the Hilbert space is not seen as
the fundamental state space, but as a contextual state space
that can be defined in certain states of knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the basic
approach is presented in qualitative terms. The fundamental
epistemic state space is introduced in Section III. In Section
IV we formulate some epistemic rules that govern the game
played on this stage. Physical law is expressed in terms of
a general evolution operator that is introduced in Section V.
Empirically, physical law is determined in well-defined exper-
imental contexts. In Section VI we try to define such contexts
formally in the language introduced in the previous sections.
This definition makes it possible to define the probability of
different outcomes of an experiment, as described in Section
VII. Equipped with these concepts and definitions we try to
argue in Section VIII that QM is the only generally valid al-
gebraic representation of experimental contexts that conforms
with the epistemic rules of the game formulated in Section IV.
In Section IX we put the present approach into perspective and
compare it to other approaches currently discussed within the
field of quantum foundations.
II. THE BASIC PICTURE
The main idea at the heart of this paper is that the structure
of knowledge and the structure of the world reflect each other.
A thorough analysis of what we can know about the world
and what we can’t teaches us a lot about the world itself. This
view is similar to that maintained by Kant [21].
To arrive at a level of discussion where we can use epis-
temic principles to derive physics, we first have to express
some basic philosophical assumptions. Each of these assmp-
tions can be discussed and debated at great length, but here
we merely state them and discuss briefly what we mean by
them. The purpose is not to convince the reader that the as-
sumptions are correct or essential for physics, but to make it
clear what perspective we choose. We refer the reader to the
more detailed, but preliminary discussion in Ref. [20].
It is assumed that the observer and the observed are equally
fundamental aspects of the world, being distinct but insepara-
ble. One of them cannot be reduced to the other, explained in
terms of the other, or even be properly imagined in isolation
from the other. We call this view intertwined dualism, and it
is expressed schematically in Fig. 1.
The role of subjective experiences is often discussed in
terms of qualia - the redness of red. Such qualia are put in
opposition to the scientific description in which light of a cer-
tain frequency hits the retina and gives rise to the experience
of redness [22]. The question how qualia may arise is often
called the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ [23]. From the
present perspective, this question is misguided. It assumes
that qualia arise from an underlying physical world and is
therefore secondary. In the present description, the physical
world and qualia always arise together, at the same footing.
Just as it is generally accepted that physics cannot explain
why there is something rather than nothing, it has to be ac-
cepted that physics cannot explain why there are subjective
experiences rather than no such experiences. Existence and
experience go hand in hand.
We may even say that everything is qualia. The idea of
the light wave with a certain frequency that gives rise to the
perception of redness is a mental image. It is therefore a kind
of qualia itself. What transcends the subjective perceptions
is therefore not an objective world of ‘things’, but objective
physical laws that govern the relations between the qualia and
their evolution. This does not mean that the world view at
the basis of the present study is solipsistic. We assume that
3FIG. 1: Schematic illustration of the world view assumed in this
study. There is nothing objective independent of the subjective, and
the subjective is completely embedded in the objective. Since the
body (including the brain) is regarded as a part of the world, fantasies
and illusions are also seen as awareness of the world. However, the
outside world emerges from a subset of awareness, just as awareness
emerges from a subset of the world.
there are other subjects whose perceptions transcend our own
perceptions. There are other aware beings ‘out there’.
To be able to identify objective physical laws, and even to
imagine and speak about them properly, we have to be able
to interpret and generalize our subjective perceptions. We
have to assume a primary distinction between proper and im-
proper interpretations of perceptions (Fig. 2). This distinction
transcends the perceptions themselves. We may say that ‘the
truth is out there’. Properly interpreted perceptions are called
knowledge, and physical law is expressed in terms of states of
knowledge and the changes they undergo.
The interpretational ability to distinguish between percep-
tions that originate in the body and in the outside world is
necessary in order to formulate the world view expressed in
Fig. 1. An example is the ability of a sane person to distin-
guish between reality and fantasies, where the latter originate
in the brain, which is part of the body. This ability makes it
possible to talk about a body of a subject being a proper subset
of the world.
It should be noted that the interpretational ability to distin-
guish the body from the outside world does not pressuppose a
transcendent world, independent from subjective perceptions,
which consists of objects just like the ones we subjectively
perceive. Following Kant, the ‘thing in itself’ must exist, how-
ever, but its nature is beyond our knowledge; it cannot be in-
tuited or cognized. Therefore it is not a concern of physics.
Metaphorically speaking, it is the background on which the
picture is drawn that expresses intertwined dualism in Fig. 1.
It is not accessible via the forms of perception that we use to
do physics, reaching out to the objective aspect of the world
via the arrow pointing upwards, and to understand ourselves,
via the arrow pointing downwards. We are stuck in this circle.
FIG. 2: Knowledge is direct experience in combination with at least
one of the three components of interpretation. There must be no
improper such component involved. The component of interpretation
called ‘context’ may, for instance, be the distinction between external
and internal experiences, or between present and past experiences.
Nevertheless, the assumed interpretational ability to distin-
guish the body from the outside world makes it possible to
assume what we call detailed materialism. According to this
assumption, different states of subjective awareness always
correspond to different states of perceivable objects within
the body, and vice versa. This means that all perceptions are
rooted in processes among the perceivable objects that make
up the body.
The qualification detailed when speaking about material-
ism refers to the assumption that each detail of a subjec-
tive perception corresponds to a detail of a process going on
among the objects in the body. We may imagine a weaker
form of materialism, in which the existence of an aware sub-
ject indeed requires a body consisting of objects, but in which
some perceptions of this subject are not rooted in the body,
but have a purely spiritual origin, so to say.
In the above discussion the term object has been essential.
We should define what we mean by that term. An object is
simply an element of perception. It is a basic quality of per-
ceptions that they can be subjectively divided into a finite set
of objects. The division is not necessarily spatial; we may
hear a sound that we are able to divide into two tones with
different pitch.
Apart from the ability to distinguish between objects of in-
ternal and external origin, we have to assume the interpreta-
tional ability to distinguish objects belonging to the present
from those belonging to the past. We have to be able to tell
things happening here and now from memories. This is nec-
essary to give meaning to the concepts of time and change.
The basic notion of time in the present picture is that of
sequential time n. The knowledge of a subject at time n
4consists of the knowledge belonging to the present time n,
as well as the knowledge referring to the set of past times
{n− 1,n− 2, . . .}. Sequential time is updated according to
n→ n+1 each time knowledge changes, each time a perceiv-
able event occurs.
All properly interpreted objects are assumed to obey the
same laws of physics, so that their states are updated in the
same way as n→ n+1. This goes for the objects in the bod-
ies of aware subjects as well. This means the present world
view cannot be called creationistic in the usual sense of the
word. God-made human beings cannot appear from nowhere,
since the history of the objects in our bodies then cannot be
properly accounted for by means of physical law. Instead, the
present world view is perfectly compatible with Darwinism.
However, the first stages of evolution have to be philosophi-
cally re-interpreted. The world was created when the first dim
awareness appeared in some primitive creature. Everything
that happened before that moment must be considered to be
an abstract mathematical extrapolation backwards in time us-
ing the laws of physics. This perspective also puts cosmology
in an unconventional light, since the Big Bang must be seen as
nothing more than such an extrapolation taken to its extreme.
At that stage, the extrapolated state of the world was not com-
patible with bodies of aware subjects that formed knowledge
about what was going on. Therefore there was no actual phys-
ical world at all, according to the assumption of intertwined
dualism (Fig. 1).
To be able to use knowledge as a basis of a well-defined
physical world view, the knowledge at any given time must
be precisely defined. However, our aware knowledge is quite
fuzzy. Our attention shifts, we may have vague ideas, our in-
terpretations of what we perceive may be correct or erroneous,
or something in between. Therefore we have to distinguish be-
tween the state of aware or actual knowledge at time n, which
may be fuzzy, and the state of potential knowledge, which is
assumed to be well-defined. The potential knowledge at time
n corresponds to all knowledge that may in principle be de-
duced from all subjective experiences at time n. It includes,
for example, experiences at time n that we do not become fully
aware of until later.
Another question that arises when we try to identify the
physical state with a state of knowledge is ‘whose knowl-
edge?’. The only way to avoid arbitrariness in the defini-
tion of such a physical state is to answer ‘everyone’s!’. We
have to take the union of the potential knowledge of all per-
ceiving subjects. To define the notion of collective poten-
tial knowledge of all these subjects we do not need to define
exactly what organisms are aware and which of these have
knowledge-forming interpretational abilities. All we need to
assume at the conceptual level is that there are several sub-
jects with potential knowledge. The nature of the associated
body necessary to uphold the assumed detailed materialism is
irrelevant.
To be able to say that the individual states of knowledge
overlap we must assume that different subjects may know
about the same object (Fig. 3). This possibility can be taken
as a definition of the notion that these subjects live in the same
world. Just as we have assumed the possibility that there are
FIG. 3: a) Potential knowledge PK is the union of the individual po-
tential knowledge PKk of subjects k. Individual potential knowledge
may overlap, which means knowledge of at least one common iden-
tifiable object Ol . b) The fact that subject k knows about an object Ol
defines a relation rkl between them. That one subject knows two ob-
jects defines a relation rkll′ between the objects. If two subjects know
the same object, a relation rkk
′
l between the subjects is defined.
several subjects living in one world, it is of course possible
that there are several objects in this world. Subjective experi-
ences are differentiated. These seemingly trivial relations are
expressed in Fig. 3 and constitute a more detailed version of
the symmetry between the subjective and objective aspects of
the world expressed in Fig. 1.
It may be noted that the assumption of the existence of sev-
eral subjects is not merely wishful thinking to avoid the lone-
liness in a solipsistic world. It is actually hinted at in physical
law. To be able to derive the Lorentz transformation we have
to assume that there are two different observers or subjects in
uniform motion in relation to each other who are able to ob-
serve the same events. An event is always associated with an
object, so that the derivation presupposes a relation rkk
′
l be-
tween two subjects k and k′ according to Fig. 3. The fact that
physical law is invariant under Lorentz transformations there-
fore indicates that the world is constructed in order to contain
several subjects whose perspectives on the world are equally
valid. This lack of hierarchy among subjects reflects the lack
of hierarchy among objects, in the sense that they are all as-
sumed to adhere to the same physical laws. This is another
expression of the symmetry between the subjective and the
objective aspect of the world.
A consequence of the ideas expressed above is that both
individual and collective potential knowledge are fundamen-
tally incomplete. This conclusion is central to the attempt in
this paper to use an epistemic framework to motivate quantum
mechanics.
We can arrive at the conclusion in the following way. As-
sume that the potential knowledge about all objects in the
world is complete. According to the assumption of detailed
materialism, this knowledge has to be a function of the phys-
ical state of the body, which in turn is in one-to-one cor-
respondence to the assumed perfectly known objects of the
body. Therefore, the complete potential knowledge becomes
5FIG. 4: Relation of the knowledge of the world in terms of perceived
objects, and the physical state of the world. The tilted arrows indi-
cate the one-to-one correspondence between these. The knowledge
of the world is encoded in the physical state of the body according
to detailed materialism, so that there is also a vertical correspondece.
This correspondence is not object-to-object, since one object of per-
ception usually corresponds to many objects in the body. The vision
of a black dot involves the eye, the visual nerve and the visual cor-
tex. The unmatched physical objects in the top row illustrates our
incomplete knowledge of the body and of the world.
a proper subset of itself (Fig. 4). This can be acounted for
if the structure of knowledge is fractal, if it lacks foundation.
But if we further assume that the body cannot be divided into
more than a finite number of objects that can be described by
a finite number of attributes, then we arrive at a contradiction.
In that case individual potential knowledge is always incom-
plete.
If we further assume that there are objects in the world that
are not part of the body of any aware subject, then the same
goes for collective potential knowledge. The last assumption
corresponds to an assumption that there is no panpsychism.
Even if there is always something outside potential knowl-
edge, the contents of this something may change from time to
time. That is to say, the currently unknowable may become
part of potential knowledge at a later time. The boundary of
this currently unknowable may be identified with the bound-
ary of the properly interpreted world (Fig. 5).
The argument for the incompletness of knowledge given
above rests upon the assumption that knowledge is always
encoded in bodies of subjects, which together form a proper
subset of all the objects in the world. The popular argument
for Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle rests on the same as-
sumption. In that case we imagine a spatially limited observer
reaching out to the objects surrounding her. In so doing she
inevitably disturbs them and lose some other knowledge about
them. This can be seen as the dynamic version of the static ar-
gument given here, where we argue that complete knowledge
cannot be encoded in a proper subset of itself.
The picture sketched above means that we abandon the tra-
ditional materialistic world view in which the physical objects
are primary and the subjective perceptions of these objects are
secondary or emergent. The price to pay for this shift of per-
spective is that we have to identify and give primary scientific
weight to a set of interpretational abilities, or forms of percep-
tion. This fact seemingly makes the conceptual foundations of
physics more complex, but this is not necessarily a bad thing,
FIG. 5: An onion of knowledge. The actual or current knowledge
corresponds to the properly interpreted current state of awareness.
The potential knowledge represents those things that are knowable
in principle at a given moment. It is part of potential knowledge that
there is something currently unknowable. The solid boundary of the
outermost layer of knowability corresponds to boundary of the world.
There is such a boundary since the existence of proper and improper
interpretation of awareness is assumed (Fig. 2). In other words, not
everything that is conceivable is part of the world.
since these forms of perception make it posssible to give form
to physical law, as we will see below. They are closely re-
lated to those statements that Kant called synthetic a priori,
statements which are seen to be true without empirical ob-
servations, but which are nevertheless not logical necessities
[21]. These forms of perception rather provide the necessary
framework that makes it possible to give meaning to empiri-
cal observations. They therefore transcend these observations.
The main idea at the heart of this study can be reformulated
as the idea that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
these forms of perceptions and the form of physical law.
III. KNOWLEDGE SPACE AND STATE SPACE
Knowledge is assumed to consist of knowledge about a set
of objects and their attributes. An attribute can be defined as
a set of qualities that can be associated with each other and
ordered. One quality in such a set can be called an attribute
value. Red, green and blue are three different such qualities
or attribute values that can be ordered into a spectrum that
defines the attribute colour. Attributes may be internal or re-
lational. An internal attribute, such as colour, refers to the
object itself, wheras a relational attribute, such as distance or
angle, relates two or more objects.
An object may divide, meaning that potential knowledge
arises at some time n that it has two different values of the
same attribute, or that there is a relational attribute that refers
to the object itself. Using a magnifying glass, we can decide
that a grain of sand has internal spatial structure, so that we
can associate distances between its different parts. An object
that can divide may be called composite, whereas as an object
that cannot be divided may be called elementary. Clearly, it is
meaningless to associate a size to an elementary object.
6Any two objects can also merge, in a process that is the
reverse of division. We may say that the knowledge about an
object increases when it divides, and that the knowledge the
two objects decrease when they merge. The field of vision
becomes more blurred.
A. Minimal objects
If we assume that elementary objects are the basic building
blocks of the perceived world, then it contains a fixed number
of such objects since they cannot divide. Each perceived ob-
ject can then be divided a finite number of times into a given
set of such elementary objects. But we argued above that po-
tential knowledge is always incomplete. One thing we cannot
know exactly is how many elementary objects are contained
in each perceived object. We cannot verify or refute the hy-
pothesis that the number of the basic building blocks of nature
indeed stays fixed. In Section IV we introduce the principle of
explicit epistemic minimalism which says that the reliance on
any such hypothesis that cannot be verified or refuted gives
rise to wrong physical predictions, and should therefore be
discarded. Nevertheless, it is possible to introduce a weaker
form of elementarity that is epistemically acceptable.
This is the notion of minimal objects. Let M be a set of
objects defined exclusively by their internal attributes. Then
M is a minimal set of objects if and only if it fulfils the fol-
lowing conditions. 1) The number of objects in M is finite.
2) Division of any object in M gives rise to objects that are
elements inM themselves. 3) There is no proper subset ofM
that fulfils condition 2). We identify the elementary fermions
with such a minimal set of objects.
Using these minimal objects we can formulate an ‘axiom of
foundation’ for knowledge. It can always be expressed as the
knowledge of a number of perceived objects and their internal
and relation attributes. The knowledge of each of these ob-
jects can in turn always be expressed as the knowledge about
a finite, but unspecified, number of minimal objects of which
the object is composed, in the sense that we can in principle
arrive at these minimal objects after a finite number of divi-
sions of the perceived object. We note that the existence of a
bottom level of knowledge of this kind was used in the moti-
vation of the fundamental incompleteness of knowledge given
in the preceding section.
B. Quasiobjects
The minimal objects that we may use in a representation
of a state of knowledge need not be directly perceived them-
selves. Their existence and their attributes may be deduced
from directly perceived objects using physical law. For ex-
ample, in a photography of a bubble chamber, given knowl-
edge of the experimental setup, the visible traces can be de-
duced to be elementary fermions with specific energies and
charges which sometimes divide. Such deduced objects are
called quasiobjects. They need not be microscopic objects,
FIG. 6: The potential knowledge PK(n) is updated each time any of
the individual states of knowledge PKkmk are updated. For example,
PK(2) is the union of PK11 , PK
2
2 , and PK
3
1 . This state is updated to
PK(3) when PK11 → PK12 . If two individual updates have space-like
separation, they can sometimes be considered to occur simultane-
ously, as the updates PK12 → PK13 and PK22 → PK23 . Overlaps be-
tween individual states of potential knowledge typically occur (Fig.
3), but this is not shown here for clarity.
but may be everyday, large objects like the moon. We can de-
duce that the moon is there and calculate its orbit even if we do
not always see it, using our previous observations and physi-
cal law, including the fact that objects that can be considered
to consist of minimal objects do not suddenly disappear.
Even if quasiobjects are indispensable in order to formu-
late physical law in a simple and general way, it important to
note that from the strict epistemic perspective that we adopt
here, they do not add any new knowledge about the physical
state, which itself corresponds to the properly interpreted po-
tential perceptions at a given time. All we can know about the
quasiobjects is deduced from this potential knowledge. This
knowledge is primary and the quasiobjects are secondary ab-
stractions. This perspective is opposite to the conventional
scientific viewpoint from which the quasiobjects are seen as
primary - they are really out there - and the perceptions that
give rise to knowledge are secondary, capturing only a small
subset of the information stored in the state of all the quasiob-
jects.
C. Potential knowledge and knowledge space
After setting the stage, let us be more formal. Denote by
PKk the state of potential knowledge of subject k. When
k potentially perceives a change corresponding to an event
ek, her individual sequential time mk is updated according
to mk → mk + 1, and so is her potential knowledge, accord-
ing to PKkmk → PKkmk+1. Such an update means that PKk has
changed, so that we always have PKkmk+1 6= PKkmk . The col-
lective potential knowledge PK(n) is updated according to
PK(n) → PK(n+ 1) whenever any individual state PKk is
updated (Fig. 6). We get PK(n) 6= PK(n+ 1). This update
defines the update of sequential time according to n→ n+1.
We have chosen to encode the instants of sequential time as
7a discrete sequence of intergers. This is appropriate since a
subjectively perceived change that defines a temporal update
corresponds to a binary distinction between before and after.
Suppose that subject k may send a message µ to subject k′
telling k′ that ek has occurred, and k′ may receive this mes-
sage before or at the same time as she potentially perceives
the change corresponding to the event ek
′
that defines the up-
date of PKk
′
. Then the temporal ordering of the events ek
and ek
′
can be determined epistemically, and they cannot be
considered to occur simultaneously. The event defined by the
delivery of the message may be called ekµ , and the event de-
fined by the reception of the message may be called ek
′
µ . The
temporal ordering of the four events may be expressed as
n[ek]≤ n[ekµ ]< n[ek
′
µ ]≤ n[ek
′
]. (1)
The first and last temporal relation arise from the assumed in-
herent ability of any given subject k or k′ to order her percep-
tions temporally. We have n[ek] = n[ekµ ] if and only if e
k = ekµ ,
and n[ek
′
µ ] = n[e
k′ ] if and only if ekµ = e
k′ . The middle tem-
poral relation n[ekµ ] < n[e
k′
µ ] arises from the finite maximum
speed of messages defined by the speed of light, together with
the assumption that the bodies of two different subjects are
spatially separated.
If such an ordering of the events ek and ek
′
via a pair of mes-
senger events (ekµ ,e
k′
µ ) is not possible, then we may sometimes
say that ek and ek
′
occur simultaneously. If so, the updates
PKkmk → PKkmk+1 and PKk
′
mk′ → PKk
′
mk′+1
together defines the
update PK(n)→ PK(n+ 1). In conventional language, this
situation may occur if and only if the events ek and ek
′
have
space-like separation at sequential time n.
It is important to note that such a pair of events does
not necessarily occur simultaneously, in the sense described
above. In some situations it becomes self-contradictory to say
that they are simultaneous. Consider three events ek, ek
′
and
ek
′′
. Suppose that ek and ek
′
have space-like separation, as
well as ek and ek
′′
. In contrast, suppose that ek
′
and ek
′′
have
time-like separation. If we would say that ek and ek
′
are si-
multaneous, as well as ek and ek
′′
, then ek
′
and ek
′′
would also
be simultaneous. But they cannot be, because of Eq. [1].
Even though we cannot use the ability to send a message µ
according to the above discussion in order to decide in each
case whether a pair of events perceived by two subjects are
simultaneous or not, we assume that the question always has a
definite answer. This is necessary in order to construct a uni-
versal temporal ordering of all events, as defined by sequential
time n.
Even if PK(n)→PK(n+1)whenever PKkmk→PKkmk+1, the
converse is not true. We may have PK(n)→ PK(n+1) even
if PKkmk stays the same. Of course, this happens when the
change that defines n→ n+1 is perceived by another subject
k′. In this case we may write PKk(n) = PKk(n+ 1). Oth-
erwise PKk(n) 6= PKk(n+1). These considerations make the
expression PKk(n)well-defined. At each sequential time n we
may then express the collective potential knowledge PK(n) as
PK(n) =
⋃
k
PKk(n). (2)
The states of potential knowledge PK(n) and PKk(n) can be
seen as subsets of a knowledge space K , which corresponds
to the knowledge contained in a hypothetical state of com-
plete potential knowledge (Fig. 7). The relation K ⊂ K′ ⊂K
means that K′ contains the same knowledge as K, but also
more than that. The additional knowledge in K′ may consist
of more knowledge about the same objects as those that are
part of K, or knowledge about other objects. That K∩K′ 6=∅
means that the two states contain knowledge about the same
objects. Two knowledge states K ⊂ K and K′ ⊂ K never
contradict each other, even if K ∩K′ = 0. The non-overlap
corresponds to knowledge about different objects rather than
different or contradictory knowledge about the same objects.
To even speak about such contradictory knowledge we have
to be able to say that two objects that are part of K and K′, re-
spectively, are the same. This notion is only possible to define
according to Fig 3; it presupposes two subjects who make dif-
ferent interpretations of what they see at a given time. This
possibility is excluded by the assumed distinction between
proper and improper interpretations, which transends the in-
dividual perceptions, and thus are common to any pair of sub-
jects.
If K and K′ would correspond to two states of collective
knowledge for which K∩K′ = 0, it does not even make sense
to say that the states are contradictory. An object that is part of
K then cannot be associated with another object that is part of
K′. As discussed above, that notion requires two subjects that
observe the same object. Such a pair of different perspectives
on the same object are not available at the collective level.
Since we have concluded that knowledge is always incom-
plete, a set K ⊆K may correspond to a state of knowledge
only if K ⊂K . We should not refer explicitly to K since it
is not related to any physical state. The only thing we know
about K \PK(n) is that K \PK(n) 6= 0, and that it contains
things that we do not know anything about at time n.
Knowledge may be completed in different ways. If we see
a tree at a long distance, it may turn out to be an oak, a beech
or a chestnut tree on a closer look. The individual leaves may
turn out to be arranged in countless different ways. We let
K represent the union of all such completions KPK of the
potential knowledge PK at hand.
There is only one basic element of knowledge PK0, in con-
trast to the many knowledge completions. This element corre-
sponds to the rudimentary state of knowledge ‘There is some-
thing’, corresponding to the dim, undifferentiated first light of
awareness.
D. The physical state and state space
We now turn to the state space S , which is kind of an in-
verse toK (Fig. 7). The elements ofS are knowledge com-
pletionsKPK . Each such completion corresponds to an exact
8FIG. 7: The state space S has exact states Z as elements. Larger
states of knowledge PK are mapped to smaller physical states S and
vice versa. In particular, the actual or aware knowledge AK is con-
tained in the potential knowledge PK, whereas the corresponding
‘aware physical state’ AS contains the physical state S. Since knowl-
edge is always incomplete, S never shrinks to a single element Z.
state Z. The state space S is the set of all possible states of
complete knowledge
S = {Z}= {KPK0}. (3)
Just as we should not refer explicitly to the unphysical
knowledge completions, we should not refer explicitly to ex-
act states Z, but only to physical states S. The physical state
that corresponds to the state of potential knowledge PK is the
set of all knowledge completions consistent with PK, that is
S = {KPK}. (4)
We may say that S is the set of all exact states Z that cannot be
ruled out given the potential knowledge PK. The incomplete-
ness of knowledge implies that S always contains more than
one element Z. The inverse relation between K and S can
be expressed as
PK′ ⊂ PK⇔ S′ ⊃ S, (5)
where PK↔ S and PK′↔ S′. When knowledge shrinks, the
physical state expands, and vice versa. The actual or aware
knowledge AK is assumed to fulfil AK ⊆ PK, according to the
discussion in Section II. This means that the corresponding
‘aware physical state’ AS fulfils S ⊆ AS, according to Eq. [5]
(Fig. 7). In terms of the physical state, Eq. [2] is re-expressed
as
S(n) =
⋂
k
Sk(n). (6)
The requirement that the knowledge of different subjects can-
not contradict each other can be expressed as the fact that the
physical state S(n) as defined in Eq. [6] is always a non-empty
set, that is
⋂
k
Sk(n) 6=∅ (7)
FIG. 8: The boundary ∂PK of a state of potential knowledge PK is
precisely defined, but the boundary ∂S of a physical state S is not.
A precise definition would require a precise discrimination between
very similar exact states Z and Z′, which would require complete
knowledge.
for all n. In other words, there are exact states Z that conform
with the knowledge of all subjects k.
There is an asymmetry between the mirror images of
knowledge represented in knowledge spaceK and state space
S, respectively. The state of potential knowledge is supposed
to be well-defined in principle: either we potentially know
something or not. Therefore the boundary ∂PK of PK in K
must be considered precisely given. The same is not true for
the boundary ∂S of S (Fig. 8). Suppose that one exact state Z
cannot be ruled out given the potential knowledge PK, so that
Z ∈ S, but a very similar exact state Z′ can, so that Z′ 6∈ S. To
be able to discriminate between such neighboring exact states
on each side of the boundary ∂S we must have acess to com-
plete knowledge, which we have not. Therefore the ∂S must
be considered fuzzy. There are several boundaries ∂S that
cannot be excluded given PK. Furthermore, we cannot tell
exactly which boundaries cannot be exluded. The set {∂S}
has a fuzzy boundary for the same reason as S has one. The
argument can be repeated, of course, to conclude that bound-
ary of the set of possible boundaries of {∂S} is also fuzzy, and
so on.
Denote by I a general item of knowledge. The logical rela-
tions between two such items I1 and I2 can then be expressed
in state space and knowledge space as shown in Table I.
Since all knowledge is assumed to be possible to express
in terms of objects and their attributes, the incompleteness of
knowledge must correspond to uncertainty about the number
of objects or uncertainty about their attribute values. Such
an uncertainty can always be expressed as the fact that there
are several numbers of objects that cannot be excluded by the
knowledge at hand, or that there is more than one combination
of attribute values that cannot be excluded.
For the sake of illustration, consider the case where the un-
certainty resides in the attribute values of a given object. Fig-
ure 9 shows arrays of those values υ1 j and υi2 allowed by
physical law of two attributes 1 and 2, respectively. Complete
knowledge of these attributes means that all pairs of values
(υ1 j,υi2) except one can be excluded. To have no knowledge
means that no such pair of values can be excluded. Partial or
incomplete knowledge may be of two different kinds. That
knowledge is defocused simply means that some set of values
{υ1 j} of a attribute 1 and some set of values {υi2} of attribute
9TABLE I: Set-theoretical symbols in state space and knowledge
space relating items of knowledge I1 and I2, where K˜2 represents
the item of knowledge ‘not I2’ in knowledge space.
Logical relation State spaceS Knowledge spaceK
I1 AND I2 S1∩S2 K1∪K2
I1 OR I2 S1∪S2 K1∩K2
I1 NOT I2 S1 \S2 K1∪ K˜2
2 can be excluded. That knowledge is conditional means that
it can be expressed as a condition that relates the values of at-
tributes 1 and 2, for instance ‘If the value of attribute 1 is υ1 j,
then the values of attribute 2 is υi2. Knowledge can be both de-
focused and conditional, corresponding to a set of statements
fo the form ‘If the value of attribute 1 is υ1 j, then the values
of attribute 2 cannot belong to the set {υi2}’.
E. The structure of state space
The encircled regions in Fig. 9 correspond to projections of
the physical state S onto a subspace of state space S . Let us
discuss in more detail the structure of S . Say that the object
Ol in the state of potential knowledge PK is described by the
set of attributes {Ail}i. Then the set {Ail} of all attributes of all
such objects can be regarded as axes that span state space, ac-
cording to the assumption that all knowledge can be expressed
in terms of objects and their attributes (Fig. 10).
Let Ai be an attribute of a given object. The set of values
{υi j} j of Ai are assumed to be qualities of perception that can
be associated with each other and subjectively ordered. We
may say that the set {υi j} j with its ordered elements defines
Ai. To define the ability to order the elements {υi j} j we can
use the concept of betweenness.
Definition 1 (Betweenness) Betweenness is a relation be-
tween three different values υi j, υik and υil of the same at-
tribute Ai. If υik is between the members of the pair (υi j,υil)
we write υi j  υik ≺ υil . Otherwise we write υi j 6 υik 6≺ υil .
When the values are permuted in these formal expressions,
the following rules hold. We have υi j  υik ≺ υil if and only
if υil  υik ≺ υi j. If υi j 6 υik 6≺ υil , then υik  υi j ≺ υil or
υi j  υil ≺ υik.
Suppose that there are more than three different values
of Ai, and that the betweenness relation is defined for each
triplet picked from the quadruplet {υi j,υik,υil ,υim}. Then
the following transitivity rules hold. If υi j  υik ≺ υil and
υik  υil ≺ υim, then υi j  υik ≺ υim and υi j  υil ≺ υim. If
υi j  υik ≺ υil and υik  υim ≺ υil , then υi j  υik ≺ υim.
Definition 2 (Ordered attribute) Let ϒi = {υi j} be the set of
values of attribute Ai allowed by physical law. Suppose that
υi j ∈ ϒi, υik ∈ ϒi and υil ∈ ϒi, and that these values are all
different. The attribute Ai is ordered if and only if the between-
ness relation is defined for each such triplet (υi j,υik,υil).
FIG. 9: Different types of knowledge about a pair of atttributes.
Such knowledge always corresponds to the ability to exclude a set
{(υ1 j,υi2)} of pairs of attribute values allowed by physical law. Such
a pair corresponds to a point in the present graphic representation.
The encircled regions that correspond to pairs of values that cannot
be excluded can be seen as projections of the physical state S on the
subspace of state spaceS spanned by the attributes 1 and 2.
The concept of ordering says nothing about direction. We
have not added any arrows to the dashed attribute axes in Fig.
10(a). If we have a preconceived notion about direction, we
can say that Definition 2 is symmetric with respect to a direc-
tion reversal, according to the rule saying that υi j  υik ≺ υil
if and only if υil  υik ≺ υi j. However, the necessity to in-
troduce this symmetry is an artefact of the directedness of the
formal notation, which introduces a redundancy in the repre-
sentation of the betweenness concept. We have to introduce
the notion of direction separately via the concept of succes-
sion.
Definition 3 (Succession) Succession is a relation between
two different values υi j and υik of the same attribute Ai. If
υik is a successor to υi j we write υi j < υik. Otherwise we
write υi j > υik.
The rule for value permutation in this formal expression is
υi j < υik if and only if υik > υi j.
Suppose that there are more than two different values of Ai,
and that the succession relation is defined for each pair picked
from the triplet {υi j,υik,υil}. Then the following transitivity
rules hold. If υi j < υik and υik < υil , then υi j < υil .
Definition 4 (Directed attribute) Let ϒi = {υi j} be the set of
values of attribute Ai allowed by physical law. Suppose that
υi j ∈ ϒi, υik ∈ ϒi, and that these values are different. The
attribute Ai is directed if and only if the succession relation is
defined for each such pair (υi j,υik).
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FIG. 10: The attributes Ai can be regarded as axes that span state
space. a) The ordering of the attribute values along a given axis is
determined from the concept of betweenness. We assume that it is
always possible to decide whether a value υ1k is placed between an-
other pair of values (υ1 j,υ1l) or not. b) The values of sequential
time has an additional structure, namely direction. For such an at-
tribute A3, it is always possible to decide which value υ3k succeeds
another value υ3 j. c) For attributes with only two possible values,
the betweenness quality cannot be defined. d) Circular attributes are
defined by the property that for any pair (υ6 j,υ6l), all other values
υ6k are placed between the members of this pair.
The primary example of a directed attribute is sequential
time n. We have assumed the interpretational ability to distin-
guish objects in the state of potential knowledge PK(n) that
belong to the present from those that belong to the past. This
distinction breaks the directional symmetry of time from the
epistemic perspective. Accordingly, we can attach an arrow to
sequential time, as in Fig. 10(b).
Sequential time is a discrete attribute where n+ 1 is the
neighbouring time following just after n. But we do not spec-
ify whether the two successive values in Defintion 3 are neigh-
bours or not, meaning that we do not address the question
whether we can squeeze another value between them, accord-
ing to Definition 1. This makes the above approach differ-
ent from that used in the Peano axioms for the natural num-
bers, where the successor S(x) of x is the neighbour to x in the
discrete sequence of natural numbers. The definitions of be-
tweenness and succession suggested here do not address the
FIG. 11: A pool {Or} of reference objects can be used to measure
distances between values of a given attribute Ai. In this example, we
get d jl = 5, d jk = 2 and dkl = 3. We decide that d jk < dkl . How-
ever, the outcome of this comparison depends on the pool chosen, so
that this method cannot be used straightaway to compare distances
objectively.
question whether the set of values {υi j} is discrete or contin-
uous.
There are attributes for which just two values are allowed
by physical law, such as the projection of the spin of an elec-
tron along a given axis [Fig. 10(c)]. Another example is the
binary presentness attribute, which tells whether a perceived
object belongs to the present or to the past. In such a case we
cannot use the concept of betweenness to say that the attribute
is ordered.
Some attributes such as quark colour may be called circular.
The values of such attributes lack direction and are naturally
represented by equidistant complex numbers of modulus one.
They can be defined by the quality that for any pair of values
(υi j,υil), all other values υik are placed between the members
of this pair, so that we may write υi j  υik ≺ υil . Clearly, an
attribute must have at least three possible values to be called
circular.
In general, we may say that an attribute is either ordered, or
it has just two possible values. A directed attribute is always
ordered, but the converse is not true.
We have suggested a couple of qualities of attributes and
their values that give structure to state space S . These qual-
ities transcend the individual attributes and the perception of
their values. All such transcendent qualities should be used as
structural building blocks of S , but nothing else. The actual
percpetions are encoded in the physical state S ⊂ S rather
than S itself. In the language of Section II, the state space
corresponds to the forms of perception, whereas the state cor-
responds to the perceptions themselves.
This distinction is crucial when it comes to the concept of
distance. If the values of an attribute Ai are knowably dis-
crete, then the distance d jl between two values υi j and υll is
naturally defined as the number of other values υik that can be
fitted between them, the number of such values that fulfil the
11
relation υi j  υik ≺ υil . The distance is defined by qualitites
of state spaceS , and is therefore an inherent quality ofS .
This is not so when we cannot exclude the possibility that
the values of Ai are continuous. Then we cannot exclude that
infinitely many different values υik can be fitted between any
pair of values υi j and υil . We get no information about d jl .
Instead, to obtain a value of d jl we have to consider two ob-
jects O j and Ol with known values υi j and υil , and introduce
a predefined pool {Or} of reference objects Or with known
values υir of attribute Ai (Fig. 11). With these reference ob-
jects at hand, we create a ‘measurement state’ S, in which
the maximum number M jl of members of {Or} which fulfil
υi j  υir ≺ υil are fitted between the two objects O j and Ol .
Then we identify d jl = M jl . The pool {Or} defines the unit in
which d jl is determined. The use of actual objects in this pro-
cedure means that d jl is part of S rather than being a quality
of S . Without going into details, we note that an analogous
procedure can be devised even if the values υi j, υil , and {υrk}
are not precisely known.
This procedure misses an essential aspect of the concept of
distance - the subjective ability to decide which of two dis-
tances is the larger one. We can decide whether two people
are roughly equally tall, and if not, who is taller. If two men
and one woman talk, it is most often evident that the pitch of
the two male voices are more similar than the pitches of the
female voice and one of the male voices. In short, we have
an subjective sense of scale. This sense of scale cannot be re-
constructed from the building blocks shown in Fig. 11. When
two distances d jk and d jl are compared, the outcome depends
on the choice of pool {Or} and is therefore arbitrary.
We have to introduce the ability to judge whether d jk < dkl ,
d jk > dkl or d jk = dkl as a primary interpretational ability, as a
form of perception that cannot be explained in terms of other
forms of perception. The relative size of two distances refer-
ring to the same attribute should therefore be seen as part of
the structure of state spaceS . With this ability at hand we can
choose pools of reference objects such that their values υir are
equidistant, like the markings on a ruler. This unit distance
∆r captures the essential quality of the pool {Or} of reference
objects, making it unneccessary to refer to the pool itself as
a unit of measurment. Note, however, that the numerical dis-
tances d obtained in this manner are defined only as parts of
physical states S. It is only their relative size that reflects the
structure of state spaceS itself.
Even if we consider the judgement of relative size to be a
primary form of perception, it cannot be considered to be part
of the collective potential knowledge PK for all attributes Ai
having a possibly continuous set of values. Special relativity
teaches us that two subjects can judge spatial and temporal
distances differently. In particular, they can come to differ-
ent conclusions about the relative size of two spatial or tem-
poral intervals. For these relative attributes, the validity of
this judgement is therefore restricted to the individual poten-
tial knowledge PKk.
The spatial and temporal attributes r and t need more struc-
ture than betweenness and relative size to be properly char-
acterized. To be able to say in a clearcut way that a spatial
position rk is placed between two other such positions r j and
FIG. 12: The knowledge dimension DK in a two-dimensional state
space, spanned by attributes A1 and A2. There is knowledge associ-
ated with A1 in all three cases, meaning that some of its values can be
excluded, so that DK ≥ 1. a) There is no knowledge associated with
A2, so that DK = 1. b) There is conditional knowledge associated
with A2, so that DK = 2. c) There is knowledge associated with A2,
so that DK = 2.
rl , we need to assume that the three positions are placed along
a straight line. We therefore have to introduce straightness as
a primary form of spatial perception. We also have to intro-
duce orthogonality on the same footing.
Just as relative size, the corresponding judgements are not
universally or collectively valid, but are restricted to the indi-
vidual potential knowledge PKk. The absence of a univer-
sal cartesian coordinate system reflects the diffeomorphism
invariance of general relativity. It should be noted here that
in the present epistemic approach to physics, we distinguish
between sequential time n and relational time t, where the for-
mer attribute is used to evolve the physical state, and the latter
is used to measure temporal distances.
We will not refer t in the general formalism developed in
this paper. The relation between the two aspects of time is
discussed at length in Ref. [20]. We will also avoid explicit
reference to r, aiming here at a general discussion about at-
tributes Ai and the observation of their values. Note that or-
thogonality as a form of perception applies only to physical
space. In general, there is no inherent orthogonality relation
defined between two attributes Ai and Ai′ that help to span
S , as indicated by the tilted pair of axes in Fig. 10(a). The at-
tribute values cannot be used to define a general inner product,
and there is no general metric forS .
F. State space dimension
We may ask about the dimension D[S ] of S . Each at-
tribute of each object adds one to D[S ] and one axis to S .
We might try to specify D[S ] as the total number of minimal
objects in the world times the number of attributes possessed
by each of these. But the total number of minimal ojects is an
unknowable, possibly infinite number. The number of mini-
mal objects contained in each perceived object cannot be de-
termined either. Their number is not fixed, just as the number
of elementary particles is not fixed.
Therefore we introduce the knowledge dimension
DK [S ](n). Put simply, it equals the number of distinctions
in the state of potential knowledge PK(n). Only distinctions
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pertaining to directly perceived objects count. Quasiobjects
like minimal objects are disregarded since they do not add
anything to PK; our knowledge about them is a function of
what we perceive directly, according to the discussion in
Section III B.
We may also say that DK [S ](n) is the number of poten-
tially perceived attributes at time n. If two different values of
the same attribute are perceived, then they count as two differ-
ent attributes, since they are associated with two different ob-
jects. If no values of a given attribute Ai of a given object can
be excluded, then this attribute is not perceived at all from an
epistemic perspective, and does not contribute to DK [S ](n)
(Fig. 12).
Even so, we may have conditional knowledge pertaining to
Ai. Say that we know that the value of A1 is υ11 or υ12, but
that we know nothing about the value of A2. Nevertheless, we
know that A1 = υ11⇒A2 = υ21. Already such indirect knowl-
edge about A2 lifts it from the darkness of complete ignorance.
We may therefore regard a condition involving Ai as a distinc-
tion associated with Ai, since a condition picks an implication
A⇒ B and drops the alternative A 6⇒ B [Fig. 12(b)].
Definition 5 (Independent attribute) An attribute of an ob-
ject is independent if and only if physical law allows it to take
several values even if all other attributes of the given object
are completely known.
Definition 6 (Knowledge dimension) Let NO(n) be the num-
ber of objects Ol contained in S(n), and let NAl(n) be the num-
ber of independent and distinct attributes that can be associ-
ated with Ol at sequential time n. An attribute Ai of Ol is
distinct if and only if at least one of the following two condis-
tions is fulfilled: 1) Ai is directly observed by some subject,
or 2) there is conditional potential knowledge that involves
Ai. Then the knowledge dimension of S at time n is given by
DK [S ](n) =∏
NO(n)
l=1 NAl(n).
There is no reason a priori to assume that potential knowl-
edge is conserved. It may grow or shrink. In particular, the
number of objects contained in PK may change, both because
the number of perceiving subjects may change, and since the
perception of a given subject may become more refined or
more blurred. Therefore the knowledge dimension DK [S ]
must be seen as a dynamical quantity, as a function of n.
The known distinct attributes that determines DK [S ](n) ac-
cording to Definition 6 span a space that may be called the
knowledge state space SK . We may see SK as a subspace of
an underlying state space S which is such that any conceiv-
able knowledge state space fulfils
SK ⊆S . (8)
We clearly have
DK [S ](n)≤ D[S ] (9)
at each sequential time n. Since there is a priori no upper limit
on the number of subjects that may contribute to PK, and no
upper limit of the size of the body that encodes the knowl-
edge of each subject, there is no upper limit on the number of
known distinct attributes. Therefore we must set D[S ] = ∞.
We will argue in Section V that when it comes to rep-
resentations of physical law, the only important part of S
is spanned by the DK [S ] attributes that we know anything
about. This conclusion conforms with the strict epistemic per-
spective advocated in this study.
G. A measure on state space
We have argued that there is no inherent metric in state
space. It is nevertheless possible to define a measure. It will
be essential in our discussions about probability.
Definition 7 (Attribute value spaceS (A,υ)) Let A be an
independent attribute according to Definition 5. S (A,υ) ⊆
S is the set of exact states Z for which there is at least one
object for which A is defined, and for which the value of A is
υ .
Definition 8 (State space volume) The measure V [S] ≥ 0 is
defined for any state S ∈S belonging to a σ -algebra ΣV over
S , and is such that V [S (A,υ)] =V [S (A,υ ′)] for any inde-
pendent attribute A, and any pair of values (υ ,υ ′) of A al-
lowed by physical law. Like for any measure, V [Σ1 ∪Σ2] =
V [Σ1]+V [Σ2] for any two disjoint sets Σ1 ∈ ΣV and Σ2 ∈ ΣV .
For any exact state Z we have V [Z] = 1.
The condition V [S(A,υ)] = V [S(A,υ ′)] can be interpreted
as a statement that for each exact state Z for which the value
of A is υ there is exactly one exact state Z′ for which the value
is υ ′. We thus compare state space volumes in the same way
as we compare the sizes of two sets Σ1 and Σ2 by putting el-
ements of Σ1 into one-to-one correspondence with elements
of Σ2. Nevertheless, we avoid reference to the individual ele-
ments Z of the space S in this condition. We do so because
they lack epistemic meaning if considered one by one.
Nevertheless, we let V [Z] = 1 to ensure that a physical state
S consistent with at least one exact state gets positive volume.
This assignment is allowed theoretically since the exact state
is a well-defined concept. However, it cannot be used to cal-
culate the volume of actal physical states since exact states
cannot be knowably counted one by one. Instead we have to
compare the volumes of different states. Such a relative vol-
ume specification will be sufficient in our treatment of prob-
ability, and can also be used to make the concept of entropy
epistemically well-defined [20].
Note that Definition 8 does not refer to the structure of the
set of possible values υ , as to whether they are continuous or
discrete. We avoid such references since we want to keep the
conceptual framework as general as possible.
H. Object states and object state space
Typically, we want to model and predict the evolution of a
particular object Ol rather than the whole world. The object
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Ol of interest may be composite, of course, meaning that it is
or can be divided. We can define the complement ΩO to any
object O, where ΩO corresponds to ‘the rest of the world’.
The entire world may be denoted Ω.
If the world Ω as a whole is regarded to be an object, then it
can only contain a finite number of minimal objects, accord-
ing to the ‘axiom of foundation’ discussed in Section III A.
This is too restrictive. We want to allow the world to be infi-
nite in size, so that we can come across a (countably) infinite
number of objects if we travel along a straight line forever.
To make this possible we have to make a distinction between
the division of an object and the appearance of new objects
among those already perceived. Even if the depth of knowl-
edge is finite, we do not want to put boundaries to the scope
of knowledge by assumption. Thus neither Ω nor ΩO are con-
sidered to be objects.
There is another sense in which the world Ω cannot be re-
garded as an object. By definition, the entire universe lacks
a complement. In contrast, all objects have a complement
which contains at least one other object. This is so since each
perceived object corresponds to another object in the body of
the perceiving subject according to the assumption of detailed
materialism (Section II).
Even if the world cannot be seen as an object, our actual po-
tential knowledge PK of the world may correspond to a (com-
posite) object. This knowledge corresponds to an object if the
number of aware subjects is finite. This is so since each of
the finite bodies of these subjects can only perceive a finite
number of objects.
We define the object state SO as the physical state that
would result if the knowledge about all the other objects was
erased. More precisely, SO is the union of all exact states Z
in state space that do not contradict the fact that O exists, or
the potential knowledge of its internal attributes. Correspond-
ingly, we may define the environment state SΩO as the union
of all exact states Z in state space that do not contradict the
existence of any of the perceived objects in the complement
ΩO to O, or the potential knowledge of the attributes internal
to this complement. Generally, S⊆ SO∩SΩO .
If there would be no potential knowledge PKR about the
relational attributes that relate O to its environment ΩO, and
if there would be no conditional knowledge PKC that relates
O and ΩO, then we would have PK = PKO ∪PKΩO . This is
the same as to say S = SO ∩ SΩO . However, whenever SO is
defined, there is also some knowledge about the relation be-
tween O and its environment. We must therefore always write
PK = PKO∪PKΩO ∪PKR. This means that PK is larger than
PKO∪PKΩO , so that
S⊂ SO∩SΩO , (10)
as illustrated in Fig. 13.
Considering the set {Ol} of all objects that are part of
PK(n) we may also write
S(n)⊂
⋂
l
SOl(n), (11)
FIG. 13: SO is the state corresponding to knowledge of object O. SΩO
is the state corresponding to all other objects in a state S of composite
knowledge. SO is shown large since it corresponds to ‘small’ knowl-
edge of a single object (c.f. Fig. 7). The state S is a proper subset of
the intersection between SO and the environment SΩO whenever O is
related to its environment.
where SOl is the state of object Ol . This expression should be
compared to Eq. [6], in which we consider a set of subjects
rather than objects.
In the scientific modelling of the behavior of an object we
often assume that it is isolated. In our terminology this ap-
proximation corresponds to the assumption that S= SO∩SΩO .
We know, of course, that this is never quite true, as expressed
in Eqs. [10] and [11].
Apart from knowledge PKR about relational attributes that
connect object O to its environment ΩO, there may also be
conditional knowledge that relates object O and ΩO. In that
case we should write
PK = PKO∪PKΩO ∪PKR∪PKC. (12)
The object state SO is a subset of state space S och all
possible exact states Z of the world. We may, however, also
consider the space SO of all possible exact states ZO of an
object rather than of the entire world. This makes a qualitative
difference, since we cannot consider the world to be an object,
as discussed above.
We may embed the object state in this object state space
SO rather than in S . Let us call the corresponding object
state SOO. It is the set of exact object states ZO ∈SO that are
not excluded by the potential knowledge of the attributes of
object O. Since SOO is a subset of another space, we have to
give it a different name than SO. If we describe SO as all exact
states of the object O and the surrounding world ΩO that is
consistent with the knowledge about O, we may describe SOO
as all exact states of O that is consistent with the knowledge
about O, ignoring the rest of the world.
What difference does this distinction make? Consider two
knowably different objects O1 and O2 that are observed at the
same time n. Clearly there is a physical state S(n) that is con-
sistent with the simultaneous existence of both these objects,
and therefore there are exact states Z that are consistent with
these objects. In other words, SO1 ∩ SO2 6= ∅. On the other
hand, there is no exact object state ZO that is consistent with
both these objects. If there were, we would be unable to dis-
tinguish them. We would not be able to give them the different
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FIG. 14: The object state space SO and the state space S . If two
object states SOO1 and SOO2 overlap in SO , then they represent the
same object. Otherwise they represent different objects. In contrast,
states of objects SO perceived at the same time always overlap, even
if they are known to be distinct.
names O1 and O2. This means that SOO1 ∩ SOO2 = ∅. These
relations are illustrated in Fig. 14. The represention of object
states in object state space will be useful when we discuss the
evolution of individual objects, and is crucial in the definition
of identifiable objects (Section V A).
In terms of object states SOO embedded in object state space
SO, the definitions [7] and [8] should be reformulated as fol-
lows.
Definition 9 (Object attribute value spaceSO(A,υ)) Let A
be an independent attribute according to Definition 5.
SO(A,υ) ⊆SO is the set of exact object states ZO for which
A is defined for object O, and for which the value of A in this
object is υ .
Definition 10 (Object state space volume) The mea-
sure V [SOO] ≥ 0 is defined for any state SOO ∈ SO
belonging to a σ -algebra ΣVO over SO, and is such
that V [SOO(A,υ)] = V [SOO(A,υ ′)] for any independent
attribute A, and any pair of values (υ ,υ ′) of A in ob-
ject O allowed by physical law. Like for any measure,
V [Σ1∪Σ2] =V [Σ1]+V [Σ2] for any two disjoint sets Σ1 ∈ ΣVO
and Σ2 ∈ ΣVO. For any exact object state ZO we have
V [ZO] = 1.
IV. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICAL LAW
We have argued in general terms that a strict epistemic per-
spective can be employed to construct a scientific world view.
But such a perspective is scientifically useful only if it pro-
vides a unified way to understand physical law as we already
know it, and also makes it feasible to extend our understand-
ing of it. To this end we need to formulate epistemic princi-
ples that limit the possibilities, that exclude some conceivable
physical laws.
A. Implicit epistemic minimalism
History of physics teaches that it is a dead end to intro-
duce objects that cannot be perceived, neither directly nor in-
directly, such as the aether, or to make use of attributes that
cannot be operationally defined or measured, such as absolute
positions or velocities. The same goes for operations with
no perceivable effect, such as the interchange of two identical
particles. Physical law is epistemically picky. This principle
may be called epistemic minimalism. There are two levels of
this principle: implicit and explicit epistemic minimalism.
Implicit epistemic minimalism is the principle that proper
physical models can always be expressed without the intro-
duction of entities or distinctions that cannot be subjectively
perceived as such, or deduced from such perceptions. This is
true, in particular, when it comes to the introduction of ob-
jects, attributes and attribute values.
The primary example is Galilean invariance. There is no
need to use the attribute absolute speed to formulate physi-
cal law: it is invariant under the transformation x→ x+ vt for
any constant v. Even if physical law does not need the idea of
absolute speed, it is nevertheless compatible with Galilean in-
variance. Therefore Newton could uphold the idea of absolute
space. This is the reason this level of epistemic minimalism is
called implicit. To arrive at special relativity we need some-
thing more.
B. Explicit epistemic minimalism
The principle of explicit epistemic minimalism means that
the introduction in a physical model of entities or distinc-
tions that cannot be subjectively perceived, or deduced from
such perceptions, leads to conflict with physical law. In other
words, a model which relies on such entities or distinctions
gives rise to wrong predictions. This is true, in particular,
when it comes to the introduction of objects, attributes and
attribute values.
This principle constrains the form of physical law further.
It means that Nature explicitly answers ”yes” or ”no” if we
ask her whether a proposed entity or distinction has epistemic
meaning.
To obey explicit epistemic minimalism, physical law must
be inconsistent with the notion of absolute speed, since this
concept is epistemically empty. The speed of an object can
only be operationally defined in relation to another object.
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FIG. 15: Probabilities that can be used to illuminate the difference
between implicit and explicit epistemic minimalism in the double-
slit experiment. See text for further explanation.
The notion of absolute speed implies the addition law for ve-
locities, and whenever the addition law holds it is possible to
uphold the notion of absolute speed. A bit more generally,
we may say that the notion of absolute space and time can be
kept alive if and only if the addition law for velocities always
holds.
The addition law may expressed as follows. Consider any
three objects O1, O2 and O3. Let u12 be the relative velocity
of O1 and O2, as judged in the rest frame of O1. In the same
way, let u23 be the relative velocity of O2 and O3, as judged in
the rest frame of O2. Then the relative velocity of O1 and O3
is
u13 = u12+u23, (13)
as judged in the rest frame of O1.
To rule out the notion of absolute speed, it is thus necessary
and sufficient that physical law sometimes break Eq. (13).
One way to do this is to introduce a maximum speed c that no
object ever exceeds. To give such a concept epistemic mean-
ing, all subjects k must agree that a given entity, under given
circumstances that all agree upon, always travels at speed c in
their own reference frame. We may let O1 be the body of a
subject 1, and 2 be the body of a subject 2, whose reference
frames should be equally valid according to the discussion in
Section II. Of course, this ansatz leads to the Lorentz transfor-
mation, which breaks Eq. [13].
In the limit c→ ∞ we get
√
1− (v/c)2 → 1, and we get
back the Galileo transformation, for which Eq. (13) holds.
Thus, the introduction of a maximum speed is the only pos-
sible way to break Eq. (13). In other words, the finite speed
of light and special relativity can be seen as an expression of
explicit epistemic minimalism.
The statistics of identical particles is another example of ex-
plicit epistemic minimalism. Since it is epistemically mean-
ingless to treat permutations of identical particles as different
states, the principle implies that it must lead to wrong statistics
if such permutations are included as distinct states in the cal-
cultation of statistical weights. And, of course, it does, since it
gives rise to Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, which in many ex-
perimental situations is physically very different from the cor-
rect Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics of bosons and
fermions, respectively. In contrast, if the minimalism would
have been implicit, it would have made no physical difference
whether permutations of identical particles were included or
not.
The same principle can be used to motivate the Pauli exclu-
sion principle. It does not make epistemic sense to say that
two objects are found in the same state. From the epistemic
perspective we have to be able to tell the objects apart to be
allowed to say that we are indeed dealing with two objects.
Their attributes must differ in some respect, be it their their
spatio-temporal positions, their momentum or energy, or their
internal attributes. The fact that electrons and other building
blocks of matter follow Fermi-Dirac rather than Bose-Einstein
statistics can therefore be seen as an expression of explicit
epistemic minimalism. One may ask why we cannot argue in
the same way that elementary bosons cannot share the same
state either. The reason is that they should not be seen as
objects in the epistemic sense of the word that we use here.
These matters are discussed at length in Ref. [20].
As a fourth example of explicit epistemic minimalism, we
may take the fact the orbital angular momentum of a possibly
rotating object has to be set to zero if we have no potential
knowledge at all where in its orbit the object is positioned at
a given time, that is, if the probability distribution of its posi-
tion is spherically symmetric. Allowing for non-zero angular
momentum in such a case gives rise to erroneous physical pre-
dictions.
In section II we have already used the same principle to ar-
gue that it is impossible to invent an adequate physical model
with a fixed number of elementary objects that do not divide
or merge.
In the present paper, explicit epistemic minimalism is used
mainly in order to analyse the double-slit experiment from an
epistemic point of view. Consider Fig. 15, and assume that it
is forever outside potential knowledge which slit the particle
actually passes. However, there is (potential) knowledge that
it passes slit 1 with probability p1 and slit 2 with probability
p2. (Strictly speaking, according to the discussion in Section
VII, these probabilities are not defined in such a case, but this
is not essential for the present argument.) Implicit epistemic
minimalism would mean that it does not matter for the evo-
lution of the system whether we assume that it actually takes
one of the paths, even if we can never know which. The only
option is then to combine probabilities as if events 1 and 2 are
mutually exclusive. That is, for any pair of probabilities pk
and prk we must have
pr = p1 pr1+ p2 pr2, (14)
where pr is the probability that the particle finally hits the
point r on the detector screen, pk is the probability that it
passes slit k, and prk is the probability that it hits r given that
it has passed slit k.
In contrast, explicit epistemic minimalism means that phys-
ical law must contradict the possibility that there is (unknow-
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able) path information. The only way to get the message
through is to let
pr 6= p1 pr1+ p2 pr2 (15)
for some choice of probabilities. In Section VIII C we discuss
how this condition leads to Born’s rule.
C. Epistemic completeness
Epistemic minimalism is all about the fact that physical law
seems to make use of no more than what can be perceived and
distinguished in principle. Turning the perspective around, we
may argue that physical law should make use of everything
than can be perceived and distinguished from something else.
Loosely speaking, if two things can be distinguished, there
will be a corresponding distinction in physical law.
This idea can be promoted to the principle of Epistemic
completeness. All subjectively perceived distinctions, or dis-
tinctions deduced from such perceptions, correspond to dis-
tinctions in proper models of physical law and of the physical
state. This is true, in particular, when it comes to objects, at-
tributes and attribute values.
Since we can deduce from the incompleteness of knowl-
edge that there is a distinction between potential knowledge
and the currently unknowable (Fig. 5), a corresponding dis-
tinction should be made in physical law. This is accomplished
by the distinction between Eqs. [14] and [15], which there-
fore can be seen as a consequence of epistemic completeness
as well as a consequence of explicit epistemic minimalism.
Epistemic completeness can also be applied in order to treat
time in a proper scientific way. Since there are primary subjec-
tive distinctions between the past, the present and the future,
these distinctions should be present also in proper represen-
tations of time in physical models. We have tried to do this
by introducing sequential time n as an inherently directed at-
tribute according to Definition 4.
The attribute n is distinguished from the numerical measure
t of the temporal distance between two events. Like all other
distances between attribute values, t is not considered to be
a primary attribute in state space S , but is defined in certain
physical states S in which there are reference objects accord-
ing to Fig. 11 which defines the distance. Thus knowledge
about the distance t between two prior events becomes an ob-
ject in the state of potential knowledge PK at the present time
n. This distinction between n, which formalise the perceived
flow of time and our ablity to order events temporally, and t,
which formalise our ability to make temporal measurements,
can also be seen as an expression of epistemic completeness.
D. Epistemic closure
Comparing the principles of explicit epistemic minimalism
and epistemic completeness, the former basically says ‘ev-
erything physical is epistemic’, while the latter says ‘every-
thing epistemic is physical’. Any entity or distinction intro-
duced in a physical model should correspond to a knowable
entity or distinction, and any knowable entity or distinction
chould have a counterpart in a physical model. We get a one-
to-one correpondence between knowable entities and distinc-
tions, and entities and distinctions in proper physical models.
We may call this correspondence epistemic closure. It reflects
the world view expressed in Fig. 1, where the subjective and
the objective aspects of the world are seen as inseparable and
equally fundamental.
E. Epistemic consistency
An axiomatic mathematical system is consistent if and only
if the given set of axioms and the given set of deduction rules
cannot be used to conclude that one and the same theorem T
is both true and false. In other words, it is never proper to
arrive at both T and ¬T . In an analogous way, we may say
that a physial theory is consistent if and only if the state of
world at a given time n never becomes properly described by
two different physical states S and S′ if we follow the given
physical law.
Such a contradiction can occur only if the physical theory
contains different perspectives on the same situation, so that
these perspectives may be consistent or not. Otherwise the
consistency of the theory is self-evident and does not consti-
tute a condition that constrains physical law. This is so in re-
alistic and deterministic physical theories like Newtonian me-
chanics. The physical state at a later time t ′ is a function of
the state at a previous time t. It is meaningless to require con-
sistency, since no conflict of perspectives is possible.
In the present epistemic approach to physics the situation
is different. We have different subjects who observe the same
objects according to Fig. 3, and the requirement that their
knowledge about these objects is consistent is expressed by
Eq. [7].
There is another way in which we can have different per-
spective on the same situation, on the same set of objects or
events. We may observe them as they happen, or we may
remember them afterwards. According to the discussion in
Section III E, each object in the state of potential knowledge
PK(n) is equipped with the binary presentness attribute. We
may therefore divide PK(n) into two parts, one containing
all objects that belong to the present time n, and the other
containing all objects which corresponds to memories of the
past. We may call the first part PKN(n) and the other part
M(PK(n−1)), writing
PK(n) = PKN(n)∪M(PK(n−1)), (16)
where M(. . .) denotes the memory of the state of knowledge
within brackets. If we ignore the presentness attribute of all
objects in M(PK(n−1)) and PK(n−1), we must require that
M(PK(n−1))⊆ PK(n−1). In terms of the physical state, we
may write
S(n) = SN(n)∩M(S(n−1)) (17)
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in an analogous notation. We then have the following criterion
for epistemic consistency:
M(S−Pr(n−1))⊇ S−Pr(n−1), (18)
where the subscript −Pr indicates that the value of the pre-
sentness attribute is ignored, or, in other words, that we project
the physical state from the entire state space S to the sub-
space spanned by all other attributes than the presentness at-
tribute. Equation [18] represents a criterion that constrains
physical law in the sense that it provides a condition that S(n)
must fulfil given S(n−1).
Apart from the different perspectives on the same situa-
tion provided by different subjects, and those provided by the
memory of the situation as compared to the first hand experi-
ence of it, there is a third way to get such different perspec-
tives: we may experience or remember the situation at the
same time as we deduce knowledge about it from other expe-
riences. Memories and deductions have the thing in common
that they refer to something else, upon which they provide
their own perspective. In more abstract terms, memories and
deductions are objects that point to other objects. In this lan-
guage, epistemic consistency means that the source objects
and the target objects must conform.
Let us call the deduced object O˜, and let O be the directly
perceived object to which O˜ refer. Then O˜ should never be
described by properly deduced attribute values that are know-
ably different from those of O. Employing the object state
spaceSO introduced in Section III H and the object state SOO
referred to in Fig. 14, we get the condition
(SOO)−Pr ∩ (SO˜O˜)−Pr 6=∅. (19)
Just as in the concistency criterion [18], we ignore the pre-
sentness attribute, since it does not matter whether O˜ or O, or
both, are memories.
There is one way to use epistemic consistency to constrain
physical law where the temporal relations are crucial, though,
where the deduction is a retrodiction, where it is pointing to-
wards an object belonging to the past. In the present epis-
temic approach, physical law acts via an evolution rule that
constrains the potential knowledge PK(n′) at time n′ given the
potential knowledge PK(n) at a previous time n < n′. These
matters are discussed in the following section. Suppose that
the knowledge PK(n′) that appears at time n′ allows a retrod-
iction about the physical state at the previous time n. Together
with the remembered knowledge about time n, this retrodicted
or deduced knowledge concerning time n may become greater
than the actual state of potential knowledge PK(n) was at the
time. This extended knowledge concerning time n may give
rise to another state PK′(n′) of potential knowledge at the sub-
sequent time n′, since the physical evolution law then acts on
a different initial state. If that were the case, then there would
be two inconsistent corresponding physical states S(n′) and
S′(n′) that properly described the world at time n′. This is for-
bidden, which means that the new knowledge that may appear
FIG. 16: Illustration of the consistency criterion expressed in Eq.
[20]. Anything that can be deduced about time n from any possi-
ble future state of potential knowledge PK(n′) must be insignificant
enough, so that it does not cause a future state PK′(n′) that is dif-
ferent in any way from the state PK(n′) we actually see. Such a
forbidden difference might be an outright contradiction, but it might
also amount to more (or less) focused knowledge, or more or less
conditional knowledge.
at time n′ is constrained so that it does only allow retrodic-
tions about time n which evolves into a state of knowledge
PK′(n′) = PK(n′). The idea is illustrated in Fig. 16.
To make the argument more precise and formal, let
P˜Knew(n;n′) be the new potential knowledge about time n that
physical law make it possible to deduce at a later time n′ > n.
That the deduced knowledge is new means that P˜Knew(n;n′)∩
PK(n) =∅. Let PKnew(n) = PK(n)∪ P˜Knew(n;n′). Then, for
any time n′′ > n, we have
PKnew(n′′) = PK(n′′) (20)
for any potential knowledge PKnew(n′′) that follows from
PKnew(n) via physical law.
This more subtle kind of consistency is relevant in discus-
sions of the double-slit experiment (Fig. 15). Suppose that we
see an interference pattern in such an experiment at time n.
If it were possible to gain knowledge at the later time n′ that
makes it possible to retrodict which slit the particle actually
passed at time n, then the future state that would follow if this
knowledge were there alreday at time n would contradict the
state that we actually perceive and remember now, since then
physical law dictates that we get no interference pattern. To
avoid such a contradiction we have to impose the quantum me-
chanical rule that tells us that interference patterns only appear
when it is impossible in principle to gain path information at
a later time, be it via regained memories, later deduction from
memories, or deduction from knowledge acquired later.
This rule can thus be seen as a constraint on physical law
imposed by the requirement of epistemic consistency. Even
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though it may seem that this rule transcends time, anticipating
at time n in a non-deterministic world what may or may not
happen at time n′, this is not really the case, since the impossi-
bility in principle to gain path information at such a later time
is a function of the physical state at time n. The appearance
of an interference pattern at time n in such a situation is an
expression of this fact, via the principle of explicit epistemic
minimalism (Section IV B).
V. THE EVOLUTION OPERATOR
Any physical law allows us to define an evolution operator
u that acts on any physical state S and gives another state uS
such that the next physical state is a subset of uS. In other
words, given the present physical state, any physical law lim-
its the possibilities for the future. The sharpest formulation
of physical law limits these possibilities as much as possible
without giving rise to predictions which are sometimes not
fulfilled. This idea is captured in the definition of u1.
Definition 11 (The evolution operator u1) The evolution
operator u1 is defined by the condition that u1S(n) is the
smallest possible set C ⊆ S such physical law dictates that
S(n+1)⊆C.
The generality of this definition means that it does not tell
us anything about the form of physical law. To give some
basic structure to u1, we assume the following (Fig. 17).
Assumption 1 (The operator u1 is unique and invertible)
Two states S and S′ overlap if and only if u1S and u1S′
overlap: S∩S′ 6=∅⇔ u1S∩u1S′ 6=∅.
That S∩ S′ 6= ∅⇒ u1S∩ u1S′ 6= ∅ can be regarded as an
assumption that the evolution u1 is a function in a subjec-
tive sense: two states that are subjectively the same can-
not evolve into states that are subjectively different. That
S∩ S′ = ∅⇒ u1S∩ u1S′ = ∅ can be seen as an assumption
that u1 is subjectively invertible: two subjectively different
states cannot evolve into states which are subjectively indis-
tinguishable.
Time changes if and only if something changes. The se-
quence of time instants {n,n+ 1, . . .} is well-defined if and
only if we can tell the physical states in the corresponding se-
quence {S(n),S(n+1), . . .} apart. Each states in this sequence
must be knowably different from all the others. It is therefore
not possible for one exact state Z to be consistent with both
S(n) and S(n+1). That is, we require
S(n+1)∩S(n) =∅. (21)
It follows that
S(n)∩u1S(n) =∅, (22)
as illustrated in Fig 18.
FIG. 17: Physical law as expressed by u1 is analogous to an invertible
function. Evolution of two states S and S′ according to cases a) and
b) are allowed by Assumption 1, whereas evolution according to c)
and d) are forbidden.
One might argue that S(n+1) may correspond to a state in
which knowledge increases or decreases rather than changes,
as compared to S(n), so that we might have S(n+ 1) ⊂ S(n)
or S(n+ 1) ⊃ S(n), contradicting Eq. [22]. However, in-
creased or decreased knowledge about the observed objects
corresponds to a changed perception of the observer, and must
therefore correspond to a changed state of the objects in the
body of the same observer, according to the assumption of de-
tailed materialism (Section II). If you put your glasses on to
increase your visual knowledge, the state of the neurons in the
visual cortex changes. Therefore Eq. [22] still holds.
The evolution operator u1 is a mapping from the power set
P(S ) of state spaceS to itself. Explicit epistemic minimal-
ism (Section IV B) requires that the evolution should just be
defined for elements of P(S ) that may correspond to states
of potential knowledge PK. Since we argue in Section II that
potential knowledge is always incomplete, exact states Z are
therefore not in the domain Du of u1.
Since we cannot make u1S(n) any smaller according to Def-
inition 11, we conclude that we may have S(n+1) = u1S(n).
And since it must be possible to apply u1 to the physical state
at all times, we conlude that u1S(n) ∈ Du. The range of u1
becomes the same as its domain.
u1 :Du→Du, Du ⊂P(S ). (23)
If Σ ⊂ S and Σ′ ⊂ S are two sets that may correspond
to physical states, then so is Σ∪Σ′. This set corresponds to
the state of potential knowledge PK ∩PK′ according to Ta-
ble I, which in turn correponds to the statement ‘things are
according to PK or to PK′’, which is always a possible state
of knowledge. This closure ot the domain of u1 under unions
of its elements reminds us of σ -algebras, and one may try to
describe Du as such an algebra.
According to the definition of a σ -algebra, that would mean
that we have to allow the evolution operator to be applied to
the entire state space S , and also to the empty set ∅. How-
ever, it is not possible to fulfil the condition u1S ∩S = ∅
that is implied by Eq. [22]. In fact, we must have u1S ⊆S
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FIG. 18: Since S(n+1)⊆ u1S(n) cannot overlap S(n), by definition
of successive states, we can define the evolution operator u1 such that
u1S(n) and S(n) do not overlap either.
according to the definition of the state space. A physical state
that equals the entire state space corresponds to a state of no
knowledge at all, to a state of non-existence. The evolution
operator is not a creation operator; it cannot create some-
thing from nothing, but rather evolves the state of a world
that already exists. We conclude, therefore, that Du is not a
σ -algebra. This conclusion is reinforced by the observation
that the expression u1∅ lacks meaning.
Nevertheless, Du can be compared to the largest σ -algebra
ΣV of measurable subsets of S (Definition 8). To be able to
define probability properly in all relevant circumstances (Sec-
tion VII), we want all physical states S and all evolved states
u1S to be measurable. Therefore we assume thatDu ⊆ ΣV . We
have S 6∈Du and ∅ 6∈Du according to the above discussion.
Also Z 6∈Du for any exact state Z. Therefore we conclude that
Du ⊂ ΣV . (24)
If potential knowledge changes size, it changes content.
This observation was used above to validate Eq. [22]. In gen-
eral we may say that if S is a possible physical state which
can evolve to u1S and corresponds to the state of knowledge
PK, then S′ with S′ ⊂ S or S′ ⊃ S is not a conceivable physical
state if it corresponds to a different state of potential knowl-
edge PK′. It is therefore meaningless to apply u1 to such a set
S′. This means that
S ∈Du⇒ S′ 6∈Du (25)
whenever S′ ⊂ S⊂S or S⊂ S′ ⊂S , and PK 6= PK′. The last
qualification is added since a given state of potential knowl-
edge PK may correspond to many slightly different physical
states S,S′, . . . since we cannot determine the boundary ∂S ex-
actly, as discussed in relation to Fig. 8. Some of these candi-
date physical states may be subsets of each other, and we want
to be able to apply u1 to all of them, of course.
We argued in Section III F that the only relevant part of state
space S is the subspace SK spanned by the known distinct
attributes. The number of these attributes defines the knowl-
edge dimension DK [S ](n) (Definition 6). Let ΠKu1S(n) be
the projection of the state S(n) onto SK . To be epistemically
sound, the evolution operator u1 should be such that it is suf-
ficient to specify its effect on ΠKS in order to specify the evo-
lution of the physical state S. This condition can be expressed
as the commutation relation
u1ΠKS(n) =ΠKu1S(n), (26)
which should hold for all n.
It is almost self-evident that this condition is fulfilled, when
you think about it for a minute. We have identified the physi-
cal state which we are going to evolve with a state of knowl-
edge. Thus the evolution u1 must depend on this knowledge,
and on nothing else. We know nothing about the attributes in
the part S \SK of state space. Therefore u1 cannot depend
on these parts. It must depend on something known, it cannot
depend on nothing.
To be a bit more formal, consider Fig. 12. In panel a) there
is no knowledge associated with attribute A2. We can specify
the state S completely by saying υmin1 < υ1 < υ
max
1 , where υ1
is the value of attribute A1. The values of A2 does not appear in
this specification, and therefore u1 cannot depend upon these.
Even though this may seem self-evident, it has peculiar
consequences. It means that whenever new attributes become
known, their appearance in the ‘field of vision’ is not dictated
by the deterministic part of physical law, as given by u1. For
example, if we suddenly become aware of attribute A2, learn-
ing that υmin2 < υ2 < υ
max
2 , this knowledge appears ‘out of the
blue’. It can be seen as the effect of a state reduction, defined
by the condition S(n+1)⊂ u1S(n).
Let us next discuss such state reductions, and their relation
to determinism.
Definition 12 (Determinism) Physical law is deterministic if
and only if S(n+ 1) = u1S(n) for all states S(n) ∈ Du. The
individual state S(n) evolves deterministically if and only if
S(n+m) = umS(n) for all m≥ 1, where um ≡ (u1)m.
Assume that S(n) evolves deterministically even though it
is not exact. Since we have argued that potential knowledge
is incomplete at all times, the evolved state S(n+1) = u1S(n)
is not exact either. This means that there are several values
of some attribute Ai that we know at time n that we cannot
exclude at time n+ 1. The same goes for subsequent times
n+ 2,n+ 3, . . .. But if there is no possibility to gain more
knowledge about Ai in the future than can be anticipated at
time n, to exclude some more values, then it is meaningless
to say that there are several values that cannot be excluded in
the first place. The sequence of states {S(n),S(n+1), . . .} be-
comes analogous to an atom moving in state space S , which
can never be split to see what is inside, even though we as-
sume that it is composite, that it contains several exact states
Z. Explicit epistemic minimalism (Section IV B) does not al-
low such a picture, since it makes use of distinctions that can
never be probed perceptionwise. Therefore there cannot be
any inexact state S(n) that evolves deterministically. Since all
true states are inexact due to the incompleteness of knowledge
we conclude the following.
Statement 1 (Physical law is not deterministic) There are
times n such that a state reduction occurs at time n + 1,
meaning that S(n+1)⊂ u1S(n).
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We note that a state reduction is never a deterministic event,
according to Definition 11. If the state S(n+ 1) that emerges
from the state reduction u1S(n) → S(n+ 1) ⊂ u1S(n) were
possible to determine at time n, then u1 should be re-defined
to u′1 for which S(n+ 1) = u
′
1S(n), so that no state reduction
would occur.
Suppose next - contrafactually - that potential knowledge is
complete, so that we can write S(n) = Z for some exact state
Z. Suppose further that S(n) does not evolve deterministically
even though it is exact. That would correspond to the exis-
tence of a stochastic term in the operator u1. In other words,
such an lack of determinism would not be the result of incom-
ple knowledge, but of an added noise that has no basis in the
state of the world, as described by a set of objects, and their
internal and relational attributes.
If we assume that there is no such noise in physical law,
then we arrive at the conclusion that a state S(n) evolves de-
terministically if and only if it is exact, so that we may write
S(n) = Z for some exact state Z. This means that in the ab-
sence of noise, complete knowledge and deterministic physi-
cal law goes hand in hand. In that case we could equally well
define an exact state Z as a state that evolves deterministically.
A. Identifiable objects and their evolution
To be able to speak about objects whose evolution we fol-
low through time, we have to be able to decide whether two
perceptions of an object at different times corresponds to one
and the same object. The intuition is the following: if an ob-
ject in a state of knowledge PK(n) cannot be distinguished
from an object in the next state PK(n+1), then these two ob-
jects must be seen as the same object. It is impossible to tell
them apart, and it is epistemically unsound to give them dif-
ferent names. This can be seen as a consequence of explicit
epistemic minimalism (Section IV B). An object O which is
possible to track in this way from time n to time n+1 may be
called identifiable at time n. It fulfils the criterion
SOO(n)∩SOO(n+1) 6=∅, (27)
where SOO ⊂SO is the object state embedded in object state
space, as discussed in Section III H.
Note that this definition does not take into account the rela-
tional attributes that relate O to its environment ΩO (Section
III H). The object O can therefore be suddenly moved spatially
and still preserve its identity. This means that all minimal ob-
jects of a given species are seen as one and the same object,
in a certain sense. This view conforms with the conclusion
in statistical mechanics that that the exchange of two identical
particles does not create a new physical state. However, it is
at odds with the fact that electrons can follow distinguishable
trajectories through space.
We may therefore introduce the spatio-temporal attributes
of an object O as ‘pseudo-internal’ attributes, and include
them in the list which specify an expanded internal object
state SˆOO. This can be achieved if we fix a set of identifi-
able reference objects {Or} and regard them as a rudimentary
FIG. 19: The evolution of the state SOO of an object O that is identifi-
able in the time interval [n,n+6]. The object O′ at time n+7 cannot
be identified with object O at time n+ 6, and is therefore given a
separate name.
spatial coordinate system for each other object O. (We may
alternatively consider the reference objects to be parts of an
extended object Oˆ that is always composite: Oˆ = {O,{Or}}.)
Then we can express the corresponding identifiability condi-
tion SˆOO(n)∩ SˆOO(n+1) 6=∅. Using this condition, an elec-
tron whose existence is deduced in an experiment at time n on
Earth should not be identified as being the same as an elec-
tron whose existence is deduced at time n+ 1 by a physicist
somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy.
It may be possible to track an object during extended pe-
riods of time. If object O is identifiable at all times n,n+
1, . . . ,n+m, then it is said to be identifiable in the time inter-
val [n,n+m]. This definition is illustrated in Fig. 19. Even
if the object is identifiable at every time instant in the above
sequence, it may be possible to distinguish the object at some
time n+ µ from the object at time n, that is, we may have
SOO(n)∩SOO(n+µ) =∅, where 1 < µ ≤m. Due to its iden-
tifiability at each instant, the object nevertheless preserves its
identity.
If an object O is identifiable at time n, there must be other
objects in PK(n+1) that can be distinguished from objects in
PK(n), since sequential time n is updated only if a subjective
distinction can be made between now and then. These other
objects can collectively be seen as a clock that ticks each time
sequential time is updated.
Conversely, if an object changes and time is updated ac-
cording to n→ n+1, there must be other objects that subjec-
tively stay the same, that are identifiable at time n. Otherwise
there is nothing that makes it epistemically meaningful to say
that the states S(n) and S(n+1) refer to the same world. More
formally, a world specified by a sequence of states S(n) pre-
serves its identity during time interval [n,n+m] if and only if
there is an identifiable object at all times n,n+1, . . . ,n+m−1.
A leave may fall from the tree, but the stem of the tree does
not move. When the leave falls, the immobility of the stem
helps to preserve the identity of the tree, and of the entire
world. When the leave has fallen, the tree may be cut down,
and the leave resting on the ground preserves the identity of
the world. Even if everything around us seem to change at
once, some internal objects may stay the same, such as mood
and memories. In this way, the evolution of a given, identi-
fiable world may be compared to walking: when one foot is
lifted, the other is resting on the ground.
If object O is identifiable at time n, the following expression
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is defined:
SO(n+1)⊆ u1[S(n)]SO(n). (28)
We have to let the evolution operator depend on the state S(n)
of the entire world, since object O is always related to the
world to which it belongs. Of course, we may define the cor-
responding expression
SOO(n+1)⊆ uO1[S(n)]SOO(n) (29)
if we work in object state spaceSO rather thanS .
The above discussion concerns directly perceived objects
O rather than deduced quasiobjects O˜. We argued in Section
II that objects O are always sufficient to specify the physical
state S, and to determine its evolution u1S. We added, how-
ever, that quasiobjects O˜ such as minimal objects are never-
theless useful when we want to express the evolution operator
u1 in a way that is generally valid, that does not depend on the
specific state S or object state SO to which it is applied. The
same reasoning applies to the operator uO1 as applied to the
object state SOO in object state spaceSO (Eq. [29]).
Since we have concluded that all objects cannot be iden-
tifiable at all times, it is necessary to introduce a notion of
identifiability and evolution of quasiobjects if we want to up-
hold the idea that no perceived object pops in our out of ex-
istence, and that objects preserve their identity even if we do
not look at them each moment n of time. That the evolution
operator u1 is such that this idea can be upheld is supported
by primitive experience: we do not need to stare constantly at
a flower in the kitchen window to say that it is the same flower
we see each morning as we drink our coffee. If it is not there
one morning, we conclude that someone must have removed
it rather than that it simply vanished.
It is a basic assumption in this study that all properly
interpreted objects can be modelled as being composed of
minimal objects O˜M (Section III A). These minimal objects
are quasiobjects which are assumed to be possible to track
through time in the sense that the evolved minimal-object state
uO1SˆO˜MO˜M (n) is defined at each time n for each minimal ob-
ject O˜M that appears in the model of the physical state at that
time. This expression is assumed to be such that
uO1[S(n)]SˆO˜MO˜M (n)∩ SˆO˜MO˜M (n) 6=∅. (30)
Minimal objects are then assumed to be identifiable in the
sense that there is always a minimal object O˜′M in the model of
the state at time n+1 whose object state SˆO˜′MO˜′M (n+1) fulfils
SˆO˜′MO˜′M (n+1)⊆ uO1[S(n)]SˆO˜MO˜M (n). (31)
This means that we may identify the two minimal objects
with each other: O˜′M = O˜M . Further, there is no minimal ob-
ject O˜′M in the model of the state at time n+1 that cannot be
identified in this way with a minimal object O˜M belonging to
the model at time n.
FIG. 20: An object O is assumed to be composed of two minimal
objects O˜M1 and O˜M2. Each of them is identifiable as its state evolves
in the object state spaceSO according to the evolution rule uO1. If O
undergoes a perceivable change as n+2→ n+3, then at least one of
the minimal objects must also undergo a sudden change at the same
moment. However, it is impossible to say which if they are both
deduced quasiobjects which are not directly perceived.
There is a complication, though. Minimal objects may di-
vide or merge in particle reactions. There has to be a way to
identify a set {O˜′M} of outgoing minimal objects from such a
reaction at time n+ 1 with a set of incoming minimal {O˜M}
objects at time n. This is clearly a more tricky matter than to
identify a single minimal object with the evolved state of an-
other one according to Eq. [31]. We will not pursue the matter
here, but refer the reader to the discussion in Ref. [20].
Since the only attribute values that can differ between two
minimal objects of the same species M (like an electron) are
the spatio-temporal ones, we treat them as pseudo-internal at-
tributes according to the above discussion, and put hats above
the object states in Eqs. [31] and [30]. Otherwise two subse-
quent states of a minimal object of a given species M always
fulfil SO˜MO˜M (n+1) = SO˜MO˜M (n), so that the overlap expressed
in Eq. [30] becomes trivial.
If all minimal objects fulfil the conditions discussed above
they may be called quasi-identifiable. In effect, each minimal
object can then be treated as if it follows a trajectory like that
in Fig. 19 with the spatio-temporal interpretation that the ob-
ject moves to the right, if we allow that the worm splits into
several branches at an object division, and we do not allow
that the chain breaks the way it does at time n+7 in that fig-
ure.
We can, in principle, follow the trajectory of individual ele-
mentary fermions, for example in bubble chambers. Therefore
it is epistemically sound to speak about such trajectories and
to base physical models on these, even though we very seldom
see such trajectories in practice, and we therefore cannot keep
track of individual minimal objects that make up a perceived
object O. In the language used in this study, such a model is
epistemically sound since it is possible by assumption to di-
vide each object a finite number of times until we reach the
level of minimal objects (Section III A).
We may ask ourselves how perceivable changes may oc-
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cur at all if all objects can be described as being composed
of quasi-identifiable minimal objects. If no such changes oc-
cur, it is impossible to define any temporal update n→ n+ 1
since there is no object that can act as a clock. In other words,
how is it possible that a perceived object suddenly changes,
like the one in Fig. 19 at time n+ 7? If all minimal ob-
jects were directly perceived this would indeed be impossi-
ble. All we would see would be minimal objects with trajec-
tories that floated seeminlgy continuously through space. But
an object may change suddenly or discretely if it is assumed
that the minimal objects of which it is composed are quasiob-
jects. Then these mimimal objects may follow seemingly con-
tinous, but invisible trajectories that interpolate between the
perceived distinct states of the object now and then. In this
way we may make a proper model of the flower in the kitchen
window as being the same as the one we saw yesterday, even
if it has dropped a leaf during the night.
We may say that an object which can be modelled as being
composed of quasi-identifiable minimal objects is itself quasi-
identifiable. It is this weaker notion of identifiability that we
most often use in our everyday life. The evolution of a quasi-
identifiable object can be defined according to Eq. [28] just
like for an identifiable object.
We need to make the discussion a little bit more pre-
cise. Suppose that object O knowably changes according to
SOO(n+2)→ SOO(n+3) with SOO(n+2)∩SOO(n+3) =∅,
defining the temporal update n+ 2→ n+ 3 (Fig. 20). Even
if O is composed of a set of minimal objects {O˜M}, at least
one of these minimal objects must also change suddenly ac-
cording to SˆO˜MO˜M (n + 2) ∩ SˆO˜MO˜M (n + 3) = ∅ in order to
get SOO(n+ 2)∩ SOO(n+ 3) = ∅. Such a sudden change is
guaranteed if a state reduction occurs at time n+ 3 so that
uO2SˆO˜MO˜M (n)∩ SˆO˜MO˜M (n+ 3) = ∅, where uO2 ≡ uO1uO1. If
all minimal objects in {O˜M} were directly perceived, the sud-
denly changing ones would not be identifiable, and it would
be impossible to uphold the picture that they always follow
continuous trajectories. However, if the minimal objects are
quasiobjects, it becomes impossible to decide by direct per-
ception which of them changes abruptly. All we can say is
that at least one of them must do so. Thus we cannot exclude
the picture that if we choose any one individual minimal ob-
ject, it is indeed identifiable, following a continuous path.
VI. THE MEASUREMENT PROCESS
What we have done until now is to introduce a general
epistemic formalism that does not say anything specific about
physical law. We have also discussed some epistemic guiding
principles that limits the form of physical law to some ex-
tent (Section IV). In what follows we will use the formalism
to define certain experimental contexts in which the guiding
principles can be employed to motivate quantum mechanics
as a convenient mathematical representation of the rules that
govern observations in such contexts.
FIG. 21: The property space P of a property P is the union of all
states for which there are objects such that P is defined. P =
⋃
kP j,
where Pk is the union of states for which P has value p j. An anal-
ogous picture could be drawn in object state space SO with object
states SOO, showing the object property spacePO with object prop-
erty value spacesPO j . The latter spaces are always disjoint, in con-
trast to the spacesPO j.
A. Properties
Given any inexact physical state S we can imagine a set of
alternative states that result if additional knowledge is gained.
For instance, if we see a raptor in the sky but cannot decide
which kind, an exhaustive set of alternatives consists of all
species of raptors that live in our country. Any such set of
alternatives divides S into distinct subsets S j such that
S =
⋃
j S j,
∀ j 6= j′ : S j ∩S j′ =∅.
(32)
If the list of alternatives is not exhaustive to begin with, it
can trivially be completed by a last alternative ‘not any of the
above’. For instance, the bird may be ‘a golden eagle, a white-
tailed eagle, or some other raptor’. Formally, an incomplete
set {S j} is completed by adding S \⋃ j S j as the last alterna-
tive.
Consider the property P that defines the set of alternatives
{S j}. This property defines an abstract property space P ⊆
S (Fig. 21). It is the union of all exact states Z for which
there are objects for which the property P can be defined. Each
possible value p j of P defines a set P j as the union of those
Z ∈P for which there are objects for which the value of P is
p j. We getP =
⋃
jP j.
A property P is a statement about attributes of objects. It
may concern one attribute of one object, or several attributes
of several objects. In general,
p = f ({υil}), (33)
where υil is the value of attribute Ai of object Ol . Clearly, any
attribute is a property, but the opposite is not necessarily true.
By definition, the values υi of a given attribute Ai are always
possible to order (Definition 2). In contrast, the values p j of a
property P cannot always be ordered. Ordering is impossible
when p j is a function of attribute values υil and υi′l belonging
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to different attributes Ai and Ai′ . For example, the color of the
tail feathers of a bird can be ordered according to the spec-
trum. However, letting P represent bird species, the different
species p j cannot be ordered, since the classification depends
on other attributes than feather colors.
If P is the species of the raptor, then P is the union of all
exact states Z for which there is a raptor. We have S ⊂P
for any physical state S with raptors, since in any situation we
know more than just ‘there is a raptor’. We know the land-
scape in which we see the bird, we have self-awareness, and
so on.
Since a group of objects can always be formally described
as a single, composite object, we can always say that P applies
to a given object O. We can therefore always define an object
property spacePO and embed it in the object state spaceSO
rather than inS (Fig. 21). In this case we should write SOO ⊆
PO, since the only thing we may know about the object O in
the sky is that it is a raptor, so that SOO =PO. The object
property value spacePO is easier to work with thanP , since
we have
∀ j 6= j′ : PO j ∩PO j′ =∅. (34)
In contrast, the property value spaces P j are not necessarily
disjoint. There may be one exact state Z in which there is one
object with value p j of property P, and another object with
value p j′ . Then Z ∈P j and Z ∈P j′ .
B. Alternatives
To make the concept of alternatives meaningful in a formal-
ism aimed at expressing physical law, the alternatives should
have the potential to be realized. To be able to talk about such
realizable alternatives in the first place, it should be possible to
follow them through time until one of them eventually comes
true. In our vocabulary this means that it should be possible
to apply the evolution operator to them, and that they should
be identifiable.
Suppose that S is a given physical state. Then there is
no proper subset of S which is a conceivable physical state,
as discussed in Section V. Such a subset would correspond
to enlarged potential knowledge. But if potential knowledge
changes size, it changes content. This means that it is epis-
temically meaningless to consider the evolution of alternatives
S j ⊂ S, according to Eq. [25].
Instead, we should consider alternatives associated to the
specific object O to which the alternatives apply. In the ex-
ample above the observed raptor is the relevant object. This
object O should be identifiable or quasi-identifiable, as dis-
cussed in Section V A. Then its evolution is defined according
to Eq. [28]. We may then define the object alternative SO j as
SO j(n) = SOO(n)∩PO j, (35)
and its evolution as
TABLE II: Three knowability levels of alternatives
1 It will never become known which alternative is true. No pro-
perty value p j that corresponds to an alternative SO j defined
at time n and referring to object O will ever be observed.
2 It may become known which alternative is true. There is a time
n1 > n such that it is possible that such a property value p j is
observed at some time n′ ≥ n1, so that SOO(n′) = SO j(n′), but
it is not dictated by physical law that this will happen. We let
nˆ be the smallest possible such time n1.
3 It will become known which alternative is true. There is also a
time n2 > n such that physical law dictates that one of the pro-
perty value p j will be observed at some time n′′ ≤ n2, so that
SOO(n′′) = SO j(n′′). We let nˇ be the smallest possible such
time n2.
uO1SO j(n)≡ [uO1SOO(n)]∩PO j. (36)
We suppress the dependence uO1 = uO1[S(n)] to make the ex-
pressions less cluttered, but have to remember that this de-
pendence is crucial in some considerations below. The two
definitions [35] and [36] mean that for all j 6= j′, and for all
states S(n) of the entire world,
SO j ∩SO j′ =∅
uO1SO j ∩uO1SO j′ =∅.
(37)
Definition [36] is reasonable since the property value states
PO j are abstract subsets of SO that do not refer to any par-
ticular object state SOO (Fig. 21). Property P can be de-
fined for O whenever O is the relevant object to which the
alternatives apply, and stays relevant as time passes. This
means that SOO ⊆PO for all such times n,n+ 1, . . . of in-
terest. We may therefore write SOO(n) =
⋃
j[SOO(n)∩PO j]
and uO1SOO(n) =
⋃
j[uO1SOO(n)∩PO j]. Definitions [35] and
[36] then imply
uO1SOO(n) = uO1
⋃
j
SO j(n) =
⋃
j
uO1SO j(n) (38)
for all states S(n). These relations express that the object evo-
lution operator uO1 is linear in a set-theoretical sense.
From a strict epistemic perspective, it is only meaningful
to speak about alternatives at some time n if they are imag-
ined at that time by some subject k, who also observes O, to
which the alternatives refer. The alternatives can therefore be
seen as objects {O j} which are present in the state of poten-
tial knowledge PK(n), but which are separate from O. Rather,
they belong to its complement ΩO, which includes the body
of k, and they contribute to PKΩO (Eq. [12]). If we imagine
a situation in which subject k continuously observes O during
a period of time to check whether an alternative comes true,
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FIG. 22: Present and possible future properties. Each property value
p j spans the object property spacePO in itself if we replace all other
values by the complement ‘not p j’. The region FPO j is the union
of those object states SOO which do not have property value p j at
present, but will have it at some future time. The region N PO j is
the union of those states for which the property value is not, and will
never be p j. The object state SOO may relate to the three regions in
seven different ways.
we must assume that the imagined alternatives {O j} are iden-
tifiable objects during this period of time, just as the object O
must be an identifiable or quasi-identifiable object.
It is clear from these considerations that the fate of the alter-
natives depends crucially on other things than the state SOO(n)
of the object itself. The alternatives are external to object O,
but are related to it by means of reference. The object O is,
of course, also physically related to and affected by all other
parts of its environment ΩO, just like any other object. As dis-
cussed above, these dependences are summarized in the ex-
pression uO1 = uO1[S(n)].
Depending on S(n), all possible fates of a set of alternatives
defined at time n can be put into one of the three classes listed
in Table II. They define the three levels of knowability of the
alternatives. Comparing the definitions of knowability levels
2 and 3 in Table II, we conclude that nˇ≥ nˆ.
Up until now we have only considered alternatives which
in principle can be realized at once, meaning that SOO(n)∩
PO j 6=∅ for each relevant j. This is sufficient when we con-
sider examples such as the raptor in the sky. The bird can cer-
tainly be assumed to belong to a certain species at each time
we observe it, even if we cannot decide which at the present
moment n.
However, in other cases this is not true. Playing roulette at
the casino, the alternatives p1 and p2 that the ball end up at
a red or a black number can only be realized after a certain
time, when it has lost enough momentum as it circulates in
the wheel. Before that SOO(n)∩PO j 6= ∅ even though the
alternatives are defined in the sense that we know that one
of them will eventually come true (knowability level 3). The
same situation occurs in many scientific setups. In the double-
slit experiment, alternatives p1 and p2 that the particle passes
one slit or the other can only come true after the particle has
had time to travel from the particle gun to the screen with the
slits. We clearly have to broaden and sharpen the definition of
alternatives to make the concept generally applicable.
We may divide object property space PO into two parts:
PO j andPcO j, whereP
c
O j is the region in which the value of
property P is not p j (Fig. 22). For object states SOO that are
embedded in one of these regions, we know for sure whether
the property value at present is p j or not. For states that over-
lap both regions, we do not know.
We may define the region FPO j as the union
⋃
j Σ j of
those sets Σ j ⊂PcO j for which Σ j ∈ Du, and for which there
is a positive integer m such that uOmΣ j ⊂PO j, where uOm ≡
uO1. That is, FPO j is the region of object property space
consisting of states that we know will have property value p j
at some future time, but which do not have it now. Further,
we may define N PO j =PcO j/FPO j, meaning that it is
the union of those object states for which we know that the
property value is not p1 now, and that it will never be.
An object state SOO may overlap these three regions in vari-
ous ways, as expressed in Fig. 22. The state Sb will, by defini-
tion, be a subset ofN PO j forever. The evolved states uOmSd ,
uOmSe and uOmSg will forever (for any m≥ 1) at least partially
belong toN PO j. However, physical law may or may not al-
low that there is a time n+m such that SOO(n+m) ⊂PO j
given that SOO(n) belongs to one of the classes Sd , Se or Sg. If
it is allowed, then property p j may be called realizable.
Let
~PO j =PO j ∪FPO j (39)
be the region in which object states have property value p j
now, or will have it at some future time. We may call these
regions future property value spaces. Even if two property
value spaces PO j and PO j′ never overlap, two future prop-
erty value spaces ~PO j and ~PO j′ may or may not overlap. If
they do not overlap, meaning that ~PO j∩ ~PO j′ =∅, the prop-
erty values may be called called mutually exclusive. By this
we mean not only that the two property values cannot occur at
the same time - they cannot occur in succession either.
To exemplify, the property values p1 and p2 that a given
particle in a given double slit experiment passes slit 1 and 2,
respectively, are mutually exclusive. The setup is such that if
the particle passes one of the slits, it cannot pass the other at
a later time. In contrast, if p1 corresponds to the fact that the
distance between two objects is x1 and p2 corresponds to the
fact the distance is x2, the property values can occur one after
the other if the objects are moving, even if they, of course,
cannot occur simultaneously.
Making use of the future property value spaces ~PO j, we
define the corresponding future alternatives ~SO j as follows.
Definition 13 (Future alternative) Let ~SO j = SOO(n)∩ ~PO j
and uO1~SO j ≡ [uO1SOO(n)]∩ ~PO j. Then ~SO j is a future alter-
native if and only if~SO j 6=∅ and~SO j ⊂ SOO(n). Further, phys-
ical law must allow an object state SOO such that SOO ⊆ ~SO j.
The last sentence in the definition means that a future alter-
native ~SO j is realizable in the sense that there is a state SOO of
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the relevant object O in which the corresponding value p j of
its property P is actually observed. Note, however, that we do
not require that p j can be observed at some time in the future
given the particular object state SOO(n). We allow~SO j to have
any of the three knowability levels 1, 2 and 3 listed in Table
II.
We may want to consider a complete set of future alter-
natives such that it is guaranteed that one of the alternatives
eventually come true, that one of the property values is eventu-
ally revealed. To do so, we require that the future alternatives
~SO j do not overlap. Otherwise the quality of completeness
would be hard to use effectively in the experimental contexts
that we are going to discuss below.
If the corresponding property values p j are mutually exclu-
sive, so that ~PO j ∩ ~PO j′ = ∅ for all j 6= j′, the future alter-
natives ~S j are automatically disjoint. We may, however, de-
fine disjoint future alternatives ~SO j even if this is not the case.
Consider again the property distance, and call it P. Two differ-
ent distances may be found in succession, so that the property
values are not mutually exclusive. But in a physical setup pre-
pared to measure the distance between the objects at a given
time, the possible outcomes nevertheless define disjoint fu-
ture alternatives, defined as ‘the outcome of the measurement
that we have prepared’. These alternatives correspond to a
slightly different property P′, defined as ‘the first distance to
be measured after the present time n between a given pair of
identifiable objects’.
Definition 14 (Complete set of future alternatives) A set of
future alternatives {~SO j} is complete if and only if SOO(n) =⋃
j
~SO j and ~SO j ∩~SO j′ =∅ for all j 6= j′.
From this definition, and from the condition ~SO j ⊂ SOO(n)
in Definition 13, we see that a complete set of future alter-
natives always contains more than one element, meaning that
the value of P is unknown to begin with, at time n. To make
the concept of alternatives meaningful, several such alterna-
tives should have a chance to come true. On the other hand, a
complete set of future alternatives cannot contain more than a
finite number of elements. Even if the corresponding property
values p j might be continuous, the resolution of any actual
observation is finite.
This may seem self-evient, but let us discuss the statement
in little bit more detail. Each outcome in a complete set of al-
terntives is subjectively distinguishable from all the others by
definition. A distiction always have two ends; we distinguish
this from that. Consequently, we can label each alternative
with a unique symbol, for example an integer. We see there-
fore that the number of alternatives is always countable. If
they are countably infinite, then it must be possible to make
an infinite number of distinctions at the time n at which the al-
ternatives is defined, and to keep track of all these distinctions
until one alternative is realized. To encode an infinite number
of distinctions requires an infinite number of objects. These
objects must all be part of the observed object O to which all
alternatives apply. However, the assumed existence of mini-
mal objects makes it impossible to divide an object an infinite
FIG. 23: The evolution of an object state SOO embedded in object
state space SO when it is divided into two parts by a) the object
property values spaces PO1 and PO2, and b) the future property
values spaces ~PO1 and ~PO2. In the first case a) the alternatives
SO1 and SO2 cannot be realized at time n, but only at the subsequent
time n+ 1 when the object state has ‘floated’ across SO so that it
becomes divided by the boundary between PO1 and PO2. b) The
corresponding future alternatives ~SO1 and ~SO2 cannot be realized at
time n either, but by the definition of ~PO1 and ~PO2, the object state
is ‘locked onto’ the boundary of these spaces. In this representation,
SOO cannot ‘float’ from value to value, like the position of a ball
rolling on the ground.
number of times (Section III A). We conclude therefore that
the number of alternatives has to be finite.
Statement 2 (The number of alternatives in a complete set)
A complete set of future alternatives {~SO j} always contains
more than one element, but it never contains more than a
finite number of elements.
A future alternative may be said to be invariant in time. We
have ‘integrated away’ its time dependence, so to say. We
have ~SO j ⊆ ~PO j. By definition of the region ~PO j we also
have u1~SO j ⊆ ~PO j. If no state reduction occurs at time n+1,
meaning that SOO(n+1) = u1SOO(n), then the set {u1~SO j} is
also a complete set of future alternatives. When we consider a
complete set of future alternatives, we may therefore say that
the object state is ‘locked onto’ the boundaries between the
disjoint regions ~PO j, as illustrated in Fig. 23(b).
These boundaries represent a kind of coordinate system in
SO. If we use the coordinate system defined by the set of
ordinary property value spaces {PO j}, then the object state
SOO may instead ‘float around’, as indicated in Fig. 23(a).
The object state may intersect a given region PO j at some
times, but not at others. If it intersect PO j at time n+ 1
but not at the preceding time n, we may nevertheless define
the corresponding alternative SO j(n) at time n as SO j(n) ≡
(uO1)−1{[u1SOO(n)]∩P j}. The inverse (uO1)−1 of the evo-
lution operator is assumed to exist according to the discussion
in relation to Fig. 17.
If we let {~SO j(n)} be a complete set of future alternaties,
we may show that
uO1SOO(n) = uO1
⋃
j
~SO j(n) =
⋃
j
uO1~SO j(n) (40)
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FIG. 24: The object state SOO ⊂ SO just after the value of prop-
erty P is decided to have value p1. The object state space SO is di-
vided into four quadrants by the pairs of object property value spaces
(PO1,PO2) and (P ′O1,P
′
O2). a) If P and P
′ are simultaneously
knowable, the state may be contained in a single quadrant just after
the value of P′ has been subsequently decided. b) This may never
happen if the properties are not simultaneously knowable.
for all states S(n) in the same way as we demonstrated Eq.
[38]. This means that the object evolution operator uO1[S(n)]
is linear in a set-theoretical sense regardless whether we de-
compose the object state SOO according to the ‘coordinate sys-
tem’ defined by {PO j} or that defined by { ~PO j}.
A complete set of future alternative belongs to knowability
level 2 or 3 according to Table II. Depending on the physical
state S(n) of the world at the time n at which the alternatives
are defined, one of them may come true, or must come true.
Two future alternatives ~SO j and ~SO j′ in such a set are subjec-
tively distinguishable by definition. More than that, once one
alternative is realized at some time n+m, all future states of
the world S(n′) with n′ ≥ n+m becomes subjectively distin-
guishable from those that would follow if another alternative
was realized. We may say that the choice between alternatives
is always definitive.
This follows from the assumed invertibility of the evolu-
tion operator (Fig. 17). The realization of one future alter-
native ~SO j defines the temporal update n+m− 1→ n+m,
since it corresponds to a subjective change of perception as
the value p j of property P is revealed, and any such change
defines a temporal update. Thus, the revelation of value p j
also defines the update S(n+m−1)→ S(n+m) of the physi-
cal state, whereas the alternative revelation of value p′j would
have defined the alternative update S(n+m−1)→ S′(n+m).
Since the values p j and p′j of the given identifibale ob-
ject O are subjectively distinguishable by definition, we have
S(n+m)∩ S′(n+m) = ∅. The invertibility of the evolution
operator then implies that uMS(n + m) ∩ uMS′(n + m) = ∅
for all M ≥ 1, where uM ≡ (u1)M . This in turn implies that
S(n+m+M)∩S′(n+m+M) =∅ for all M ≥ 0.
C. Simultaneous knowability
We argued in Section II that potential knowledge is funda-
mentally incomplete. This means that all properties cannot
be known at the same time. This incompletness is guaranteed
only if there are pairs of properties P and P′ such that precise
knowledge about the value of one of these properties makes it
impossible to know the precise value of the other at the same
time, as illustrated in Fig. 24. Therefore we argue that this is
indeed the case. This fact will be important to keep in mind
when we try use our conceptual framework to describe exper-
imental contexts in which several properties are observed in
succession.
D. The experimental context
We are most often interested in a particular aspect of a fu-
ture alternative ~SO j, an aspect that can be coded as a value p j
of a property P. Other information that is part of the potential
knowledge that corresponds to ~SO j is considered irrelevant.
For example, in a scientific experiment the object O to
which the alternatives ~SO j consists of the experimental appa-
ratus together with the specimen OS to be examined. If the
specimen is a single electron, the property of interest may be
its spin direction or its position when it hits a detector. As we
perceive the outcome of the experiment, it is irrelevant if we,
at the same moment, perceive a new scratch on some metal
part of the detector.
Let us schematically discuss the role of the specimen in the
observational setup (Fig. 25). Such a setup necessarily con-
sists of at least two objects: the object O that we observe, and
the body OB of an observer. In a controlled, scientific set-
ting, O is divided into at least two parts: the specimen OS
and the apparatus OA, with which we study the specimen, de-
cide some of its properties. Our aim is to formulate quantum
mechanics as a convenient language to analye the behavior of
specimens.
The division of O into a specimen OS and an apparatus
OA opens up the possibility that OS is a quasiobject like an
electron (Section III B). However, OA cannot be a quasiobject,
since something has to be actually observed in the experiment.
If OS is a quasiobject the setup is such that there is conditional
knowledge (Section III D) that relates the states of OS and OA,
so that new knowledge about the state of OS is gained by de-
duction (using physical law) when new knowledge of OA is
gained by observation.
This description applies not only when the specimen OS
is a microscopic quasiobject like an electron. Consider, for
example, a paleontologist who finds a fossil of a dinousaur.
The fossil can be seen as the apparatus OA, and the dinosaur
is the specimen OS, which must be seen a quasiobject whose
properties are deduced from OA via conditional knowledge
known a priori by the expert.
The dinosaur belongs to the past, meaning that the knowl-
edge gained in the observational setup refers to a past time.
The same situation occurs when an astronomer observes a
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FIG. 25: Objects that have to be or may be parts of an observational
setup. a) The observed object O and the body of an observer OB are
necessary parts. b) The observed object may sometimes be divided
into a specimen OS and an apparatus OA with which we decide a
property of the specimen. We may then say that the observation is
the outcome of an experiment. c) When the specimen is a deduced
quasiobject, the apparatus can be divided into a machine OM and a
detector OD, where the subjective change in the state of the detector
defines the outcome of the experiment.
distant galaxy in a telescope. The perceived luminous blob
is a directly perceived object that belong to the present part
PKN(n) of potential knowledge according to the discussion
in Section IV E, but the galaxy iself is interpreted to be lo-
cated in a distant part of space. Therefore the properties of
the galaxy that we infer refer to a distant past, and the galaxy
itself must be considered to be a quasiobject from the per-
spective of the astronomer. When genuinely new knowledge
about the past is gained in this way, it must be assumed that
this knowledge is epistemically consistent in the sense ex-
pressed in Fig. 16. That the gained knowledge is genuinely
new simply means that it corresponds to a state reduction
SOO(n+m−1)→ SOO(n+m) ⊂ uO1SOO(n+m−1), so that
other alternatives could have been realized.
Definition 15 (The specimen OS and its state SOS) Assume
that O is a composite object, and let SOS be the state of an
object OS that is part of O, and whose possible property
values are used to define a complete set of future alternatives
for O. Then OS is a specimen with specimen state SOS ⊂SO.
From this definition, we immediately conclude that
SOS ⊃ SOO. (41)
When the specimen OS is a quasiobject, it is possible to di-
vide the apparatus OA into one detector OD and one machine
OM (Fig. 25). The term ‘machine’ may not be very illuminat-
ing, and we define it negatively as those parts of the apparatus
OA that is not a detector.
Let OD be the detector for property P, which is observed
at time n+m. Suppose that an experiment starts at time n,
and that OS is a quasiobject in the time interval [n,n+m].
Then OD are those objects that are part of the apparatus OA,
and are such that SOD(n)∩ SOD(n′) 6= ∅ whenever n ≤ n′ <
n+m and SOD(n+m− 1)∩ SOD(n+m) = ∅, where SOD ⊂
SO is the object state of OD. The perceived change of the
FIG. 26: The property value states SP j and the contextual state SC(n)
of the specimen OS we investigate. If we forget all knowledge about
the composite object O except the nature of a specimen OS that is part
of it, and also know the present value p j of a property P that applies
to OS, we get the state SP j. If there is no knowledge of the value of
P (and no knowledge of any other property P′), then SC =
⋃
j SP j.
If forget the very nature of OS we get a state that equals the entire
object property spacePO. Assuming that P has two possible values
we have V [SP1] =V [SP2], whereas we may have V [SO1] 6=V [SO2] for
the corresponding alternatives SO j that apply to the entire object O
(Fig. 25).
detector state SOD ⊂ SO thus defines the observation of P,
and also defines the temporal update n+m−1→ n+m. The
state of the machine SOM , on the other hand, may undergo
perceived changes during the course of the experiment, but
may not change subjectively at time n+m.
Definition 16 (Property value state SP j of a specimen)
Consider a set of properties {POS} that specify the nature
of the specimen OS, with fixed, limited value ranges {ϒPOS}
that are considered known a priori. Consider also another
property P that can be defined for OS so that SOS ⊂SO, but
whose value may vary. Let SP j ⊂SO be the state of OS that
corresponds to the knowledge that the value of P is p j, in
addition to knowledge about {ϒPOS}.
The fact that SP j corresponds to knowledge about nothing
more than that the value of P is p j means that SO j ⊂ SP j ac-
cording to the definition of the object alternative given in Eq.
[35], as illustrated in Fig. 26. The union
⋃
j SP j is a state that
corresponds to knowledge about the fixed ranges {ϒPOS} of
the values of {POS}, that is, to knowledge of the nature of the
specimen. It consists of all exact object states ZO that are not
excluded by the existence of a specimen of the given nature.
Definition 17 (An experimental context C) The context C is
the potential knowledge contained at time n in the state
SOO(n) of the observed object O (Fig. 25), together with po-
tential knowledge at the same time n about a sequence of com-
plete sets of future alternatives {~SO j},{~S′O j}, . . . ,{~S(F)O j } that
correspond to values of properties P,P′, . . . ,P(F), that are at-
tained in sequence. These properties are defined for a speci-
men OS that is a part of O, but they do not belong to {POS}.
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Further, at time n the knowability level associated with the
values of each property should be 1 or 3, and the knowability
level associated with P(F) should be 3 (Table II).
We may say that the context C is initiated at time n. This is
the time of no return; after that the property values will be at-
tained in sequence, whether we like it or not. There may, how-
ever, be intermediate unobservable properties in the sequence,
like P in Fig. 28(c). The important thing is that there are no
propertes in the sequence that may or may not be observed;
the observational context should correspond to a well-defined
experiment.
Definition 18 (Contextual state SC of a specimen)
Consider a context C in which P,P′, . . . ,P(F) are ob-
served in sequence at times n+m,n+m′, . . . ,n+m(F). Then
SC(n′)⊂SO is defined for n≤ n′ ≤ n+m(F) and corresponds
to the potential knowledge of these properties at time n′, in
addition to knowledge about the values of {POS}.
At time n, before the first property P is observed, we have
SC(n) =
⋃
j
SP j =
⋃
j
SP′ j = . . .=
⋃
j
SP(F) j, (42)
as illustrated in Fig. 26. When the value of P is observed to
be p j at time n+m, the contextual state reduces to
SC(n+m) = SP j. (43)
If P and P′ are simultaneously knowable (Fig. 24), the con-
textual state reduces further to
SC(n+m′) = SP j ∩SP′ j′ (44)
when the value of P′ is observed to be p′j′ at time n+m
′ > n+
m. In contrast, if P and P′ are not simultaneously knowable,
then we may loose all knowledge of the value of P at time
n+m′, so that
SC(n+m′) = SP′ j′ . (45)
We may, for example, know and remember that the specimen
is an electron, and let P be the spin in the z-direction and P′
be the spin in another direction that will be measured subse-
quently. These state reductions are illustrated in Fig. 27. In
general, we see that
SC ⊇ SOS ⊃ SOO. (46)
If P and P′ indeed correspond to the spin of an electron
along two different directions, there are only two possible val-
ues of each property that are allowed by physical law. These
properties also correspond to an independent attribute of an
individual object according to Definition 5. Such a property
may be called fundamental. A complete set {~SO j} of future
FIG. 27: Sequences of state reductions of the contextual state SC
when properties P and P′ with two possible values each are observed
at times n+m and n+m′, respectively. The final state SC(n+m′)
depends on whether P and P′ are simultaneously knowable or not.
Compare Figs. 24 and 26.
alternatives will be called fundamental if and only if it is de-
fined by the values p j of some property P, such that there is
one alternative ~S j for each property value allowed by physi-
cal law. We will talk about a fundamental context when the
experimental context C is such that all involved properties are
fundamental, and all sets of future alternatives are also funda-
mental.
Depending on the observed properties, it may or may not be
possible to create an experimental context C such that the set
of future alternatives becomes fundamental. It is impossible
if the values of the corresponding property P are continuous,
since the set of possible outcomes {p j} of an actual observa-
tion of P must always form a discrete set. This is so because
each outcome must be subjectively distinguishable from all
the alternatives that were not realized.
VII. PROBABILITY
Probability is considered to be a measure on a future alter-
native ~SO j (Definition 13). To be able to assign a probability,
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the alternative should have knowability level 3 according to
Table II. There has to be a predefined moment of decision nˇ,
as defined in that table, after which we know whether the cor-
responding event has occurred or not. Further, probabilities
should only be assigned to a complete set {~SO j} of such alter-
natives (Definition 14). This requirement corresponds to the
condition that assigned probabilities should always add up to
one.
These conditions are quite conventional, even though they
are expressed in the somewhat unconventional vocabulary
used in this paper. However, the strict epistemic approach em-
ployed here forces us to add the condition that there has to be
actual potential knowledge about the probilities at the time n
at which the complete set {~SO j(n)} of future alternatives is
defined, before any of the corresponding events occur. The
probability q j that the future alternative ~SO j occurs may be
seen as a property of the corresponding ‘alternative-object’ in
the mind of the observer OB that points to the observed object
O (Fig. 25). The probability q j may be said to exist whenever
the potential knowledge at time n makes it possible to exclude
some of its possible values in the range [0,1].
This necessary a priori knowledge about the probabilities
may be obtained in different ways. It may arise via repeated
experiments before time n in which the observed object O
is prepared in nearly identical initial states a large numer of
times, and is isolated sufficiently from its environment ΩO so
that the probabilities can be estimated in the frequentist sense.
It may also arise via symmetry considerations, like for a dice.
The only entities there are, in the present approach to
physics, on which the probability q j to see the propery value
p j may depend are the future alternative ~SO j that corresponds
to p j, the other future alternatives {~SOk} in the complete set,
the state SOO of the observed object to which q j apply, and the
entire physical state S. We may write
q j = f [~SO j,{~SOk},SOO,S], (47)
where the range of f is the real interval [0,1].
The physical state S enters the picture if the observed object
O is not isolated from the environment. As noted above, such
isolation is necessary if q j cannot be deduced from the sym-
metries of O. If q j can indeed be deduced beforehand from
such symmetries, we should include in the definition of O all
aspects of the world that define these symmetries. This means
that we can drop the dependence of q j on S.
In this way we also exclude hypothetical ’mental influ-
ences’ on the outcome. Such influences have to be attributed
to states of the bodies OB of observers that does not belong to
the object O under study and cannot affect it by means of or-
dinary physical law. The exclusion of mental influences also
makes it possible to drop the dependence of q j on the other fu-
ture alternatives {~SOk} in the complete set. You cannot influ-
ence the probability that something will happen by imagining
other alternatives.
Complete sets of future alternatives {~SO j} (Definition 14)
correspond to mutually exclusive events. The axioms of prob-
ability can therefore be expressed as
f [~SO j,SOO] ≥ 0
f [SOO,SOO] = 1
f [~SO j ∪~SOk,SOO] = f [~SO j,SOO]+ f [~SOk,SOO],
(48)
whenever j 6= k.
We have to relate the function f to the only measure that we
have defined on sets Σ in object state space SO, namely V [Σ]
(Section III G). The relations [48] are fulfilled for all complete
sets of future alternatives (Definition 14) for which probabili-
ties can be assigned if and only if we let
q j = f [~SO j,SOO] =V [~SO j]/V [SOO]≡ v[~SO j,SOO] (49)
whenever q j exists, according to the conditions given at the
beginning of this section. The last equality defines the relative
volume
v[Σ1,Σ2]≡V [Σ1]/V [Σ2], (50)
assuming that the two sets in the argument are measurable, so
that Σ1 ∈ ΣVO and Σ2 ∈ ΣVO.
We have not included any time dependence in Eq. [49]
since it follows from the definition of a complete set of fu-
ture alternatives that all relative volumes {v[~SO j,SOO]} stay
the same until one alternative is realized. Formally,
v[uO1~SO j(n′),uO1SOO(n′)] = v[~SO j(n′),SOO(n′)] (51)
whenever n≤ n′ < n+m, assuming that one alternative comes
true at time n+m, revealing the value p j of property P.
Clearly, q j does not depend on the exact shapes of the
boundaries ∂~SO j and ∂SOO, but only on the measure V on
these sets. This is necessary, since the exact shape of the
boundaries cannot be exactly known, according to the discus-
sion in relation to Fig. 8. Nevertheless, these boundaries are
conceptually well-defined. In a similar way, the relative vol-
ume v[~SO j(n′),SOO(n′)] is always well-defined, even if it hap-
pens to be unknown, even if it is not part of PK(n′) in the form
of a probability.
In the present approach, probability is always associated
with a macroscopic physical state, since it is a function of
a subjectively perceived future alternative ~SO j by definition.
This means that we cannot assign probabilities to the states
of microscopic quasiobjects such as electrons. Consider the
statement The spin in the x-direction of an electron is +1/2.
If this statement should have any chance to be verified in
a knowable sense, the corresponding future alternative ~SO j
must involve a macroscopic detector OD mounted on a macro-
scopic machine OM, and also an observer OB, according to
Fig. 25. Therefore, from the present perspective, the probabil-
ity we assign to the spin direction of an electron is a measure
not on the state of the electron itself, but on the state of the
electron together with the states of the detector, the machine
and the observers.
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The fact that it is meaningless to assign probabilites to the
states of microscopic quasiobjects like electrons by themselves
becomes evident from the following consideration. Let O˜ be
the quasiobject, and let SO˜O˜ be its state embedded in object
state space SO. Assume that the property P of interest is an
independent attribute of O˜ (Definition 5), and that we are in-
terested in the likelihood of each of the values p j of P that are
allowed by physical law. However, from the definition of ob-
ject state space volume (Definition [10]) we pick the relation
V [SOO(A,υ)] = V [SOO(A,υ ′)]. It means that for each exact
object state ZO with value p j of the fundamental property P
there is another exact object state with value pk of P. In this
sense, each value p j of P must be considered equally likely,
and there is no other sense in which we can compare the like-
lihood of different values if we consider O˜ in isolation. This
basic fact can be seen as an expression of the assumption of a
priori equal probabilities for microscipic states that is used in
statistical mechanics.
However, in the present approach to physics quasiobjects O˜
should never be considered in isolation; they are abstract enti-
ties secondary to the directly perceived macroscopic objects O
(Section III B). For the sake of discussion, let us nevertheless
treat a quasiobject like an electron as if it were a specimen OS
that could be observed directly. Then we could throw away the
apparatus OA with the detector OD and decide its state with
our bare eyes. In that case we could write OS = O in Fig. 25,
and we would get SC = SOO, as well as V [~SO j] =V [SP j].
Referring to Fig. 26, we may say that the state SOO would
expand until it reached the boundary of SC. If we were about
to observe a fundamental property P of the specimen with m
possible values, we would get V [SP j] =V [SPk] for all pairs of
indices ( j,k), since for each exact object state ZO for which
the value of P is p j there is another such state Z′O for which
the value is pk and all the other properties of the specimen
are kept fixed. This means that V [~SO j] = V [~SOk] for all pairs
( j,k). In terms of the relative volume v[~SO j,SOO] we would
get v[~SO j,SOO(n)] = v[SP j,SC(n)] = 1/m for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. In
other words, all probabilites q j would always be equal to 1/m
according to Eq. 49.
This consideration again shows that the non-trivial content
of the concept of probability cannot reside in a quasiobject
like an electron itself, but must be attributed to the macro-
scopic apparatus OA with which is probed. Put differently,
knowledge about probabilities cannot be encoded in the state
of the electron itself, but only in the state of the apparatus OA
with which we observe it. For example, if we have an experi-
mental context C in which we measure the electronic spin P in
a given direction, and after that the spin P′ in another direction
at an angle φ relative to the first direction, then the probability
to see a given pair of spin values (p j, p j′) is a function of φ ,
which in turn is a function of the spatial relation between the
two detectors used to measure P and P′, respectively. These
detectors are parts of the apparatus OA, rather than parts of the
specimen OS.
To demonstrate that the present notion of probability gives
rise to the correct probability in the frequentist sense, we
may formulate the equivalent of Borel’s law of large numbers.
Consider a series of N observations of the same property P
of object O, where O is prepared in identical states SOO be-
fore each observation, and the same complete set of future
alternatives {~SO j} corresponding to the set of property val-
ues {p j} is defined for each observation of P. If the relative
volume v[~SO j,SOO] is known, then the probability to get p j is
q j = v[~SO j,SOO] at each of the N observations.
We can regard this setup as a single experimental context
C with an initial state SOON(n) ⊂ SO in which N properties
P = P′ = . . . = P(N) are observed in sequence, according to
Definition 17. For this context we can define the future al-
ternative ~SOK that corresponds to the circumstance that prop-
erty value p j is observed at least K− εN times, and no more
than K + εN times. Here we let ε > 0, and we require that
K− εN ≥ 0 and K+ εN ≤ N.
For any such ε we get v[~SOK ,SOON ]→ 1 as N → ∞ if and
only if Nq j ∈ [K−εN,K+εN]. In simple language we would
say that if K is the number of times the value p j is observed
in N trials, then the probability is one that K/N → q j as
N→ ∞. Since the relative state space volumes v[~SO j,SOO(n)]
fulfil Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability whenever {~SO j} is
a complete set of future alternatives, this statement can be
proved in the same way as usual [24].
VIII. ELEMENTS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
In this section we will argue that quantum mechanics
emerges as the only generally applicable algebraic representa-
tion of experimental contexts C that respects the guiding prin-
ciples for physical law discussed in Section IV.
A. State representations
A physical state S is a set in state space S of unattainable
states Z of complete knowledge about the world. In order
to do physics, we have to represent these states symbolically
or algebraically. We let S¯ denote such a representation of S,
which encodes the knowledge contained in S.
The representation of a state S may be complete, meaning
that all potential knowledge contained in S is represented or
encoded in S¯. In that case we write
S¯ ↪→ S. (52)
The representation may also be partial, meaning that only
some knowledge of interest is represented. In this case we
write
S¯ ⇀ S. (53)
Of course, the same state S can be represented in different
ways. We may have S¯ ↪→ S as well as S¯′ ↪→ S even if S¯ 6= S¯′.
A simple example is a state in which there are two objects O1
and O2 with a known spatial distance d12 between them. This
state can be partially represented by assigning two positions
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r1 and r2 to the two objects. But the choice of positions is
arbitrary as long as |r1− r2| = d12. A change of the coordi-
nate system does not change the state, just the representation
of it. Since physical law by definition acts upon and changes
the physical state, it must be insensitive to changes of repre-
sentation that do not affect the state itself. These matters are
further discussed in Ref. [20].
Analogous considerations apply to object states SO ⊂ S
and SOO⊂SO. Their representations are denoted S¯O and S¯OO,
respectively.
Consider a complete set of future alternatives {~SO j} (Defi-
nition 14) with relative volumes {v j} ≡ {v[~SO j,SOO]}, where
these alternatives correspond to the observations of values
{p′j} of property P. For any such state and any such set of
alternatives we may write
S¯OO ≡
[
~SO1 ~SO2 . . . ~SOM
v1 v2 . . . vM
]
↪→ SOO. (54)
This representation is complete since SOO =
⋃
j
~SO j. We may
even say that it is over-determined, since the relative volumes
{v j} are functions of {~SO j}. The alternatives are objects that
are external to the observed object to which they refer, as dis-
cussed in Section VI B. We may therefore say that S¯OO, as
defined in Eq. [54] is also a partial representation of the envi-
ronment ΩO to O, so that we may write S¯OO ⇀ S.
If another complete set of future alternatives {~S′O j} that cor-
responds to the values {p′j} of another property P′ of O is
defined by some subject, we may, of course, express the alter-
native representation
S¯OO ≡
[
~S′O1 ~S
′
O2 . . .
~S′OM
v′1 v
′
2 . . . v
′
M
]
↪→ SOO. (55)
The set-theoretical linearity of the evolution operator (Eq.
[40]) and the invariance of the relative volumes under evolu-
tion (Eq. [51]) allow us to write
u¯O1S¯OO ≡
[
u¯O1~SO1 uO1~SO2 . . . uO1~SOM
v1 v2 . . . vM
]
↪→ uO1SOO.
(56)
Formally, we may rearrange the schema [54] as follows:
S¯OO = v1S¯O1+ v2S¯O2+ . . .+ vM S¯OM. (57)
However, this representation attains algebraic meaning only if
we can show that the forms AB and A+B can be manipulated
as if they represent multiplication and addition, respectively.
Considering Eq. [56], we note to begin with that this repre-
sentation allows us to call the evolution operator uO1 linear, at
least in a formal sense.
u¯O1S¯OO = v1u¯O1S¯O1+ v2u¯O1S¯O2+ . . .+ vM u¯O1S¯OM. (58)
We have put bars over uO1 and ~SO j at the right hand side
of Eqs. [57] and [58], in contrast to the state representa-
tions shown in Eqs. [54] and [56]. We have chosen to do
so in to open up the possibility that the future alternatives ~SO j
may themselves be represented in the same way as SOO. In
other words, we want the representation [57] to allow recur-
sive representations of arbitrary depth. This is relevant in ex-
perimental contexts C in which several properties P,P′, . . . are
observed in succession. To keep the notation fairly simple,
we have removed the arrow on top of the future alternatives to
make room for the bar.
Along this line of thought, suppose that there are two com-
plete sets of future alternatives applying to the same initial
state SOO of the same object O, as expressed in Eqs. [54] and
[55]. We may then write
S¯O j ≡
[
~SO j1 ~SO j2 . . . ~SO jM′
v j1 v j2 . . . v jM′
]
↪→~SO j, (59)
where
~SO j j′ ≡~SO j ∩~SO j′ (60)
and v j j′ ≡ v[~SO j j′ ,~SO j]. The set {~SO j j′} j can be regarded as a
complete set of future alternatives for the state ~SO j in which
it has become known that the value of property P is p j, and
we are about to observe property P′, provided P and P′ are
simultaneously knowable (Fig. VI C).
In the case M = M′ = 2, the recursive version of represen-
tation [57] can be expressed as
S¯OO = v1(v11~SO11+ v12~SO12)+ v2(v21~SO11+ v22~SO12). (61)
Now, the two properties P and P′ observed in succession
may equally well be regarded as a single property with pos-
sible vectorial values {(p j, p j′)}. Then {~SO j j′} j j′ becomes a
complete set of future alternatives for the state~SOO before any
property P or P′ is observed. The corresponding relative vol-
umes can be expressed as v jv j j′ = v[~SO j j′ ,~SOO]. In this case
SOO should be represented according to Eq. [57] as
S¯OO = v1v11~SO11+ v1v12~SO12+ v2v21~SO11+ v2v22~SO12. (62)
Comparing Eqs. [61] and [62] we see that the distributive law
holds in the representation [54].
B. Representation of the contextual state
The above discussion about algebraic respresentations uses
two arbitrary complete sets of future alternatives as a starting
point, as represented in Eqs. [54] and [55], disregarding their
knowability level and the relation between them in an actual
experimental context C (Definition 17). We turn to such mat-
ters now.
32
In so doing, we try to represent the contextual state SC (Def-
inition [18]) of the specimen OS, rather than the state SOO of
the entire experimental setup O (Fig. 25). This reason is that
SC(n) encodes the relevant knowledge about the values of the
properties observed within context, whereas SOO contains a lot
of additional knowledge about the details about the apparatus
OA used to observe OS. This means that the symbols S¯O j in
Eq. [57] themselves represent quite complex knowledge that
is most often irrelevant to the outcome of the experiment in
terms of bare property values p j, p j′ and so on.
Nevertheless, there is one quantity encoded in the apparatus
OA that we indeed want to represent, namely the probability
for the different outcomes (Section VII). This rules out the
naı¨ve representation
S¯C ≡
[
SP1 SP2 . . . SPM
vP1 vP2 . . . vPM
]
↪→ SC, (63)
where {SP j} are the property value states (Definition 16),
since we have vP1 = vP2 = . . . = vPM for fundamental prop-
erties. These numbers tell us nothing about probabilities, as
discussed in Section VII in relation to Fig. 26.
We therefore seek another representation of the same form
as [54] that is meaningful in all kinds of contexts C, regard-
less whether the observed properties are fundamental or not
(Section VI D). In general we may thus write
S¯C =
[
SP1 SP2 . . . SPM
a1 a2 . . . aM
]
, (64)
where the numbers a j are related in some as yet undetermined
way to the relative volumes vO j of the future alternatives ~SO j,
and thus to the probability to find property value p j in an ac-
tual observation within the context C.
In other words, the numbers {a j} are contextual, referring
not primarily to the contextual ‘naked’ state SC of the speci-
men OS that we investigate, but to the state of the entire ex-
perimental setup O, of which the specimen is just a small part.
That {a j} points outwards from OS to the means OA by which
we observe it means that the representation S¯C of SC is even
more contextual than SC itself.
This means that S¯C is not only a complete representation of
SC, but an over-determined one, so that we may safely write
S¯C ↪→ SC according Eq. [52]. On the other hand it is just
a partial representation of the entire setup O since we disre-
gard every detail of O but the possible property values and
the probabilities to see them, which we hope to capture via
the numbers {a j}. Therefore S¯C ⇀ SOO according Eq. [53].
This means that the initial states SOO(n) and SOO′(n) of dif-
ferent contexts C and C′ may have the same representation:
S¯C ⇀ SOO and S¯C ⇀ SO′O′ .
We propose the following re-expression of the representa-
tion [64]:
S¯C = a1S¯P1+a2S¯P2+ . . .+aM S¯PM. (65)
TABLE III: Desiderata for the algebraic representation [65] of the
contextual state
1 The numbers {a j} can be used to calculate the probability q j to
observe the value p j of any property P observed within context
whenever this probability exists.
2 We can define a contextual evolution operator uC whose repre-
sentation is formally linear, meaning that
u¯CS¯C = a1u¯CS¯P1 +a2u¯CS¯P2 + . . .+aM u¯CS¯PM .
3 The distributive law holds for the numbers {a j} and the repre-
sentations of the property value states {SP j}, meaning that
a1(a2 +a3)S¯P j = (a1a2 +a1a3)S¯P j = a1a2S¯P j +a1a3S¯P j
for any triplet (a1,a2,a3) of such numbers that may appear in
Eq. [65].
4 The form of the representation is generally valid: it applies to
all kinds of experimental contexts C, regardless the number of
properties observed in succession and their knowability levels
(Table II), always respecting the principle of epistemic closure
(Section IV D).
We do so since the analogous representation expressed in Eq.
[57] shows some appealing characteristics. It keeps its form
when it is used recursively to represent the observation of sev-
eral properties in a sequence. In so doing, we saw that it is
possible to interpret the expression algebraically in the sense
that the distribute laws hold for the real numbers vx (Eqs. [61]
and [62]). Also, the evolution operator uO1 can be interpreted
to be linear (Eq. [58]). We hope that these characteristics can
be carried over to the representation [65], and that even more
beneficial characteristics can be found.
More precisely, we formulate the four desiderata for the
representation [65] listed in Table III.
The evolution of SC depends on the entire experimental
setup O and its evolution. We may define the contextual evo-
lution operator uC such that u¯CS¯C(n) represents the contextual
state just before the observation of property P at time n+m.
That is, the temporal update n+m− 1→ n+m corresponds
to a state reduction
uCSC(n)→ SC(n+m)⊂ uCSC(n), (66)
where uC = uC[SO(n)]. Similarly, u¯CS¯C(n+m) represents the
contextual state just before the observation of property P′ at
time n+m′, so that the temporal update n+m′− 1→ n+m′
corresponds to a state reduction
uCSC(n+m)→ SC(n+m′)⊂ uCSC(n+m). (67)
C. Born’s rule
To fulfil the desideratum in Table III that the representation
[65] makes it possible to calculate the probability for a given
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alternative, a given set of numbers {a j} must correspond to a
single set of relative volumes {v j}, and thus to a given set of
probabilities {q j}. That is, we require
{v j}= f ({a j}). (68)
Of course, SC can still be seen as a legitimate state of an object
(the specimen), and can therefore be represented as in Eq. [57]
using relative volumes v j rather than as in [65] using numbers
a j. This situation occurs when all knowledge of the context
dissipates, so that SOO grows to fill the entire state SC (Fig.
26). To make these two representations consistent we require
v j = f (a j). (69)
There is no need to require a priori that the function f is in-
vertible, given the purpose of the representation [65] that we
seek, which is to keep track of property values and probabili-
ties.
It turns out that there is only one function f that makes it
possible to fulfil the four desiderata listed in Table III, as well
as a couple of other conditions to be discussed below, which
concern the freedom to choose the details of the experimental
setup. To demonstrate this fact it is sufficient to consider a
simple family of experimental contexts C in which only two
properties P and P′ are observed, having two observable val-
ues each. After having done that we discuss why this unique
choice of f is acceptable also in more general families of con-
texts (Definition 17).
A concrete example of such a family of contexts is given
by an adjustable Mach-Zehnder interferometer, as illustrated
in Fig. 28.
Consider Fig. 29. As usual, the observational context is as-
sumed to be initiated at time n, and properties P and P′ attain
their values at times n+m and n+m′, respectively (Defini-
tions 17 and 18). We use the vague phrase ‘attain their values’
rather than ‘are observed’, since we allow for the case where
P has knowability level 1 (Table II).
Consider first the case where property P has knowability
level 3 [Fig. 29(a)]. At initial time n we have
S¯C(n) = a1S¯P1+a2S¯P2. (70)
Evolving this contextual state we get u¯CS¯C(n) = a1u¯CS¯P1 +
a2u¯CS¯P2 = a1S¯P1 + a2S¯P2 since the property value states SP j
are not time-dependent, where we have used the linearity of
u¯C according to the list of desiderata in Table III. A state re-
duction then takes place according to Eq. [66], and value p1
or p2 is revealed:
S¯C(n+m) = S¯P j (71)
for j = 1 or j = 2. If the probabilities q1 and q2 of these
alternatives are defined, we have q j = v j = f (a j). At time
n+m′ a second state reduction takes place, at which the value
of P′ is revealed. The state that reduces is
FIG. 28: Graphical representation of experimental contexts in which
binary values of two properties P and P′ are attained. Solid lines di-
vide future alternatives corresponding to a property for which the
value will be decided (knowability level 3). Interrupted lines di-
vide alternatives corresponding to a property for which the value
can never be decided (knowability level 1) a) A single property P
at knowability level 3 is defined. b) Two such properties P and P′
are defined, where the value of P is decided first, then the value of
P′. c) A single property P′ at knowability level 3 is defined, but its
value is revealed after the unknowable value of P is attained. Each
of the cases can be implemented by an adjustable Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer. Property P corresponds to the passage of the left or
right mirror, and P′ corresponds to the final absorption to the left or
right. The prescence of a detector to decide the value of the property
is marked by the letter D.
u¯CS¯C(n+m) = a j1S¯PP′ j1+a j2S¯PP′ j2, (72)
where j′ = 1 or j′ = 2, and
SPP′ j j′ ≡ SP j ∩SP′ j′ . (73)
We get
S¯C(n+m′) = S¯PP′ j j′ , (74)
according to Eq. [67]. If the probabilities q′1 and q
′
2 associated
with the alternatives for P′ are also defined, we get
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FIG. 29: The evolution in the setup depicted in Fig. 28 in terms of
the contextual state SC and the property value states SP j. Panel a)
shows the case in which properties P and P′ both have knowability
level 3 according to Table II, and the values p1 and p′1 are realized in
succession. Panel b) shows the case in which property P has knowa-
bility level 1. Again, property P′ has knowability level 3, and the
value p′1 is realized.
q′j′ = f (a1) f (a1 j′)+ f (a2) f (a2 j′) (75)
according to the classical axioms of probability, where
f (a j) = v[~SO j,SOO(n)] and f (a j j′) = v[~SO j j′ ,SOO(n+m)] =
v[~SO j j′ ,~SO j] [Figs. 28(b) and 29(a)].
Consider now the case where property P has knowabil-
ity level 1 [Fig. 29(b)]. As before, we may write S¯C(n) =
a1S¯P1 +a2S¯P2 and u¯CS¯C(n) = a1S¯P1 +a2S¯P2. The question is
how to handle what happens at time n+m. We know (con-
textually) that P has attained value p1 or p2 but it is forever
outside potential knowledge which of these values apply. No
state reduction occurs, but epistemic completeness (Section
IV C) requires that we somehow account for the knowledge
that ‘one of the two alternatives has occurred’ in the repre-
sentation of the contextual state. Most natural is to do it by
writing
S¯C(n+m) = a1S¯C1(n+m)+a2S¯C2(n+m) (76)
where SC1 and SC2 are two hypothetical contextual states that
would have applied if the corresponding alternative had oc-
curred. This means that
S¯C j(n+m) = S¯P j (77)
for j = 1 or j = 2.
At time n+m′ a state reduction does finally take place. The
state that reduces is
u¯CS¯C(n+m) = a1u¯CS¯C1(n+m)+a2u¯CS¯C2(n+m) (78)
according to the linearity of uC in the formal algebraic repre-
sentation. Comparing with Eq.[77] we still have
u¯CS¯C j(n+m) = S¯P j (79)
for j = 1 or j = 2. We should also write
u¯CS¯C j(n+m) = a j1S¯P′1+a j2S¯P′2. (80)
This expression is different from Eq. [72], since in the present
case we have no knowledge about the value of P after the final
state reduction within context. We get
u¯CS¯C(n+m) = a1u¯CS¯C1(n+m)+a2u¯CS¯C2(n+m)
= a1(a11S¯P′1+a12S¯P′2)+a2(a21S¯P′1+a22S¯P′2)
= (a1a11+a2a21)S¯P′1+(a1a12+a2a22)S¯P′2,
(81)
where we have made use of the distributive laws expressed in
the list of desiderata in Table III. These laws give the repre-
sentation algebraic meaning. Finally,
S¯C(n+m′) = S¯P′ j′ (82)
for j′ = 1 or j′ = 2. Equation [81] means that the probabil-
ity that the evolved contextual state uCSC(n+m)will reduce to
SP′1 is f (a1a11+a2a21), and the probability that it will reduce
to SP′2 is f (a1a12 + a2a22), provided that these probabilities
exist. In short,
q′j′ = f (a1a1 j′ +a2a2 j′). (83)
We argued in Section IV B that we should not treat the case
where the value of property P is unknowable as if we can ac-
tually know it. According to the principle of explicit epistemic
minimalism we get the wrong answers if we do. In the present
sitution this means that the probability [83] must be different
than in the case [75] where the value of P becomes known,
and can sometimes be associated with a probability q j. That
is,
f (a1a1 j′ +a2a2 j′) 6= f (a1) f (a1 j′)+ f (a2) f (a2 j′). (84)
We may put the reason why different equations must hold
in the two cases another way, as a consequence of epistemic
35
completeness (Section IV C). The fundamental epistemic dis-
tinction between knowability levels 1 and 3 must correspond
to a distinction in physical law. Such a distinction can be ex-
pressed only if different equations hold for the probabilities of
the values of P′. To fulfil this condition we must require that
f (a) 6= a. (85)
Given this fact, let us discuss which other functions f are
possible in Eq. [69]. All relative volumes must add to one:
1 = ∑ j v j and 1 = ∑ j′ v j j′ . We get the conditions
1 = f (a1)+ f (a2)
1 = f (a11)+ f (a12)
1 = f (a21)+ f (a22)
1 = f (a1a11+a2a21)+ f (a1a12+a2a22).
(86)
In this connection, we may ask whether the expressions
f (a j j′) in the above system of equations are well-defined. In
the case where both P and P′ have knowability level 3 they are
defined in terms of a realizable future alternative for of a given
object state, as shown in relation to Eq. [75]. But here P has
knowability level 1, so that there are no future alternatives~S j j′
(Fig. 28). Instead we must define f (a j j′) = v[Σ j j′ ,~S j′ ], where
Σ j j′ is an abstract set which corresponds to a quadrant of the
object state shown in Fig. 28(c), but which does not corre-
spond to a realizable alternative. We can nevertheless define
its formally as Σ j j′ = u1SO(n+m′−1)∩P˜ j ∩P˜ ′j′ and write
v j j′ = f (a j j′) =
V [u1SOO(n+m′−1)∩ ~P j ∩ ~P ′j′ ]
V [u1SOO(n+m′−1)∩ ~P j]
. (87)
Since f (a) corresponds to a relative volume, we must re-
quire
0≤ f (a)≤ 1 (88)
for all a in the domain of f , in the addition to the conditions
expressed in Eq. [86]. To determine f from these conditions
we make use of the assumption that the choice of f should re-
flect the fact that the parts of the observational context C that
correspond to properties P and P′ can be arranged indepen-
dently from each other.
One way to express this fact is to say that the parameters
describing the experimental setup that determine the mode of
observation of property P′ are independent from the corre-
sponding parameters that determine the mode of observation
of property P. If both P and P′ have knowability level 3, then
this vague statement can be translated to a statement about
relative volumes.
Statement 3 (Relative volume independence) Consider the
set {C} of all observational contexts C with a given se-
quence . . . ,P,P′, . . . of observed properties where P and P′
have knowability level 3, and with given sets of possible val-
ues . . . ,{p j},{p′j′}, . . .. There are enough elements C in in
{C} so that the relative volumes {v j j′} that describe the mea-
surement of property P′ can be chosen independently from the
relative volumes {v j} that describe a preceding measurement
of P.
This statement is quite trivial and follows from the fact that
the only condition that the relative volumes has to fulfil a pri-
ori is that they add to one: 1 = ∑ j v j and 1 = ∑ j′ v j j′ . These
relations do not mix relative volumes belonging to {v j} with
those belonging to {v j j′}. Therefore relative volumes associ-
ated with a property P are independent from those associated
with another property P′.
If the values of property P are unknowable, then we must
generalize the above statement to account for the fact that the
relative volumes {v j j′}may not be knowable either, since they
do not correspond to a probability q(p′j′ |p j) that is possible
to determine by repeating the experiment a large number of
times. Nevertheless, {v j j′} can still be formally defined in
those cases, as shown in Eq. [87].
However, in a strict epistemic approach we should not refer
to potentially unknowable quantities in a physical statement
about the independence of the properties P and P′, just as we
do not refer directly to the exact states Z when we make state-
ments about the evolution u1 of the physical state S. A more
general version of Statement 3 is then the following, which
must now be seen as an assumption, since it cannot be moti-
vated in the same straightforward way.
Assumption 2 (Property independence) Consider the set
{C} of all possible observational contexts C with a given
sequence . . . ,P,P′, . . . of observed properties where P′ has
knowability level 3, and with given sets of possible values
. . . ,{p j},{p′j′}, . . .. Let {α j} be a set of knowable property
values that describe the part of the observational setup that
is related to the observation of P, and let {α ′j′} be a cor-
responding set relating to P′. Suppose that these parameter
sets are minimal in the sense that they determine the proba-
bility q′j′ to get the value p
′
j′ for each j
′, so that we may write
{q′j′}= f ({α j},{α ′j′}), but if we take away one parameter α j
or α ′j′ this is no longer true. Then there are enough elements C
in {C} so that {α j} can be chosen independently from {α ′j′}.
If property P has knowability level 3, we can choose {α j}=
{v j} and {α j′} = {v j j′}, and we regain Statement 3. These
sets are minimal since q′j′ = ∑ j v jv j j′ for each j
′, but we can-
not take away any element from these sets and still determine
all probabilities q′j′ .
We may ask how many elements are contained in the two
minimal sets of independent parameters {α j} and {α ′j′} that
pertain to properties P and P′, respectively. Suppose that there
are M and M′ possible values of these properties in the context
C. There is then M−1 independent values of v j and M(M′−
1) independent values of v j j′ , taking into account the relations
1 = ∑ j v j and 1 = ∑ j′ v j j′ . These numbers give the requested
number of elements in {α j} and {α ′j′} if both P and P′ have
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knowability level 3, since then we can choose {α j} = {v j}
and {α j′}= {v j j′}. We may argue that the amount of freedom
to choose the experimental setup should never be less than in
this case.
Assumption 3 (Experimental freedom) Consider the set
{C} of all possible observational contexts C with a given
sequence . . . ,P,P′, . . . of observed properties where P′ has
knowability level 3, and with given sets of possible values
. . . ,{p j},{p′j′}, . . .. Suppose that {p j} and {p′j′} contain M
and M′ values, respectively. Then the sets of independent pa-
rameters {α j} and {α ′j′}, as defined in Assumption 2, contain
at least M−1 and M(M′−1) values, respectively.
If we add the numbers M−1 and M(M′−1) we conclude that
there is always at least MM′− 1 free parameters to describe
the observations of P and P′.
We look for a function f (a) such that the numbers a j and
a j j′ can always be used to parametrize the necessary level
of experimental freedom, just as v j and v j j′ can in the cases
where both P and P′ have knowability level 3. Otherwise the
algebraic representation S¯C of the contextual state becomes
useless, since it cannot be used to calculate probabilities for
the possible outcomes in all kinds of experiments. The whole
point of the search for f (a) is that we should find a func-
tion that makes the form of the representation [65] gener-
ally applicable, regardless the number of observed properties,
their knowability level, and their sets of possible values. This
means that we should be able to write
{α j} = F({a j})
{α ′j′} = F ′({a j j′}).
(89)
It then follows from property independence that f (a) is also
such that the elements in {a j} and {a j j′} can be chosen inde-
pendently.
If both P and P′ have knowability level 3 [Fig. 29(a)] we
could identify {α j} = {v j} and {α ′j′} = {v j j′} with the in-
dependent parameter sets introduced in Assumption 2. We
cannot in general do the corresponding identifications {α j}=
{a j} and {α ′j′} = {a j j′}. The parameters α j and α j′ are de-
fined in Assumption 2 as values of properties that define the
design of the observational context C, which must be assumed
to be known a priori. This means that they should not only be
knowable, but already known at the start of the experiment at
time n. In contrast, the relative volumes v j and v j j′ , as well
as the numbers a j and a j j′ may be unknowable in principle
when it is unknowable which value of P is attained, when this
property has knowability level 1. In that case the functions F
and F ′ in Eq. [89] are unknowable, even though it is known
that they exist.
The assumptions 2 and 3 make it possible to pinpoint a
single acceptable function f (a), given the other desiderata
listed in Table III. We note first, however, that if proper-
ties P and P′ both have knowability 3 within context, then
any function f (a) will do. In that case property indepen-
dence and experimental freedom is automatically fulfilled.
The fourth condition in Eq. [86] is replaced by 1 = q′1+q
′
2 =
f (a1) f (a11)+ f (a2) f (a21)+ f (a1) f (a12)+ f (a2) f (a22) ac-
cording to the classical axioms of probability (see Eq. [75]).
This condition follows from the first three conditions in Eq.
[86], and is therefore not independent. This circumstance ac-
counts for the fact that no restriction on f (a) can be derived.
In what follows, we therefore focus on the case where P has
knowablity level 1 and P′ has knowability level 3. We will see
that the existence of the fourth condition in Eq. [86] is crucial,
together with the requirement that the representation allows
experimental freedom.
Let us first make a general observation that we must allow
complex a. No function f : R→ R such that f (a) 6= a fulfils
conditions [86], and can also be used to parametrize the nec-
essary level of experimental freedom (Assumption 3). If all ax
are restricted to be real and f (a) 6= a, we have four conditions
in Eq. [86] that relate six real numbers a1,a2,a11,a12,a21 and
a22. In that case two independent real parameters are sufficient
determine the probabilities q′k, whereas experimental freedom
(Assumption 3) requires that at least MM′−1 = 3 are neces-
sary, since M = M′ = 2.
One could try to identify the quantities ax with members
of another collection (ring) of mathematical objects than the
complex numbers (requiring that addition and multiplication
is defined and yield another member of the same collection).
We might, for example, consider vectors of three real num-
bers, or matrices. The discussion below will show, however,
that complex numbers will do the job as arguments a in a
unique function f (a), so that there is point in trying out more
complicated mathematical objects.
Thus, we assume that f : C → R. We may then write
v = f (a) = g(x,y), where a = x+ iy and g : R2 → R. We
then ask which functions g(x,y) fulfil the requirements ex-
pressed in Eqs. [85], [86], and [88], as well as property inde-
pendence and experimental freedom (Assumptions 2 and 3).
We argue without proof that the only function that does the job
is g(x,y) = x2 + y2, that is, f (a) = |a|2. This can be seen by
inserting the Taylor expansion g(x,y) = ∑∞m,n=0 dmnxmyn into
Eq. [86] and checking in what cases property independence
and experimental freedom can be upheld. The general expres-
sions become messy, but the lesson is that more terms and
higher exponents make it impossible to comply with property
independence and experimental freedom if we insist on ful-
filling the other requirements. We take a shortcut through this
mess by arguing that f (a) should fulfil one additional condi-
tion, which makes the argument why f (a) = |a|2 is the only
possible choice much easier.
If we write the evolution of the contextual state represen-
tation S¯C sequentially in the case where both P and P′ have
knowability level 3 [Fig. 29(a)] we get the temporal sequence
of contextual state representations starting with Eq. [70]. The
probability q j j′ to see the property values p j and p′j′ becomes
q j j′ = f (a j) f (a j j′). However, we may also regard (P,P′) as
one single property with values (p j, p′j′), just like we did in
the motivation of Eq. [62]. This vectorial value is decided at
time n+m′. We may therefore write
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u¯CS¯C(n+m)= a1a11S¯PP′11+a1a12S¯PP′12+a2a21S¯PP′21+a2a22S¯PP′22.
(90)
In this way we see that q j j′ = v j j′ = f (a ja j j′). Thus the func-
tion f (a) must also fulfil
f (axay) = f (ax) f (ay). (91)
There are only two operations on a pair of complex numbers
that have this property, namely complex conjugation and ex-
ponentiation. That is, we must have f (a) = (a∗)γaη . Since
f (a) is real we hve to require γ = η , so that
f (a) = |a|2γ , (92)
where γ is a positive integer.
Let us check first that the choice f (a) = |a|2 is acceptable,
as claimed. Consider again the case where property P has
knowability level 1, and P′ has knowability level 3. Inserting
this ansatz in Eq. [86] we get
1 = |a1|2+ |a2|2
1 = |a11|2+ |a12|2
1 = |a21|2+ |a22|2
0 = a1a∗2(a11a
∗
21+a12a
∗
22)+
a∗1a2(a
∗
11a21+a
∗
12a22).
(93)
Suppose that a given choice {a j} and {a j j′} satisfies the last
equation. Property independence (Assumption 2) then means
that we should be allowed to vary {a j j′} freely for the given
choice of {a j}, or vice versa, and the equality would still hold.
To make this possible we must require that the following rela-
tion is always fulfilled.
0 = a11a∗21+a12a
∗
22. (94)
This relation corresponds to two equations that relate the
eight real parameters in the set {x j j′ ,y j j′}, where a j j′ = x j j′+
iy j j′ . The second and third lines in Eq. [93] give two more
conditions, so that we have four free parameters that are re-
lated to the setup to measure the value of P′. The necessary
minimum number of free parameters is two according to As-
sumption 3. The first line in Eq. [93] gives one condition that
relates the four real parameters {x j,y j}, where a j = x j + iy j.
We have thus three free parameters that are related to the setup
to measure the value of P, whereas the minimum number is
just one in order to respect experimental freedom. We con-
clude that the choice f (a) = |a|2 for complex a is acceptable
in experimental contexts involving two properties P and P′
with two possible values each.
Let us next try f (a) = |a|4. If we require property indepen-
dence, we get the following conditions that relate the numbers
a j j′ , describing the setup to measure property P′:
0 = a11a21a∗21a
∗
21+a12a22a
∗
22a
∗
22
0 = a11a11a∗21a
∗
21+a12a12a
∗
22a
∗
22
0 = a11a∗11a21a
∗
21+a12a
∗
12a22a
∗
22
0 = a11a11a∗11a
∗
21+a12a12a
∗
12a
∗
22
(95)
These relations should be compared to the corresponding
Eq. [94] that holds for f (a) = |a|2. They correspond to
eight conditions that relate the eight real parameters in the
set {x j j′ ,y j j′}. The second and third lines in Eq. [93] give
two more conditions, so that we have ten independent con-
ditions, preventing any solution at all with property indepen-
dence. Thus the choice f (a) = |a|4 for complex a is not ac-
ceptable.
It is easy too see that the higher exponent γ is used in Eq.
[92], the more independent conditions like those in Eq. [95]
appear when we demand property independence. This fact
spoils all chances to get any solution at all for γ > 1.
Having concluded in this way that f (a) = |a|2 is the only
acceptable choice in the simple situation with two properties
P and P′ with two property values each, we must also check
that it is acceptable in more complex situations with more than
two properties that can take more than two values.
Figure 30 shows some of the simplest of these more com-
plex cases. Sequential time n flows upwards in these dia-
grams. Each circle represents the ‘event’ that a property value
px is attained. The contextual numbers ax are related to the
relative volume of the event at the end point of the associated
arrow given the event at the starting point. If this latter event
is knowable (if the corresponding property has knowability
level 3), this relative volume may correspond to a probability
for the event at the end point of the arrow given the event at
the starting point.
The context depicted in Fig. 30(b) gives rise to the follow-
ing relation for the numbers a j j′ when P has knowability level
1, and we require property independence (compare Eq. [94]):
0 = a11a∗21+a12a
∗
22+a13a
∗
23. (96)
This relation corresponds to two conditions that relate twelve
real parameters. The equations that correspond to the require-
ment 1 = ∑ j v j j′ give three more conditions, so that we have
left seven independent real parameters describing the setup to
measure property P′. This is more than enough to fulfil exper-
imental freedom.
If we have more than two properties that are observed in
succession, we get a new set of relations of the type in Eqs.
[94] and [96] for each such property at knowability level 1
when we demand property independence. For the context in
Fig. 30(c) we get
0 = a11a∗21+a12a
∗
22
0 = a′11(a
′
21)
∗+a′12(a
′
22)
∗.
(97)
It is easily understood that experimental freedom is respected
in cases such as that as well. If we have more than two pos-
sible values of P, we also get more than one relation of this
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FIG. 30: Experimental contexts depicted as ‘networks of alterna-
tives’. The nodes at each row correspond to the values of a given
property that are possible in the given context. The numbers ax are
seen as relations between the possible values of sequentially realized
properties. Time flows upwards, as indicated by the directed edges.
The context in panel a) is the one shown in 28. In more complex con-
texts, the visual representation introduced here is easier to interpret.
We do not distinguish graphically between different knowability lev-
els in this figure, but this can, of course, be accomplished by marking
the nodes or the edges in different ways.
type when property independence is required. For the context
in Fig. 30(d) we get
0 = a11a∗21+a12a
∗
22
0 = a11a∗31+a12a
∗
32
0 = a21a∗31+a22a
∗
32.
(98)
Here we have six conditions relating twelve real parameters.
The requirement 1=∑ j v j j′ gives three conditions more. Thus
we are left with three real parameters which equals the mini-
mum number M(M′−1) needed to respect experimental free-
dom (Assumption 3). Here we are approaching a problem. If
we increase the number of possible values M of P from three
to four, and still have M′ = 2 possible values of P′, we get six
relations of the type in Eq. [98]. This means twelve conditions
relating sixteen real parameters. The requirement 1 = ∑ j v j j′
gives four conditions more, so that we have at most a unique
solution {a j j′} when we demand property independence. Ex-
perimental freedom is obviously not respected. This problem
arises when M > M′, and gets worse as M−M′ gets bigger.
Does this mean that there are contexts in which the choice
f (a) = |a|2 is not acceptable, so that we fail in the search for
a function f (a) that makes the representation [65] generally
applicable? No, we are saved by the elusive relation between
the numbers a j j′ and the knowable, tangible physical proper-
ties that describe the experiment.
We may simply regard the set of contexts in which M >
M′ as contexts in which M = M′ and the set of probabili-
ties {q′M′+1,q′M′+2, . . . ,q′M} to see the last M−M′ values of
property P′ are set to zero. In such contexts we regain the
necessary experimental freedom (Assumption 3) that should
be reflected in the representation. This is so since we add
M(M−M′) numbers a j j′ , corresponding to 2M(M−M′) new
real parameters, while we only add M−M′ conditions that
relate all real parameters that occur in the representation, cor-
responding to
q′M′+1 = q
′
M′+2 = . . .= q
′
M = 0. (99)
We may argue that we should also set all correspond-
ing relative volumes v j(M′+1),v j(M′+2), . . . ,v jM and numbers
a j(M′+1),a j(M′+2), . . . ,a jM to zero, in order to really erase the
ghostly presence of the imagined extra M−M′ values of prop-
erty P′. If we do this, the point of the trick is lost, since then
we introduce as many new real parameters as we introdude
conditions relating them. The degree of experimental freedom
in the representation does not increase.
However, the procedure to add hypothetical values to P′ is
needed only when the knowability level of P is 1, when the
value this property attains is forever unknowable. In that case
a j j′ and v j j′ are also unknowable in principle. (To determine
v j j′ would mean to repeat the experiment many times until
the conditional probability q(p′j′ |p j) is determined. But this
would require that we know in which repetitions the value p j
of P was attained.) Therefore we should not refer to a j j′ or
v j j′ explicitly when we demand that the context is physically
arranged so that imagined new values of P′ are not observable.
That would go against explicit epistemic minimalism (Section
IV B). We should only refer to the knowable final probabilities
q(p′j′) = q
′
j′ .
If, on the other hand, P has knowability level 3, just as P′,
then it is equivalent to demand that q′j′ = 0 and to demand
that q(p′j′ |p j) = v j j′ = f (a j j′) = 0 for all j. We may intro-
duce imagined values of P′ and erase them again by setting
the relevant probablities or relative volumes to zero, but there
is absolutely no point to it - nothing changes in the represen-
tation.
Statement 4 (Born’s rule) Consider the formal algebraic
representation [65] of the contextual state SC of the experi-
mental context C (Definition 17), where the relative volume
v j of the corresponding future alternative ~SO j is given by
v j = f (a j). An acceptable choice of function f (a) is such that
it makes this representation fulfil the four desiderata listed in
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Table III. An acceptable choice also allows property indepen-
dence (Assumption 2) as well as the necessary degree of ex-
perimental freedom (Assumption 3). The choice f (a) = |a|2,
where f :C→R, is acceptable in this sense, and it is the only
acceptable choice.
D. The Hilbert space
The form of relations [94], [96], [97], and [98] resembles
that of inner products in a vector space. We may treat them as
actual Hermitian inner products in a complex vector space if
we formally define the orthonormality relation
δi j = 〈S¯P′i, S¯P′ j〉, (100)
where δi j is the Kronecker delta. Then the condition [94]
translates to
0 = a11a∗21+a12a
∗
22
= 〈a11S¯P′1+a12S¯P′2,a21S¯P′1+a22S¯P′2〉
= 〈u¯CS¯C1, u¯CS¯C2〉,
(101)
where the representations S¯C1 and S¯C2 of the corresponding
‘hypothetical contextual states’ are introduced in Eq. [76].
Consider the general case where a property P at knowabil-
ity level 1, with an arbitrary number of possible values, is ob-
served before another property P′, which also has an arbitrary
number of possible values. Then the conditions corresponding
to Eq. [94] can be collapsed to the relation
∀i j : δi j = 〈u¯CS¯Ci, u¯CS¯C j〉. (102)
We see from Eqs. [77] and [79] that S¯C j = u¯CS¯C j = S¯P j.
Therefore Eq. [102] implies
δi j = 〈S¯Pi, S¯P j〉. (103)
Further, Eqs. [77] and [80] mean that we may write
S¯P j = a j1S¯P′1+a j2S¯P′2, (104)
so that Eq. [103] implies
a j j′ = 〈S¯P j, S¯P′ j′〉. (105)
We should keep in mind, however, that the relations [104] and
[105] are only defined contextually within C via the hypothet-
ical contextual states SC j.
The conditions of the form [94] arose because we required
that the representation [65] should be able to express property
independence. Therefore the orthonormality relations [102]
and [103] can be seen as consequences of this requirement.
This goes for the inner product [105] as well, meaning that the
FIG. 31: Three kinds of representations of an experimental context
which involves two properties P and P′ at knowability levels 1 and
3, respectively, and in which P and P′ have two possible values each.
Compare Figs. 28 and 30.
sets {S¯P j} and {S¯P′ j′} can be seen as two different orthonor-
mal bases in the same complex vector spaceHC.
To be able to illustrate these facts in a simple manner, let us
focus again on the basic context in Fig. 30(a). We see that we
have now developed three ways to describe the same situation,
as shown in Fig. 31. We have the familiar state space descrip-
tion, the description as a network of alternatives, and now we
also have a description in terms of a two-dimensional com-
plex vector space, which we may callHC [Fig. 31(c)]. Since
the numbers ax are contextual, so is the entire vector space
HC. More precisely, it is defined only within an observational
context C, as introduced in Defintion 17.
The complex vector space representation arose naturally in
experimental contexts C in which two properties P and P′ are
involved, and the values of P have knowability level 1 accord-
ing to Table II. This is one of the three possible types of ex-
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TABLE IV: Types of experimental contexts C involving two proper-
ties. The knowability levels are listed in Table II.
(a) Property P has knowability 1 and P′ has knowability level 3.
(b) Properties P and P′ are simultaneously knowable. Both pro-
perties have knowability level 3.
(c) Properties P and P′ are not simultaneously knowable. Both
properties have knowability level 3.
perimental contexts C involving two properties that are listed
in Table IV. Let us discuss whether contexts of types (b) and
(c) in this list can be represented by a complex vector space
HC in an analogous manner.
We have seen that the principles listed in Table V are ful-
filled by the vector space HC introduced for contexts of type
(a) in Table IV, and we want them to be satisfied in contexts
of the other two types as well.
Regarding principle 1, we identified the representations
{S¯P j} of the property value states {SP j} with orthogonal vec-
tors in HC in the above discussion about contexts of type (a)
in Table IV. However, there are contexts in which we need
to look at them more generally as subspaces, as we will see
below.
Principle 2 should apply regardless whether the mutually
exclusive states can actually be observed within context or not.
For example, we introduced the hypothetical contextual states
SC1 and SC2 that would have applied if we had known the value
of property P in a context of Mach-Zehnder type where P has
knowability level 1 (Eq. [76]). These states are represented as
orthogonal vectors according to Eqs. [101] and [102].
Turning to principle 3, let us denote by M the number of
elements in {p j} and let M′ be the number of elements in
{p′j′}. For Mach-Zehnder type contexts with two possible val-
ues each of properties P and P′ this means that M = M′ = 2
(Fig. 28). For the context shown in Fig. 28(a) in which only P
is observed we get DH = M, since there are two possible out-
comes p1 or p2 of the experiment, which equals the maximum
number of distinct states of knowledge that can be obtained.
For the context shown in Fig. 28(b) there are are two possible
outcomes p′1 or p
′
2 of the experiment, so that we again have
DH = M = M′ = 2, as shown in Fig. 31(c).
More generally, we should choose DH = max{M,M′} in
contexts of type (a) in Table IV. One might argue that if
M > M′ it would suffice that DH = M′, but in such cases we
should add M−M′ ‘virtual’ values of P′ to be able to uphold
experimental freedom (Assumption 3) and to apply Born’s
rule, as discussed in relation to Eq. [99]. Only then is it proper
to seek a vector space representation.
In contexts of type (b) in Table IV we should choose DH =
M×M′. Then the potential knowledge about the specimen
at time n+m′ contains knowledge about the values of both
properties P and P′, and there are M×M′ pairs (p j, p′j′) of
possible such values. In this case the property value spaces
SP j are represented by M′-dimensional subspaces ofHC, and
the spaces SP′ j′ are represented by M-dimensional subspaces.
TABLE V: Principles to be fulfilled by vector space representations
of experimental contexts.
1 To each value pi of any property P that is involved in the context
C is associated a subspace S¯Pi ⊂HC. If p j is another value of P,
then δi j = 〈v¯i, v¯ j〉, whenever v¯i ∈ S¯Pi and v¯ j ∈ S¯P j
2 Any contextual state SC is represented as a unit vector:
〈S¯C, S¯C〉= 1. Any pair of mutually exclusive contextual states
SC and S′C are represented as two orthonormal vectors:
〈S¯C, S¯′C〉= 0. That such states are mutually exclusive means
that SC ∩S′C =∅. Conversely, if SC ∩S′C 6=∅ then 〈S¯C, S¯′C〉 6= 0.
3 Let N(n′) be the number of distinct states of potential knowledge
about the specimen OS that may be obtained at a given time n′.
The dimension DH ofHC can be chosen as
DH = max{N(n),N(n+1), . . . ,N(n+m(F))}.
4 If it is possible to observe property value p j at time n+m, and if
the corresponding probability q j exists, then
q j = |〈u¯CS¯C(n+m−1), S¯P j〉|2.
Such a situation with M = 2 and M′ = 3 is exemplified in Fig.
32.
Principle 4 in Table V expresses Born’s rule in the vector
space language. In the motivation of its original formulation
in Statement 4 we considered choices of functions f (a) that
are acceptable in contexts of types (a) or (b) in Table IV. Hav-
ing sorted out the representation of property value spaces SP j
and the choice of vector space dimension DH in contexts of
type (b) we conclude that all four general principles for vector
space representations are fulfilled by contexts of type (b) apart
from those of type (a).
What is left to do is to demonstrate that such a vector space
representation is possible for contexts of type (c) as well. If
we manage to do this we can safely say that all kinds of ex-
perimental contexts C can be represented in a complex vec-
tor space HC of the desired kind, since contexts of types
(a)-(c) can be used as building blocks to construct all types
of more complicated contexts involving more than two prop-
erties P,P′, . . . ,P(F). At the other end of the spectrum, we
note that an appropriate vector spaceHC can trivially be con-
structed for contexts in which a single property P is observed.
A vector space representation cannot be constructed for
contexts of type (c) in Table IV in the samy way as for contexts
of type (a) or (b). The contextual state SC reduces to one of the
property value states SP j at time n+m (Fig. 29) in contrast to
contexts of type (a). In terms of the algebraic representation
S¯C(n+m) of the contextual state, we get an expression of the
form [71] rather than of form [76].
In contrast to contexts of type (b) we cannot define future
alternatives ~SO j j′ according to Eq. [60] and Fig. 28, corre-
sponding to the event that the value of property P is found
to be p j and the value of P′ is found to be p′j′ . A future
alternative corresponds to a realizable object state according
to Definition 13, meaning that it should be possible to have
SOO ⊆ ~SO j j′ . However such an object state SOO would corre-
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FIG. 32: A context involving two simultaneously knowable prop-
erties P and P′ at knowability level 3, having M = 2 and M′ = 3
possible values, respectively. We choose a vector spaceHC with di-
mension DH = M×M′ = 6. a) We write S j j′ as a short hand form
of the specimen state SPP′ j j′ in object state space SO (Eq. [73]). b)
The property value spaces SP j and SP′ j′ are represented in HC by
3- and 2-dimensional subspaces, respectively. c) The observation of
P corresponds to a projection of the contextual state representation
S¯C down to S¯P j. The subsequent observation of P′ corresponds to a
further projection down to a vector S¯ j j′ , which corresponds to one of
the six specimen states shown in panel a).
spond to a situation where the values of both properties were
simultaneously known, contrary to assumption. This means
that we cannot define a sequence of projections down to one
of M×M′ orthonormal vectors {S¯ j j′} that spans HC in Fig.
32.
According to principle 3 for vector space construction
in Table V, we should rather choose DH = max{M,M′} =
max{N(m+m),N(n+m′)} in contexts of type (c) in Table
IV. For the sake of simplicity, let us focus first on the case
M = M′ = 2, just as we did for contexts of type (a) and (b)
when we considered context of the Mach-Zehnder type shown
in Fig. 28.
What we have to do is to relate the two bases in HC that
correspond to the two complete sets of future alternatives
{~SO1,~SO2} and {~S′O1,~S′O2}. To this end, we take a step back
and focus first on the relation between the properties P and
P′ themselves, rather than the context C in which they are ob-
served.
FIG. 33: Relation between the state space and vector space represen-
tation of two properties P and P′ that are not simultaneously know-
able. P and P′ are assumed to have two possible values each. (a)
The region of state space enclosed by the dashed curve is the set of
object states for which both P and P′ are defined. When the tilted
line associated with P′ is rotated to the left, so that P and P′ become
‘more different’, the corresponding basis in the vector space is also
rotated, but only half the angle. We assume that the properties P and
P′ are fundamental so that the state space volumes at each side of
the horizontal line are equal, as well as the volumes at each side of
the tilted line. (b) This fact implies that v(P)j j′ = v
(P)
j′ j and v
(P)
j j = v
(P)
j′ j′ ,
making it possible to represent the property value spaces associated
with P and P′ as two orthonormal bases in a vector space.
If the property P is fundamental (Section VI D), Defini-
tion 10 implies that the property value spacesPO j of the ob-
ject property space P fulfil the relation V [POi]/V [PO] =
V [PO j]/V [PO] for any pair of indices (i, j). If property P′ is
also fundamental, then we may write
v[POi] = v[PO j]
v[P ′Oi′ ] = v[P
′
O j′ ]
(106)
for all pairs of indices (i, j) and (i′, j′) in terms of the relative
volume v[POi]≡V [POi]/V [PO].
Let us define the space POP ′O ⊆ SO as the set of exact
object states ZO for which both properties P and P′ are defined
for the object O. Clearly,POP ′O ⊆PO andPOP ′O ⊆P ′O.
Let v(P)j j′ = v[Σ j j′ ,POP
′
O], where Σ j j′ ⊆POP ′O is the region
inside which the value of P is p j and the value of P′ is p′j′ .
Explicitly,
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v(P)j j′ ≡
V [PO j ∩P ′O j′ ∩POP ′O]
V [POP ′O]
. (107)
Note that if P and P′ is not simultaneously knowable, this
region does not correspond to any realizable alternative; we
cannot have SOO ⊆ Σ j j′ .
In any case, Eq. [106] gives rise to the relations v(P)11 +
v(P)12 = v
(P)
21 + v
(P)
22 = v
(P)
11 + v
(P)
12 = v
(P)
12 + v
(P)
22 = 1/2 in the case
M = M′ = 2, which imply that
v(P)j j′ = v
(P)
j′ j
v(P)j j = v
(P)
j′ j′
(108)
for all pairs of indices ( j, j′), as illustrated in Fig. 33(a).
Equation [108] makes it possible to represent the two sets of
property value spaces {PO1,PO2} and {P ′O1,P ′O2} as two
orthonormal bases in one vector space, as illustrated in Fig.
33(b). These bases are specified by the following conditions.
〈P¯Oi,P¯O j〉 = δi j
〈P¯ ′Oi′ ,P¯ ′O j′〉 = δi′ j′
〈P¯O j,P¯ ′O j′〉 =
√
2v(P)j j′ exp(iθ j j′)
(109)
The relation between the inner product and the relative vol-
ume in the bottom row is chosen to conform with the follow-
ing defining rule for inner products in vector space represen-
tations.
Definition 19 (Inner products for overlapping object states)
If the elements v¯ and w¯ in a vector space H represent two
regions Σv ⊂SO and Σw ⊂SO such that V [Σv] =V [Σw], then
|〈v¯, w¯〉|2 =V [Σv∩Σw]/V [Σv].
The requirement V [Σv] =V [Σw] is necessary to make sense
of the representation of Σv and Σw as vectors or subspaces in
a vector space. This condition is fulfilled thanks to the rela-
tion [106], which in turn follows from the fact that P is as-
sumed to be fundamental. Looking at the list in Table V of
four principles that govern the construction of vector space
representation, we see that this definining rule conforms with
and generalizes principle 2, and does not contradict any other
princple.
We may look at the boundary between P ′O1 and P
′
O2 in
Fig. 33 as a line that is fixed at the centre ofPOP ′O and may
be rotated to alter the relative volumes v(P)j j′ . If the line is verti-
cal we have v(P)11 = v
(P)
12 = v
(P)
21 = v
(P)
22 . The corresponding basis
(P¯ ′O1,P¯
′
O2) is tilted 45
◦ in relation to the basis (P¯O1,P¯O2).
If the boundary line is horizontal the two properties P and
P′ are not independent and can be seen as two manifesta-
tions of the same property. We have v(P)11 = v
(P)
22 = 1/2 and
v(P)12 = v
(P)
21 = 0. The corresponding bases in vector space co-
incide. In general, if we rotate the boundary line in state space
between P ′O1 and P
′
O2 the angle φ , the corresponding basis
in vector space is rotated the angle φ/2.
The above abstract construction can be used in actual exper-
imental contexts C of type (c) in Table IV if we can choose two
bases {S¯P1, S¯P2} and {S¯P′1, S¯P′2} forHC with the same mutual
relation as that between {PO1,PO2} and {P ′O1,P ′O2}. This
is not self-evident, as the practical details of the experiment
can color the relative volumes that determine this relation so
that they deviate from {v(P)j j′ } (Fig. 33).
Regardless whether there is a vector space representation
of the desired kind, we can always formulate the formal alge-
braic representation
u¯CS¯C(n) = a1S¯P1+a2S¯P2
S¯C(n+m) = S¯P j
u¯CS¯C(n+m) = a j1S¯P′1+a j2S¯P′2,
(110)
where we have assumed in the second and third row that the
value p j of property P was observed at time n+m. We may
say that the context does not affect or color the relative vol-
umes if and only if
|a j j′ |2 = v(P)j j′ (111)
for each pair of indices ( j, j′), where v(P)j j′ is defined in Eq.
[107]. Such a context is illstrated in Fig. 34, and it may be
called neutral. If the probabilities for all the different out-
comes are defined in a neutral context we have
q(p j) = v
(P)
j1 + v
(P)
j2
q(p′j′ |p j) = 2v
(P)
j j′ ,
(112)
where q(p′j′ |p j) is the conditional probability to observe the
value p′j′ of property P
′ at time n+m′ given that the value p j
of property P was observed at time n+m.
If a context C of type (c) Table IV is neutral so that Eq.
[111] is fulfilled, and the underlying relative volumes v(P)j j′ de-
fined in Eq. 107 fulfil Eq. [108], then we can indeed represent
C of type (c) in a proper vector space HC. To do so we for-
mally identify
S¯P j = P¯O j
S¯P′ j′ = P¯ ′O j′ .
(113)
The two sets of vectors {S¯P j} and {S¯P′ j′} become two bases
that span the same vector spaceHC, and are related according
to Eq. [109], as illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 36(a).
However, the two bases {S¯P1, S¯P2} and {S¯P′1, S¯P′2} of HC
are not on equal footing since the order in which two proper-
ties P and P′ are observed is predefined within any experimen-
tal context C. We can restore the symmetry between the two
bases if we consider a reverse context C˘ in conjunction with
C, as shown in Fig. 35. In each such reverse context, the same
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FIG. 34: Illustration of a neutral context. a) The same joint property
space POP ′O as shown in Fig. 33, with two state space volumes
V (P)A and V
(P)
B that correspond to the relative volumes v
(P)
21 and v
(P)
22 ,
respectively. b) A context in which value p2 of P has been observed,
and in which we are about to observe P′ at time n+m′. The two
properties are not simultaneously knowable, just as in Fig. 24(b). In
a neutral context we have VA/VB = V
(P)
A /V
(P)
B , and correspondingly
if p1 would have been observed.
FIG. 35: A context C in which two properties P and P′ with two alter-
native values is observed, together with a reverse context C˘ in which
the order of observation is reversed. The contextual numbers ax and
the reverse numbers a˘x are not necessarily related in any particular
way.
set of properties {P,P′, . . . ,P(F)} as in C is observed, but in
reverse order. Also, the same sets of possible values for each
such property apply in both C and C˘.
We may next define the reciprocal context C˜ to C as the
reverse context for which
FIG. 36: Vector space representation of a context C with a recip-
rocal C˜ where two properties P and P′ that are not simultaneously
knowable are observed. a) In C, property P is observed first, and
{S¯P1, S¯P2} is therefore the primary basis. In C˜ property P′ is ob-
served first, and {S¯P′1, S¯P′2} beomes the primary basis. b) If we con-
sider C and C˜ together, we may identify S¯C = S¯C˜ and consider the
two bases to be interchangeable in the common vector space.
a˘ j = a1a1 j +a2a2 j
A˘ = A−1
(114)
for all j, where
A˘ ≡
(
a˘11 a˘12
a˘21 a˘22
)
, A ≡
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
. (115)
Such a choice of reciprocal context C˜ is chosen since it gives
rise to an evolution of S¯C˜(n) as if we set S¯C˜(n) = S¯C(n) in Eq.
[110], and make an algebraic change of basis from {S¯P1, S¯P2}
to {S¯P′1, S¯P′2}, using the fact that contextually we have S¯P j =
a j1S¯P′1 + a j2S¯P′2 according to Eq. [110]. The vector space
representation HC˜ is shown in the right panel of Fig. 36(a).
The reciprocal context clearly exists if and only if M = M′
At this stage we may introduce the common vector space
HCC˜ according to Fig. 36(b). Looking at a context C and its
reciprocal C˜ together in this way, we have restored the sym-
metry between the two bases. They are at equal footing in the
sense that we can express the initial contextual state at time
n in either basis. A change of basis in HCC˜ correponds to at
change of focus from C to C˜ or vice versa.
In this way we give epistemic meaning to the operation
in which we change basis in a quantum mechanical Hilbert
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FIG. 37: Representation of pairs of properties (P,P′) that are not
simultaneously knowable. a) A mutually defined pair of properties,
exemplified by the angular momenta (Jz,Jz′) of a given object along
two axes. b) A pair of independent properties, exemplified by the
position x and momentum px of a given object. Compare Fig. 33.
space. It is no longer seen as an abstract operation on a given
Hilbert space that is ‘out there’ in some transcendent sense,
but as an operation that corresponds to a change of focus to
a well-defined experimental context in which we reverse the
order in which two properties are observed.
Up until now we have discussed the case where M = M′ =
2. We argued that if the two properties P and P′ are funda-
mental, meaning that physical law allows exactly two possi-
ble values of each property, then Eq. [108] is fulfilled. These
are the relations that enable a vector space representation, the
skeleton of which is defined by Eq. [109].
What about other cases? Can we say anything more general
about the conditions for the existence of vector space repre-
sentations of contexts of type (c) in Table IV? First, we note
that in the case M = M′ = 2 it is a sufficient but not a nec-
essary condition that the two properties and the entire exper-
imental context C are fundamental. Second, we note that for
M = M′ > 2 this condition is no longer sufficient. Then Eq.
108] does not follow from Eq. [106]. Third, we recall the
necessary condition M = M′ for the existence of the recipro-
cal context C˜, ensuring that both sets of property value state
representations {S¯P j} and {S¯P′ j′} span HC, and that we can
change basis at will if we consider the common vector space
HCC˜.
Let us discuss two kinds of property pairs (P,P′) for which
we can have M = M′ > 2 and still be sure that a vector space
representation exists. We denote these two kinds of property
pairs mutually defined and independent, respectively.
As an example of a mutually defined property pair we may
consider the angular momenta (Jz,Jz′) of a given object, ob-
served along two axes e¯z and e¯z′ . The relation between these
properties are defined by the angle φzz′ between these two
axes. When we speak of the relation between two properties
in their own right, we are not allowed to refer to any partic-
ular experimental context containing objects that can be used
to define an external coordinate system in which we can as-
sign coordinates to the two axes. The only possible relation
between Jz and Jz′ is thus given by the angle φzz′ . An angle
has no direction, meaning that
φzz′ = φz′z. (116)
The permutation of the indices z and z′ has no epistemic mean-
ing if we consider the properties stripped from any context.
Therefore, in a symbolic representation where the permuta-
tion nevertheless makes a graphical difference, like the one
above, we must compensate for this redundancy in the repre-
sentation by invoking a symmetry relation like Eq. [116]. We
conclude immediately that for the property pair (Jz,Jz′) Eq.
[108] must be fulfilled because of such redundancies in the
representation. We can therefore represent (P,P′) in the joint
property spacePOP ′O, and also as two orthonormal bases in
a vector space, as shown in Fig. 37(a).
More generally, mutually defined property pairs can be de-
fined as two properties (P,P′) with a difference that is com-
pletely specified by one or several relational attributes or prop-
erties that lack direction, such as angles or spatial distances.
It follows that mutually defined property pairs must have the
same number M =M′ of possible values, since a difference in
this number defines a direction - from the property with the
smaller number of possible values to the one with the larger
number of values. In the same way we see that two properties
that are related according to a temporal difference cannot be
mutually defined, since time is directed (Definition 4).
As an example of an independent property pair (P,P′) we
can take the position and momentum of the same object.
There is no inherent relation between them at all, directed or
not, that allows the observation of a given position xi to make
it more probable to observe some momentum pxi′ along the
same x-axis rather than px j′ . This may be so in a particular ex-
perimental context, but not in the entire property spacePP ′.
This becomes even more clear if we consider the fact that the
numerical value of xi is just a matter of choice of a coordinate
system, which requires a context of external objects to define.
The same line of reasoning applies to pxi′ , since velocity is
also defined in relation to an external coordinate system. For
these reasons we must set v(P)ii′ = v
(P)
j j′ for all index pairs (i, i
′)
and ( j, j′) because we cannot define any quantity that relates
xi and pxi′ on which any difference could depend. Specifically
we see that Eq. [108] holds, so that a vector space representa-
tion is possible regardless the value of M = M′. The situation
is illustrated in Fig. 37(b).
More generally, we may say that a property pair (P,P′) is
independent if and only if there is no set of relational attributes
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that can be used to specify the difference between them. If
both P and P′ are fundamental, then we can be sure that v(P)ii′ =
v(P)j j′ for all index pairs (i, i
′) and ( j, j′), so that Eq. 108] holds
and a vector space representation exists such that
|〈P¯i,P¯ ′i′〉|2 = |〈P¯ j,P¯ ′j′〉|2. (117)
The reason why we add the condition that both properties
should be fundamental is that otherwise we could define one
observed property value to consist of two property values of
the corresponding fundamental property. Then the symmetry
between two property value spacesP j andP ′j′ could be bro-
ken, and we could motivate an assignment v(P)ii′ 6= v
(P)
j j′ .
This is not possible in the case of the property pair (xi, pxi′),
since we cannot exclude that both these properties are con-
tinuous. In such a case each property value pi that is ob-
served within a context corresponds to a bin of continuous
values within some interval ∆pi = [pi, pi + δ pi) which can-
not be excluded by an observation with limited resolution.
In other words, continuous properties are never fundamen-
tal within an experimental context C. We cannot count the
number of values in such a bin ∆pi, and therefore we cannot
compare the state space volumes V [∆pi] and V [∆p j] of two
such bins. Each element in one bin can be put into one-to-
one correspondence with each element in another bin. The
condition V [SOO(A,υ)] =V [SOO(A,υ ′)] in the specification
of the object state space volume (Definition 10) implies that
V [∆pi] = V [∆p j] because of this one-to-one correspondence.
Therefore v(P)ii′ = v
(P)
j j′ for all index pairs (i, i
′) and ( j, j′) when
properties P and P′ are continuous, just like in the case where
they are fundamental. Consequently, a vector space represen-
tation according to Eq. 117 can be constructed.
To exemplify the procedure, imagine that we have a double
slit towards which we shoot a specimen. There is a detector at
each slit. There are three alternative outcomes in this context.
The specimen may be detected at detector 1 or 2, or it may
not be detected at all. We may then discretize the positions
on the plane that is defined by the double slit screen into three
compartments: those points that define slit 1 may be called
∆x1, those that define slit 2 may be called ∆x2, and the set of all
other points are placed in the trashbin ∆x3. Then we may make
a three-dimensional vector space representation. We may also
combine the position measurement with a measurement of the
momentum, which we should then discretize into three bins to
enable a common vector space representationHC with DH =
M = M′ = 3.
The conclusion that V [∆pi] =V [∆p j] for a continuous prop-
erty P regardless the length of the intervals ∆pi and ∆p j cor-
responds to coordinate system independence. It is crucial that
the possibility to make vector space representations of dis-
cretized continuous properties is coordinate system indepen-
dent. Since the choice of coordinate system is arbitrary, basic
physical distinctions, such as that between contexts that can
be represented in vector spaces or not, should not depend on
such arbitrary choices. Furthermore, when we take relativity
into account, different subjects may assign different coordi-
nate values to parts of the same context. We have chosen to
build the algebraic representation upon the measure V [S] on
state space. We conclude that the coordinate independence of
this measure is essential.
It may seem counter-intuitive that the choice of bin widths
is irrelevant when we construct the vector space representa-
tion. Consider, for example, a context in which we observe
position and momentum in succession, and in which there are
just two alternative values for each property. This means that
the bins may be ‘very big’. Even more, we can make one of
the position bins, say x2, very wide compared to the other. Say
that we indeed find value x2 of the discretized position prop-
erty. Even so, the outcome of the momentum measurement is
completely undetermined, since the position and momentum
bases are tilted 45◦ in relation to one another regardless the
details of the discretization. One might think that the finding
of x2 correspond to such a wide interval ∆x2 that Heisenberg
would have allowed us to determine momentum well enough
to be sure whether we would find px1 or px2, corresponding to
the intervals ∆px1 and ∆px2, which may also be wide.
Recall, however, that the vector space representation is
only possible for neutral contexts, as defined by the condi-
tion [111]. It may be harder to obtain such neutrality if we
use a context with large bins. Recall also that the state that we
represent in vector space is the memoryless contextual state
SC of the specimen OS (Definition 18). Whenever OS is not
a quasiobject like an electron, we may have more knowledge
about its state than is encoded in SC. In other words, we may
have SOS ⊂ SC. That is, the vector space description does not
always represent all knowledge about a specimen. In partic-
ular, if the specimen is a directly perceived object like a ball,
we obviously can keep track of position xi and momentum pxi′
simultaneously if we choose large enough bins ∆xi and ∆pxi′ .
The discussion in this long section has been winding, so it
might be worthwhile to provide a brief overview. We have
been seeking a vector space representation that applies to as
many different type of experimental contexts C as possible,
and to as many different arrangements of contexts of a given
type as possible.
Contexts of type (a) in Table IV made it necessary to make
use of complex numbers ax in the algebraic representation
[65] and utilize Born’s law (Statement 4) to calculate prob-
abilities. The requirement of property independence (Defini-
tion 2) naturally gave rise to relations of the form [101] that
can be interpreted as inner products. Such relations were used
to construct a complex contextual vector spaceHC that fulfils
the four principles in Table V.
It was seen that contexts of types (a) and (b) in Table IV can
be always represented in this kind of vector space, as well as
contexts of type (c), under some mild conditions. First, con-
texts of type (c) have to be neutral; the practical setup should
not color the inherent relation between the observed proper-
ties P and P′, as expressed in Eq. [111]. Second, these two
properties should be either mutually defined or independent,
as exemplified in Fig. 37. Third, these two properties should
either be fundamental, meaning that all values that are allowed
by physical law can also be observed within context, or they
should be continuous. Fourth, there should be equally many
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values of P that can be observed within context as there are
values of P′.
Simple contexts in which just one property is observed can
trivially be represented in the desired kind of vector space,
and contexts of type (a), (b) and (c) can be combined to more
complex contexts which can also be represented in this way.
We see that the vector space representation is indeed quite
general.
Statement 5 (Representable experimental contexts C) An
experimental context C (Definition 17) can be represented
in a finite-dimensional complex vector space HC that fulfils
the principles in Table V, provided the following sufficient
conditions are met in the case when C involves pairs of
properties P and P′ which are not simultaneously knowable
(Fig. 24). All such pairs should have the same number of
observable values M = M′. Further, the context must be
neutral with regard to their observation, in the sense of Eq.
[111]. Also, the two properties P and P should be either
mutually defined or independent (Fig. 37). Finally, all such
property pairs should be either be fundamental, or be allowed
by physical law to take continuous values.
The statement that it is sufficient to consider finite-
dimensional contextual vector spaces HC follows from the
fact that the number M of observable values of any property
P is always finite within any experimental context C. This is
so since these values correspond to one element in a complete
set of future alternatives (Definition 14), and since the num-
ber of alternatives in such a set is always finite (Statement 2).
Further, in any context C we observe no more than a finite
number P,P′, . . . ,P(F) of properties. Therefore the dimension
DH of HC fulfils DH ≤M×M′× . . .×M(F), where we have
equality if all observed properties have knowability level 3
(Table II).
E. Properties and operators
We may ask whether there is a general way to represent
properties and their values in the vector space language. We
have discussed the subject to some extent in relation to the ob-
servation of properties that are not simultaneously knowable.
Here we continue that discussion.
A property transcends the object for which it is defined, as
well as the context in which it can be observed. Therefore we
should consider the entire property space P or PO, which
contain the states of all such objects and contexts. Also, we
should consider the set {p j} of all possible values of the prop-
erty allowed by physical law, not just the set of possible values
that are possible to see in a particular object observed in a par-
ticular context.
For simplicity, in the following discussion we use indices i
and j to distinguish different property values and correspond-
ing entities, even if we do not exclude the possiblity that they
form a continuous set. That is, we do not pressuppose that we
can count them according to {p j}= {p1, p2, p3, . . .}.
We can formally construct a vector space HP such that
each property value space PO j ⊂PO corresponds to a vec-
tor P¯O j such that 〈P¯Oi,P¯O j〉= δi j [Fig. 38(a)]. This vector
space is analogous to HC except for the fact that the coordi-
nates a j are not determined by any experimental context in
the case ofHP. In the vector space language, each property P
is uniquely specified by the complete basis {P¯O j} with asso-
ciated real numbers {p j}. Conversely, each such pair of sets
({P¯O j},{p j}) inHP defines at least one property P.
P↔

HP
{P¯O j}, a complete basis forHP
{p j}, p j ∈ R for all j
(118)
A linear operator is uniquely defined by its eigenvectors and
eigenvalues if the basis of eigenvectors is complete. Therefore
we can associate P with exactly one linear operator P¯ with
domain HP, with a complete basis of eigenvectors P¯O j, and
with real eigenvalues p j. Any such operator P¯ is necessarily
self-adjoint: 〈P¯v¯, w¯〉 = 〈v¯, P¯w¯〉 whenever v¯, w¯ ∈HP. Further-
more, the eigenvalues of P¯ are non-degenerate, since different
property values pi and p j are different by definition.
For any observational context C in which property P is ob-
served, we have SC ⊆PO. It would therefore be natural to
defineHC so thatHC ⊆HP. To relate the two vector spaces,
we define the action of P¯ on a vector S¯C ∈HC so that
SC ⊆PO j⇔ P¯S¯C ≡ p jS¯C. (119)
If the property value state fulfils SP j ⊆PO j, then we may
identify S¯P j = P¯O j since both quantities are defined as an
eigenspace of the same operator with the same eigenvalue.
Since {P¯O j} is a complete basis forHP we indeed getHC ⊆
HP, as desired.
The last statement is not necessarily true when more than
one property is observed within C. If two such properties P
and P′ are simultaneously knowable and have M and M′ pos-
sible values each, we argued in relation to Fig. 32 that we
should choose the dimension DHC = M×M′ of HC. Since
we have DHP = M, where DHP is the dimension of HP, we
see thatHC 6⊆HP.
In such a case we should compare HC with a formal vec-
tor spaceHPP′ , constructed from the common property space
POP
′
O. This space can be decomposed as POP ′O =⋃
j j′P j j′ , where each property value space P j j′ = PO j ∩
P ′O j′ corresponds to the pair of values (p j, p
′
j′) of the com-
bined property (P,P′). To each property value space P j j′
we associate a vector P¯ j j′ such that 〈P¯ii′ ,P¯ j j′〉 = δ(ii′),( j j′).
Then, in anaology with Eq. [119] we may say that
SC ⊆P j j′ ⇔
{
P¯S¯C ≡ p jS¯C
P¯′S¯C ≡ p j′ S¯C
, (120)
while Eq. [119] still holds true, of course, meaning that
SC ⊆PO j =
⋃
j′
P j j′ ⇔ P¯S¯C ≡ p jS¯C (121)
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FIG. 38: a) The property spacePO as a vector spaceHP spanned by
the eigenvectors P¯O j of property operator P¯. b) Relation between
the property space PO and the contextual state SC and the corre-
sponding relation between the vector spaces HP and HC. Three
cases are shown. Top panel: all possible property values can be ob-
served within context. Middle panel: Some property values cannot
be observed. Bottom panel: some future alternatives (S¯O2 in this ex-
ample) correspond to several property values - the resolution of the
observation is limited.
and
SC ⊆P ′O j′ =
⋃
j
P j j′ ⇔ P¯′S¯C ≡ p′j′ S¯C. (122)
At this stage we can identify S¯ j j′ = P¯ j j′ as orthonormal ba-
sis vectors in bothHC andHPP′ , and it makes sense to write
HC ⊆ HPP′ , since both vector spaces now have dimension
DHC = DHPP′ = M×M′. Here S¯ j j′ is the vector space repre-
sentation of the set defined in Eq. [73].
We argued in relation to Eq. [118] that the eigenvalues of
the self-adjoint operator P¯ are always non-degenerate when
we let it act on the elements of HP. This is no longer true
when we enlarge the domain of P¯ to the vector spaceHPP′ , as
illustrated by Eqs. [121] and [122]. The entire set of eigenvec-
tors {P¯ j j′} j′ is now associated with the same eigenvalue p j,
and the entire set of eigenvectors {P¯ j j′} j becomes associated
with the same eigenvalue p′j′ .
Figure 38(b) shows the relation between HC and HP in
three basic cases in which a single property P is observed
within the experimental context C. In the top panel C is fun-
damental, meaning that each value p j allowed by physical law
can also be observed within context. In that case we may write
HC =HP.
In the middle panel only two of the three values p j allowed
by physical law can be observed within C. The context is not
fundamental, and we getHC ⊂HP.
In the bottom panel the resolution of the observation of P
is limited within C. There is a future alternative ~SOk that cor-
responds to more than one of the property values p j allowed
by physical law. In such a case we may define a contextual
property PC in which some values corresponds to several val-
ues of the fundamental property P. In the present example we
have pC1 = p1 and pC2 = {p2, p3}. This situation occurs for
all properties which possibly are continuous, like position or
momentum, as discussed in the previous section. If
pCk = {p j, p j+1, . . . , p j+l} (123)
we set
S¯Pk = P¯O j⊕ P¯O( j+1)⊕ . . .⊕ P¯O( j+l), (124)
where we identify the unit vectors in HC and HP with the
subspaces they span. We getHC =HP.
In general we state that the number of possible values pCk
of a contextual property PC is always finite, even if physical
law allows an infinite number of values p j. Keeping Eq. [124]
in mind, this means that the dimension of HC can always be
considered to be finite, in contrast to that ofHP.
To make the notation less cluttered in the following, we
write P instead of PC when we speak about a contextual prop-
erty, and we write p j instead of pCk even though this contex-
tual value corresponds to several values of the corresponding
fundamental property, according to Eq. [123].
Statement 6 (Properties as self-adjoint operators) To each
contextual property P, which may or may not be fundamental,
there corresponds exactly one self-adjoint linear operator P¯
with domainHC, and with a finite complete set of eigenspaces
{P¯O j} = {S¯P j} that span HC, and a corresponding set of
non-degenerate eigenvalues {p j}. The number M of such non-
degenerate eigenvalues and eigenspaces filfils M =DHC if and
only if the experimental context C does not involve a pair of
simultaneously knowable properties P and P′. Otherwise M <
DHC. We have P¯v¯ = p j v¯ whenever v ∈ S¯P j. If value p j is
observed at time n+m, then SC(n+m) ⊆PO j and S¯C(n+
m) = P¯O j = S¯P j.
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Let us check that the operators P¯ fulfil the familiar com-
mutation rules. Consider a context in which two properties P
and P′ are observed in succession. If they are simultaneously
knowable we have SC(n+m′) = SP j ∩SP′ j′ = S j j′ at the time
n+m′ when we have just observed the value of P′, according
to Fig. 32. We have SP j ⊆PO j and SP′ j′ ⊆P ′O j′ . Accord-
ing to Eq. [119] this means that P¯SC(n+m′) = p jSC(n+m′)
and P¯′SC(n+m′) = p′j′SC(n+m
′), so that P¯P¯′S¯C(n+m′) =
P¯′P¯S¯C(n+m′) = p j p′j′ S¯C(n+m
′). This holds true for any fi-
nal contextual state. These final states are the same as those
called S j j′ in Fig. 32, and the corresponding subspaces S¯ j j′
can be identified with a complete basis forHC. Thus, for any
vector v¯ ∈HC we get
P¯P¯′v¯ = P¯′P¯v¯. (125)
The situation is different if P and P′ are not simultaneously
knowable. Then SC(n+m′) = SP′ j′ . We have P¯P¯′S¯C(n+m′) =
p′j′ P¯S¯C(n+m
′), but P¯S¯C(n+m′) 6= p jS¯C(n+m′) for all j, as
implied by Eq. [119] and Fig. 24. Therefore we cannot arrive
at the conclusion that P¯P¯′S¯C(n+m′) = P¯′P¯S¯C(n+m′) in the
same way as before.
We could nevertheless try to use the same kind of basis
{S¯ j j′} forHC as in the case when P and P′ are simultaneously
knowable. Then we could try to apply P¯ to S¯C(n+m′) written
as a linear combination of these basis vectors. We would get
the same commutation relation [125] as for simultaneously
knowable properties.
Why do we not accept this approach? The reason is that the
corresponding sets Σ j j′ ≡ SP j∩SP′ j′ in state space do not cor-
respond to realizable future alternatives (Definition 13) like
the sets S j j′ do in Fig. 32(a). Referring again to Fig. 24,
we understand that SC can never be squeezed into any of the
individual compartments S j j′ in Fig. 32(a). The principle of
explicit epistemic minimalism implies that we would get an
incorrect physical theory if we tried to operate on enitites that
are not knowable. The same argument was used to infer that
the evolution operator u1 or uO1 cannot be applied to exact
states Z or ZO. In fact the domainDP¯ of each contextual prop-
erty operator P¯ must be the same as that of u¯C, which acts on
all contextual state representations S¯C. That is,
DP¯ =Du¯C =HC. (126)
For this reason it does not help to write S¯C(n+m′) as a linear
combination of vectors Σ¯ j j′ , since we cannot apply P¯ to the
outcome. We have P¯S¯C(n+m′) = P¯SP′ j′ , but we cannot write
P¯S¯P′ j′ = P¯
⋃
j Σ¯ j j′ =
⋃
j P¯Σ¯ j j′ even though SP′ j′ =
⋃
j Σ j j′ ,
since Σ¯ j j′ is not an element of HC when P and P′ are not
simultaneously knowable.
These considerations block the road for any attempt to de-
rive the result that P¯ and P¯′ commute when P and P′ are not
simultaneously knowable. As we discussed above, in this
case we should choose a Hilbert space HC with dimension
M =M′, rather than M×M′. This reduction of dimensionality
means thatHC will be spanned by two ‘competing’ orthogo-
nal bases, one associated with P and one with P′, as explained
FIG. 39: In a context C, described by the object state SOO, in which
property P is observed with possible values {p j}, we may define a
vector spaceHC with basis {S¯P j}. We may define another orthonor-
mal basis {v¯ j′} in HC. Such a basis can always be associated with
another property P′, where we can identify {v¯ j′} = S¯P′ j′ in another
context C′ in which P′ is observed after P. This context C′ is de-
scribed by the state SO′O′ . Compare Figs. 33 and 36.
in connection with Fig. 33, rather than a combined basis that
spans a larger space. Since the two competing bases are not
orthogonal to each other, we immediately see that the corre-
sponding two operators cannot commute.
Statement 7 (Commutation rules for property operators)
Assume that we have a context C in which two contextual
properties P and P′ are observed in succession. Then the pair
of operators P¯ and P¯′ defined according to Statement 6 fulfil
the following commutation rules: [P¯, P¯′] ≡ 0¯ if P and P′ are
simultaneously knowable, and [P¯, P¯′] 6≡ 0¯ if they are not.
Here 0¯ is the zero operator that maps any vector to the ori-
gin.
The direction of the reasoning behind Statement 6 can be
reversed - just like a contextual property corresponds to a self-
adjoint operator in HC, a self-adjoint operator in HC corre-
sponds to a contextual property.
Statement 8 (Self-adjoint operators as properties)
Consider a context C in which P is the last contextual
property to be observed. To each linear, self-adjoint operator
P¯′ that acts upon any vector v¯ ∈HC and has a complete set
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of DH orthonormal eigenvectors P¯ ′O j with non-degenerate
eigenvalues, there corresponds at least one contextual prop-
erty P′ with DHC possible values in the following sense: there
exists another context C′ that is the same as C except that
another property P′ is observed after P, and this property
corresponds to the operator P¯′, in the sense expressed in
Statement 6. P′ and P are not simultaneously knowable
whenever P¯′ 6= P¯.
To see why this statement is reasonable, consider Fig. 39.
In the top panel we show the state space and the vector space
representation in HC of the original context C. Choose an
arbitrary self-adjoint operator P¯′ that acts inHC. It will have
a set of orthogonal eigenvectors {v¯ j′} that spans HC (middle
panel, right). To define the operator uniquely, we also have to
fix a set of eigenvalues {ε j′}. We may write
P¯′↔
{
{v¯ j′}
{ε j′}
(127)
To interpret the basis {v¯ j′} as the vector space representa-
tion of the property value spaces P ′O j′ of another contextual
property P′, we have to make a partition of a presumed joint
property spacePOP ′O that conforms with such an interpreta-
tion. To this end we choose
POP
′
O = PO∩
(⋃
j′P
′
O j′
)
P ′Oi′ ∩P ′O j′ = ∅,
(128)
with
v[P ′Oi′ ] = v[P
′
O j′ ]
v(P)j j′ = |〈P¯O j, v¯ j′〉|2/2,
(129)
for all triplets of indices ( j, i′, j′), where the involved relative
volumes are defined in Eqs. [106] and [107]. The inner prod-
uct is chosen to conform with the third row of Eq. [109].
It is clear that sets P ′O j′ ⊂SO of the desired kind always
exist, but they may not be uniquely determined by the opera-
tor P¯′ and its eigenvectors {v¯ j′}. The set of relative volumes
{v(P)j j′ } does not uniquely determine {P ′O j′}. The bound-
aries ∂P ′O j′ may wiggle around some mean position without
changing the relative volumes.
As a last step, we have to assign values p′j′ to the new con-
textual property P′. Since the property value spacesP ′O j′ are
disjoint by construction, they correspond to states of the ob-
served object O that are subjectively distinguishable. As such,
they can be encoded by any set of values {p′j′}, provided all
of them are different. We may set p′j′ = ε j′ without loss of
generality, since this is just a matter of choosing a coordinate
system for the new property P′.
F. State reduction by epistemic consistency
We have tried to argue that quantum mechanics arises as
the only algebraic representation that applies to most exper-
imental contexts C (Defintion 17) and respects the guiding
principles for physical law discussed in Section IV. But can
all scientific experiments be described as such a context C, or
is the definition too strict?
We required that all properties P,P′, . . . ,P(F) that are in-
volved in C have knowability level 1 or 3 according to Table II.
However, it is indeed possible to construct well-defined exper-
iments in which it is not known at the start of the experiment
at time n whether one of the predefined values {p} of some
property P 6= P(F) will ever become known or not, meaning
that it has knowability level 2.
A state reduction uO1SOO(n + m− 1) → SOO(n + m) ⊂
uO1SOO(n+m− 1) occurs in a context C if and only if such
a value p becomes potentially known to some subject at time
n+m. We may call such an event a state reduction by obser-
vation. If we allow properties P at the contingent knowability
level 2, it is necessary to introduce another kind of state re-
duction, which we may call state reduction by epistemic con-
sistency.
Imagine a double-slit experiment where the source emits
two (entangled) particles in opposite directions, as illustrated
in Fig. 40. Property P represents the slit one of the parti-
cles passes. Property P′ is the position on the detector screen
behind the slits that is hit by the same particle.
Suppose first that the other particle is deflected backwards
into a detector [Fig. 40(a)]. There is one detector for each slit,
so that detection of this twin particle determines which slit
the original particle passed. The two detectors may be placed
far away, so that the twin particle reaches them at a moment
in time n+m′′ a long time after the original particle hits the
screen at time n+m′. Until time n+m′′, the detectors can
be turned on and off at will. Therefore the alternatives SO1
and SO2 corresponding to property values p1 or p2 may have
knowability level 2 during the entire course of the experiment.
We may write SOO(n′) = ~SO1(n′)∪~SO2(n′) for n′ ≥ n. If
there would be no state reduction uO1SOO(n′) → SOO(n′ +
1) = ~SO j(n′+1) ⊂ uO1SOO(n′) at some time n′+1 < n+m′,
then an interference pattern would appear at the screen (if
the experiment were repeated many times). However, if we
choose to gain path knowledge afterwards, at time n+m′′,
then this knowledge would refer backwards to the time n+m
at which the particle passed the slit, and this knowledge
would contradict the appearance of the interference pattern.
Therefore a state reduction must occur no later than at time
n+m′− 1 to preserve epistemic consistency in the sense ex-
pressed in Fig. 16 in Section IV E. Note that the mere risk of
inconsistency is enough to trigger a state reduction.
In contrast, if it is known a priori a the start of the ex-
periment at time n that path knowledge is erased before time
n+m′, then there is no risk of inconsistency. Such an eraser
is represented in Fig. 40(b) as a cloud in which the twin parti-
cle disappears before the original particle passes through one
of the slits. The alternatives corresponding to property values
p1 or p2 are degraded from knwability level 2 to knowability
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FIG. 40: Gedankenexperiment to illustrate state reduction by epis-
temic consistency. The source emits two particles in opposite direc-
tions at time n. One of these particles passes a slit at time n+m.
Property P is the slit that particle passes. Property P′ is the position
at the screen hit at time n+m′ by the same particle. a) If there are
two detectors that can detect the backward-moving twin particle at
a still later time n+m′′, there may or may not appear path knowl-
edge depending on whether the detectors are turned on or off. This
may not be decided until after time n+m′. The state reduces at time
n+m′−1 in either case to preserve epistemic consistency. b) If path
information is erased in a ‘cloud’, the values of P are degraded to
knowability level 1 at time n, and there is no state reduction at time
n+m′−1. The cloud has to be close enough, so that information is
erased before the particle hits the screen.
level 1.
However, if the eraser is successively moved away, the pos-
sibility to gain path path knowledge finally survives after time
n+m′, and we are back in a situation where Nature has to
choose path no later than at time n+m′−1 to make sure that
no contradiction will occur. Nature is about to paint itself into
a logical corner, so to say, and must jump out of it to preserve
epistemic consistency.
We conclude that if we allow the algebraic representation
S¯C of the contextual state to ‘collapse’ from S¯C(n+m′−2) =
a1S¯P1+a2S¯P2+ . . . to S¯C(n+m′−1) = S¯P j in order to uphold
epistemic consistency, just as S¯C collapses according to Eqs.
[70] and [71] as a result of an observation, then quantum me-
chanics can indeed be used to represent a more general kind
of experiment that involves properties at knowability level 2.
IX. DISCUSSION
A. A bird’s eye perspective
The aim of this study has been to use epistemic principles
and concepts to construct the formalism of quantum mechan-
ics (QM). We have tried to loosen the feathers, to make the
discussion as general and abstract as possible without making
it empty.
The fact that it seems to be possible to motivate QM from
such a general epistemic discussion conforms with the fact
that QM is the general framework which gives form to all
modern physical theories. In this sense, QM can be seen as
a metaphysical theory. From that perspective, it calls for a
general philosophical motivation of the kind suggested here.
As an example of the generality of the present approach,
we do not even address the question whether space-time or
other attributes are fundamentally continuous or discrete. In-
stead, we use only the more primitive notions of ordered and
directed attributes. Nonetheless, the approach does suggest
that it is always sufficient to consider finite-dimensional quan-
tum mechanical Hilbert spaces, since the number of alterna-
tive values of an attribute or property that can be detected in
an experimental context is always finite.
This unconventional conclusion is enabled by the viewpoint
that Hilbert space is not the fundamental physical state space.
Rather, it can be defined on top of the epistemic state spaceS
in certain well-defined experimental contexts, as summarized
in Statement 5. In such contexts, QM can be seen as an al-
gebraic representation of the relations between the events that
occur during the course of the experiment. As such, it ap-
plies only to the specimen that is studied in the experiment,
never to the entire world. From this perspective, the concep-
tual troubles we run into when we try to apply QM to the entire
universe arise because we try to apply a formalism outside its
domain of validity.
Probability and probability amplitudes are central to QM.
The strict epistemic approach adopted here means, however,
that the probability for an event is not always defined, just
like the Hilbert space is not always defined. Nevertheless,
the underlying epistemic state spaceS resembles the sample
space Ω in probability theory in several respects. A physical
state S is defined as a subset ofS just like an event is defined
as a subset of Ω. Also, we define a measure V on S just like
a probability measure is defined on Ω.
However, since we want the same state spaceS to describe
all physical situations we need to make it more general than
Ω, provide a deeper interpretation, and give it more structure.
For example, we need to define carefully the evolution in time
of the state S.
The shift of perspective offered in this paper can thus be
described as follows. We downgrade the Hilbert space so
that it is no longer seen as a fundamental physical state space.
Rather, we define different Hilbert spaces in different experi-
mental contexts. Each of them applies in its own setting, but
nowhere else. In contrast, we upgrade and develop the sample
space, so that can now be regarded as the fundamental physi-
cal state space. Traditionally, the sample space is only defined
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in certain probabilistic experiments, and we define different
sample spaces for different such experiments.
In this paper we have not tried to derive differential evo-
lution equations analogous to the Shro¨dinger equation. That
requires a more elaborate treatment of time than that provided
here. This will be the subject of an upcoming paper. A pre-
liminary account of the matter can be found in Ref. [20]. We
will argue that such evolution equations involving a continu-
ous wave function are useful even though we have argued in
this paper that a finite-dimensional Hilbert space is sufficient
to describe any given experimental context.
B. A comparison to other points of view
In this final section we try to position the present approach
to QM among the wealth of approaches currently pursued
within the field of quantum foundations. There are similar-
ities to some of them, and differences to all.
Interpretations of the wave function are often classified as
either ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic. The former class of interpre-
tation attach an element of objective reality to the wave func-
tion ψ , meaning that it represents a physical entity that does
not presuppose a relation to an observer. Such a relation is
supposed in the latter class of interpretations, where the wave
function represents a state of knowledge.
In the former class we find, for example, the many worlds
interpretation [8, 9] and the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave the-
ory [25]. Theories in which the wave function collapse is con-
sidered to be an objective physical process do also belong to
this class [4, 5]. A recent ψ-ontic theory is suggested by Gao,
who argues that the wave function reflects the random, dis-
continuous motion of particles [26].
The perspective put forward in this paper is ψ-epistemic, of
course. However, we have to distinguish between two types
of such interpretations. In the first type the knowledge rep-
resented by the wave function is incomplete in the sense that
there is an underlying physical state that represents objective
reality. This state is specified by the precise values of a set of
hidden variables. These values cannot be extracted from the
wave function itself. This was the viewpoint of Einstein [27].
After Einstein’s death, a series of theorems have been
proven that rule out the more natural theories with hidden vari-
ables that conform with the predictions of QM. Bell’s theo-
rem excludes local hidden variables [28, 29], and the Kochen-
Specker theorem rules out non-contextual hidden variables
[30] that belong to the objects themselves, regardless the de-
vice used to observe them. More recently, Pusey, Barrett and
Rudolph ruled out ψ-epistemic models with hidden variables
in which the states of two systems that are described as inde-
pendent by QM are truly independent [31]. In other words,
a ψ-epistemic model with hidden variables must be such that
even if we manage to prepare two systems independently to
the best of our knowledge, the hidden variables that specify
the underlying physical states of these two systems are nev-
ertheless not independent [32]. A comprehensive review of
restrictive theorems of this kind is provided by Leifer [33].
Despite the obstacles presented by these no-go theorems
when it comes to the construction of simple and natural ψ-
epistemic models with hidden variables, some researchers,
such as Matt Leifer and Robert Spekkens, regard them as the
most promising path towards an understanding of the meaning
of QM. Spekkens has constructed a toy model that restricts the
amount of knowledge an observer can have about reality [34].
This model reproduces several characteristic features of QM,
and Spekkens argues that this fact together with the simplicity
of the model is a sign that points in the ψ-epistemic direction.
Leifer and Spekkens find it striking that QM can be seen as
a certain kind of generalization of classical probability theory
[35], a circumstance that also points in the epistemic direc-
tion. The same goes for the fact that several reconstructions
of QM from probabilistic or information-theoretic principles
have been successfully carried out in recent years [12–16, 36].
The assumption that there are hidden variables is not es-
sential in all of these ψ-epistemic models or reconstructions.
The wave of information-theoretic approaches to QM can be
traced back to John Wheeler’s ideas, summarized in his phrase
”it from bit” [37]. Wheeler was quite explicit that he associ-
ated this phrase with a ”participatory universe” in which the
subjective act of observation is crucial: ”Physics gives rise
to observer-participancy; observer-participancy gives rise to
information; and information gives rise to physics.” This self-
referential loop is very similar to the view advocated in the
present approach, as illustrated in Fig. 1. If this view is in-
deed true, there is no observer-independent underlying layer
of physical reality, the state of which has to be described by a
set of hidden variables. Anton Zeilinger adheres to a similar
view in his attempt to implement Wheeler’s ideas [19, 38]. So
do the adherents of the Qbist interpretation [18]. Of course,
Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and several other pioneers of QM
also rejected the notion of an observer-independent layer of
physical reality in their Copenhagen interpretation. In mod-
ern language, they advocated the second type of ψ-epistemic
model, where the knowledge represented in the wave function
is complete in the sense that no additional hidden variables are
needed to specify the fundamental physical state. The present
approach belongs to this tradition.
To throw away the hidden variables is a relief since we can
forget about all the previously mentioned no-go theorems. To
avoid them, we do not have to choose among more or less far-
fetched ψ-epistemic models, if we still aim at a theory that
conforms with QM. Why are several researchers that promote
ψ-epistemic models unwilling to take this step? First and
foremost they seem to consider realism too precious to aban-
don, and therefore cling to this metaphysical idea as a tem-
plate for scientific models. In addition, Spekkens argues that
a proper scientific explanation of statistical correlations be-
tween two perceived events require a causal relation between
them, or a common cause [39, 40]. Such well-defined causal
relations are not provided by QM itself [35].
Let me relate the present approach to QM to some of the
concepts and ideas discussed above, and do so in more detail
than just to say that it arrives at a ψ-epistemic model of the
second type, without any hidden variables. We have tried to
reconstruct the basic formalism of QM from a set of epistemic
principles. Therefore the approach follows in the footsteps of
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other recent reconstructions of QM [12–16, 36]. The present
attempt is more ambitious in the sense that the assumed prin-
ciples are chosen to be so general that they, as I see it, have
power to shed new light not only on the structure of QM, but
also on other aspects of physical law [20].
I agree with those researchers who stress that any proper in-
terpretation of QM must have a well-defined ontology. How-
ever, I disagree with the idea that such an ontology must con-
tain observer-independent objects, which motivate the intro-
duction of hidden variables. Very generally, we might say
that the ontological content of a physical theory corresponds
to those aspects of that theory that transcend the contents of
subjective perceptions and cannot be manipulated at will. In
the present epistemic approach we have to assume a distinc-
tion between true and false interpretations of perceptions, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. Knowledge and belief are not the same
thing. The assumed existence of truth is therefore part of the
ontology. This also goes for the structure of truth, or the struc-
ture of knowledge. For example, we assume the possibility to
divide perceptions into objects and to arrange them hierarchi-
cally so that some objects may be part of another object as
subsets. These forms of perception are given once and for all
and are therefore also part of the ontology. The same goes
for physical law. Also, we assume the existence of potential
knowledge that transcends the knowledge we happen to be
consciously aware of at a given moment. We also assume that
there is collective knowledge that transcends our own personal
knowledge. The existence of collective knowledge reflects
the assumed existence of several observers, meaning that the
present approach is not solipsistic. We may say that we assign
objective existence to a set of subjects rather than to a set of
objects.
There is a subtlety to be noted in this connection. The world
view sketched in Fig. 1 presumes the ability to distinguish
objects in our own body from external objects. However, both
kinds of objects lose their meaning if they are not perceived
by anyone. That is, we do not consider external objects to be
the same thing as observer-independent objects.
Some would say that the above set of ontological ‘beables’
in the present approach contains mystical elements. But every
physical theory must contain elements of the world that enter
the construction as assumptions, just as a formal mathemat-
ical system must contain axioms. Any such set of elements
must be considered ‘mystical’ in the sense that they cannot be
explained within the theory in terms of other, more primitive
elements. All we can do to minimize the amount of mysticism
in our world view is to look for a set of assumptions that is as
small as possible and account for as much as possible of the
structure and behavior of the physical world.
Such a set of assumptions can obviously be too small. The
wave of informational approaches to physics explores the idea
that the bit or the qubit is the only necessary fundamental
building block of the world. It is true that virtually all the
knowledge about the world that we receive via our senses can
be encoded as strings of bits, but it does not follow that the
perceived world can be described as a collection of bits. It is
true that the simplest quantum mechanical systems have two
possible states, and therefore may be called qubits. But it does
not follow that all other quantum mechanical systems can de-
scribed as collections of qubits.
If that would indeed be the case, then the world would cor-
respond to a structureless heap of bits or qubits. To assume
spatial or other relations between these binary units would be
the same as to introduce additional structure of the world ex-
ternal to the binary units themselves, admitting that this de-
scription is too narrow. If we insist that everything can never-
theless be described in terms of binary units we might want to
encode this additional structure in terms of an additional set
of binary units. But then we must mark the members of this
additional set in a particular way to avoid that they are thrown
into the structureless heap of binary units that we started out
with. Such markings would correspond to a key to the code
that is again external to the binary units themselves. We may
want to encode this key with still another set of binary units,
but we see that we end up in infinite regress if we continue
along this road.
The crucial mistake is to conflate the concepts of encod-
ing and description. An encoding presupposes three distinct
proper subsets of the world: the object to be encoded, the code
and the key. Therefore it is misguided to describe the world as
a whole as a code made up of binary units. It would amount to
a description of the structure of the world in terms of a proper
subset of its own structure. To take a trivial example, if we
are given just a heap of bits, it is impossible to account for the
fundamental distinction between different binary attributes of
the same object and binary attributes of different objects.
The exclusion of the subjective aspect of the world in clas-
sical physics can be seen as a mistake of the same kind. (This
amounts to an exclusion of the lower half of Fig. 1). If the de-
scription of the world in terms of a physical model contains
observed objects but no observers, then it becomes impos-
sible to account for the appearance of conscious awareness
within the model. This is often called the ‘hard problem of
consciousness’ [23], but I would rather call it a consequence
of a misguided attempt to describe all fundamental aspects of
the world in terms of just one of these aspects.
In the present approach we try instead to identify all fun-
damental aspects or ‘degrees of freedom’ of the world and
include them explicitly in the physical model. This goes for
the vertical degree of freedom in Fig. 1 where the objective
and subjective aspects corresponds to its binary values. Also,
it goes for the treatment of attributes and attribute values in
Section III E, where we do not try to squeeze them all into
a binary paradigm, but allow attributes with any number of
discrete values, as well as attributes with continuous values.
Another difference between the present epistemic recon-
struction of QM and epistemic reconstructions within the in-
formational paradigm is that the present attempt aims at the
postulates of QM formulated in terms of state vectors in
Hilbert space, whereas other reconstructions often aim at the
formulation of QM in terms of density operators [36]. In
this connection, I agree with Roger Penrose [1] that it is mis-
leading to focus on density operators in discussions about the
foundations of QM. They should be seen exclusively as an el-
egant practical tool to do calculations in the case the quantum
state is not exactly known to the experimenter.
53
Density operators mix classical and quantum probabilities
in a way that is impossible to decompose without additional
information external to the density operator itself. Many dif-
ferent ensembles of state vectors are represented by the same
density operator. This may cause confusion in foundational
discussions. For example, given a diagonal density matrix, it
is impossible to tell whether it corresponds to a state of deco-
herence or de-superposition. This makes it possible to argue
erroneously that decoherence solves the measurement prob-
lem, since de-superposition corresponds to the collapse of the
wave function. As I see it, the fact that the transition from
state vectors to density operators is not one-to-one means that
a reconstruction that arrives at the correct rules that govern
density operators has not gone all the way to a reconstruction
of the fundamental formulation of QM in terms of state vec-
tors.
In the language used in the present study, a description of
an experimental context in terms of a density operator corre-
sponds to the best possible description given the aware knowl-
edge AK of the experimenter, whereas the description in terms
of a state vector corresponds to a description given all the po-
tential knowledge PK (Fig. 7). Most often the aware knowl-
edge is smaller than the potential knowledge, meaning that the
experimenter cannot pinpoint the state vector that describes
the context precisely. Instead, there will be an ensemble of
state vectors that cannot be excluded. If her aware knowledge
allows it, the experimenter may assign a classical probability
to each member of this ensemble and define the density opera-
tor. However, we have argued that the only well-defined state
of knowledge that every observer may agree upon is the col-
lective potential knowledge PK. To arrive at an epistemic ap-
proach to physics in which the physical state S is well-defined
and associated with the world as a whole rather than the fuzzy
knowledge of any particular observer, we must let it corre-
spond to PK rather than AK. The aware knowledge AK and
the associated density operator becomes secondary.
Similar considerations apply to to the treatment of proba-
bility in the present approach. Probabilities do not exist in all
physical states S, but when they do, they are considered to be
well-defined quantities associated with the state of the world
as a whole, but applying to a particular object, being a func-
tional of its state. More precisely, a probability is defined as
a measure on a future alternative, which is a subset ~SO j of
the physical state SOO of an experimental context C, defined
at the start of the experiment (Section VII). As such it tran-
scends the beliefs and the personal knowledge of individual
experimenters and acquire a certain objectivity. All observers
who make proper interpretations of their perceptions of the
experimental setup at the start of the experiment, and are in a
position to perceive all relevant parts of it, must also agree on
the probability of a certain outcome.
This view is very different from that in quantum Bayesian-
ism or qbism [18]. This interpretation of QM corresponds to
a ψ-epistemic model without hidden variables, just like the
present approach. However, the qbists adhere to the Bayesian
view that all probabilities reflect personal beliefs. When an in-
dividual observer makes a measurement the new information
makes it possible for her to update her beliefs, corresponding
to an update from a prior to a posterior probability. As far as
I understand, this persepctive makes no clear distinction be-
tween proper and improper beliefs, so that different observers
may assign different probabilities to the same experimental
outcome, in which case they assign different quantum states
to the same experimental setup. Therefore it seems to me that
the statement that two observers look at the same object be-
comes ill-defined, just like the statement that they live in the
same world.
Apart from giving them a more objective role, the present
approach to probability differs from that of qbism in another
respect. In the present construction it is not possible to define
any posterior probabilities at all after the final measurement
in the experimental context C. The Bayesian approach breaks
down. At that stage there is no longer any wave function,
and no probabilities. (The experimenter may of course de-
sign another experimental context C′ at a later time, but the
probabilities associated with C′ has no direct relation to those
associated with C.)
The physical state S that corresponds to the state of collec-
tive potential knowledge PK is still defined after the disap-
pearance of the wave function. Since we need this more ba-
sic layer of physical description, we may borrow a term from
those who promote ψ-epistemic models with hidden variables
and say that QM is considered incomplete in the present ap-
proach, in contrast to the Copenhagen and the qbist interpre-
tations. However, it is not considered incomplete in the sense
that the wave function cannot describe all relevant aspects of
the physical state, but rather in the sense that it cannot describe
the physical state in all situations.
The introduction of the state S and the state space S as
a more basic layer of physical description than the wave
function might nevertheless please those ψ-epistemicists like
Robert Spekkens who sense the need for a clearer concept of
causality than that provided by conventional QM [39, 40]. The
physical state S(n) at sequential time n always has a boundary
∂S(n), meaning that S(n)⊂S for each n, and the same goes
for the evolved state u1S(n). This means that given the present
state we can always exclude some future states as incompat-
ible with physical law. This circumstance is reflected in the
strict implication S(n)⇒{S(n+1)∩ [S \u1S(n)] =∅}, and
may be called ‘negative causality’. If I grab a trumpet and
start blowing, it will not remain silent. Of course, such a clear
causal implication may occur in conventional QM as well, and
corresponds to a situation in which the wave function has lim-
ited support, whose boundary changes with time. However,
the connection to causality in such situations is rarely spelled
out, and wave functions with unlimited support are seemingly
treated as the typical case.
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